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ABSTRACT
Vigilance, or sustained attention, is the capacity to attend to information for a prolonged period
of time (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Jerison, 1970; Warm, 1977). Due to limitations of the
human nervous system, as well as the environmental context, attention can begin to wane over
time. This results in a phenomenon referred to as the vigilance decrement, or a decline in
vigilance performance as a function of time. The vigilance decrement can manifest as poorer
attention and is thusly associated with poor performance, which is defined behaviorally as more
lapses in the detection of critical signals and an increase in response time to these signals during
watch. Given this, the present dissertation seeks to systematically examine the impact of two
types of motivation (i.e., achievement motivation, autonomous motivation) on vigilance
performance across four experiments. The present experiments manipulate information
processing type, source complexity, and motivational task demands. Three hundred and ninetyeight participants completed either a cognitive task or sensory task, which were psychophysically
equated in previous studies (Szalma & Teo, 2012; Teo, Szalma, & Schmidt, 2011), with or
without motivational instructions, and with either low, medium, or high source complexity.
Performance measures, perceived stress and workload, and changes to state motivation and
engagement at pre-task and post-task are interpreted across three theories of information
processing: resource-depletion theory, mind-wandering theory, and mindlessness theory. The
results of each of the four studies are discussed in terms of overall support for the resourcedepletionist account. The limitations of the present set of experiments and the future directions
for research on motivation and sustained attention are also discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Motivation is an important, but often neglected, factor in human-technology interaction
(Szalma, 2009, 2014). It is particularly important in the context of monitoring tasks, which are
associated with performance decrements and are often unpleasant experiences for the human
operator (Hancock, 2013; Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008). Early research at the
intersection of motivation (Lucaccini, Freedy, & Lyman, 1968; Montague & Webber, 1965) and
vigilance is being reexamined for several reasons. First and foremost, initial studies of vigilance
did not examine the role of motivation on perceived stress and workload scores, which are
integral to the perception of monotony or boredom associated with vigilance tasks. Second, the
effects of state motivation and trait motivation have not been examined together as factors that
may covary with vigilance performance, perceived stress, or perceived workload. However,
recent pilot work has suggested that both state and trait motivation may be important in vigilance
performance (Dewar, Fraulini, Claypoole, & Szalma, 2016) and perceptions of stress and
workload that are associated with the vigilance task (Dewar & Szalma, 2016). Furthermore, in
early research, motivation tended to be presumed, rather than measured (Karwowski & Cuevas,
2003), which is problematic given that motivation toward vigilance tasks is not a stable trait
across individuals (Fishbein et al., 2006). This trend is not unique as there is a “tradition” of
attributing performance, stress, and workload to external factors in the environment, rather than
internal individual difference factors (Matthews, 2016, pg. 801).
The presumption of a motivated operator dates to the origins of vigilance research.
Mackworth (1948, 1950) assumed his participants were highly skilled and motivated observers.
These assumptions could very well be correct, given Mackworth’s samples consisted of Royal
Air Force operators who monitored radar that aided in threat detection (albeit with limited

1

success) in World War II. The importance of the Clock Test was clearly conveyed to
Mackworth’s participants, but performance on the task still continued to decline despite assumed
motivation. The current set of four studies seeks to rectify this performance discrepancy by
measuring achievement and autonomous motivation across several types of tasks.
The present research for this dissertation is seeks to address the gap in the literature on
motivation and vigilances. As well, the effects of individual differences in trait and state
motivation on vigilance performance have not been reexamined for nearly fifty years (Lucaccini
et al., 1968; Montague & Webber, 1965; for exceptions see Bonnefond, Doignon-Camus, Hoeft,
& Dufour, 2011; Slade & Rush, 1991). Therefore, in four following experiments motivation
effects are examined as both an important individual trait (i.e., achievement motivation) or state
(i.e., autonomous motivation) that impacts performance, perceived engagement, perceived stress,
and perceived workload in various vigilance paradigms, as well as an instruction manipulation
that can effect task perception. The present dissertation seeks to apply recent research on
autonomous motivation (a facet of intrinsic motivation) and achievement motivation (a desire to
perform successfully) to the study of vigilance given the myriad of benefits associated with each
of these types of motivation.
First, a review of the literatures on vigilance and motivation is presented. Following this,
the present plan of study for this dissertation is outlined across four experiments. Reports of task
engagement and task motivation, perceived stress and perceived workload, and performance
outcomes are interpreted across three theories of information processing: resource-depletion
theory, mind-wandering theory, and mindlessness theory. Finally, the discussion concludes with
future directions for work at the conjuncture of motivation and vigilance.
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CHAPTER TWO: VIGILANCE
Vigilance, or the ability to sustain attention over a period of time, is crucial to human
performance, particularly in monotonous contexts. For instance, students are required to direct
attention toward lengthy lectures and Soldiers toward long-duration reconnaissance missions.
Furthermore, whole occupations (i.e., airport baggage screeners, loss prevention specialists,
nuclear power plant operators, etc.) are dedicated to the ability of an observer to remain attentive
to threats over time.
When a threat goes undetected, the cost of such an error can be enormous. Lapses in the
detection of threats can result in financial losses (Williams, 2005), nuclear meltdowns (Casey,
2006; Reinerman-Jones, Matthews, & Mercado, 2016), medical complications (Scott, Rogers,
Hwang, & Zhang, 2006; Wakefield, 2000), breaches of homeland security (Hancock & Hart,
2002; Meuter & Lacherez, 2016), unsuccessful military operations (McBride, Merullo, Johnson,
Banderet, & Robinson, 2007), and, most unfortunately, in the loss of life or widespread
destruction (Casey, 2006). Such threats have a very low probability of occurring and are
extremely infrequent, which makes their likelihood and expectancy rare (Davies & Parasuraman,
1982; Warm & Jerison, 1984). The rarity of potential threats results in more inattention to these
potential threats over time (c.f., Hancock, 2013; Loeb, Noonan, Ash, & Holding, 1988;
Parasuraman, 2011; Sprauge, 1981; Tomporowski & Tinsley, 1996) and manifests behaviorally
as poorer performance, especially in visual search (Hout, Walenchok, Goldinger, & Wolfe,
2015).
The decline in human performance in vigilance tasks over time is colloquially referred to
as the “vigilance decrement” (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Jerison, 1970; See, Howe, Warm, &
Dember, 1995; Warm, 1977). The vigilance decrement is commonly associated with increases in
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self-report measures of stress and workload (Dillard, Warm, Funke, Vidulich, Nelson,
Eggemeier, & Funke, 2013; Warm, Dember, & Hancock, 1996; Warm, Matthews, & Finomore,
2008), as well as many other adverse psychological outcomes (e.g., boredom; Scerbo, 2011).

Understanding the Vigilance Decrement
During World War II, Mackworth’s (1948, 1950) seminal research on the vigilance
decrement indicated that Royal Air Force radar operators exhibited poorer performance as time
on task increased. In this study, the radar operators were asked to monitor and detect small jumps
in the hands of a clock (see Figure 1). Mackworth found that it became more and more difficult
to detect the jumps in the hands of the clock with the passing of time on task. His results have
been replicated in thousands of vigilance studies in the following 68 years. The decrement has
become a hallmark associated with vigilance research, though it should be noted that a vigilance
decrement is not always observed in traditional tests of vigilance.

4

Figure 1. The vigilance decrement as first observed by Mackworth (1948, 1950) demonstrates
the decline in performance as a function of time on task.

Some researchers argue that the vigilance decrement is iatrogenically created by the
researcher (Hancock, 2013; Hancock, Volante, & Szalma, 2016). This implies that the perception
of boredom and monotony reported by numerous observers and participants is induced by the
design of the task. This is particularly true in the cases of fuzzy signal detection and tasks
involving low probability of threat or target stimulus presentation (i.e., baggage screening, x-ray
examination, etc.). When the task is designed in a way in which is perhaps motivating or helpful
to the observer (i.e., visual cues or alerts to threatening stimuli), the vigilance decrement is
almost entirely eradicated (Hancock et al., 2016). To overcome the vigilance decrement, it is
argued that the task can be designed to support the limitations of human attention and bolster
individual differences, which assist in vigilant attention (Hancock et al., 2016). The present
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dissertation will seek to extend support for this theoretical assumption by systematically
manipulating task complexity, task instructions, and task type. This will demonstrate the extent
to which the vigilance decrement is an iatrogenically created psychological phenomenon.

Theoretical Explanations for the Vigilance Decrement

While task design can determine whether or not the vigilance decrement is observed,
there are several theoretical debates over the state of the mind during vigilance performance. For
example, early explanations of the vigilance decrement suggested that performance declined as a
function of reactive inhibition (Hull, 1943) or arousal (Hebb, 1955; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).
Drive and arousal theorists suggested the monotonous nature of vigilance tasks lowered activity
in the brainstem and thalamic projections (Loeb & Alluisi, 1984; Welford, 1968), which reduced
the ability to remain vigilant to threats over time. While drive and arousal theories accounted for
the vigilance decrement, these theories could not explain the subsequent increases in subjective
stress and workload post-task.
In an effort to explain the changes in subjective ratings of stress and workload was
resource theory (Hirst & Kalmar, 1987; Kahneman, 1973; Moray, 1967; Navon & Gopher, 1979;
Wickens, 1984). And in more recent years, two new information processing theories have
emerged to explain the vigilance decrement because of some of the pitfalls associated with the
resource account. These theories are outlined below and an overview is provided in Table 1.
Interestingly, there is little integration between resource theory, mindlessness theory, and mindwandering theory. Rather than theoretical coalescence, these theories tend to operate in isolation,
oft ignoring seminal research studies related to sustained attention (for more on this see Fraulini,
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Hancock, Neigel, Claypoole, & Szalma, 2017). This tends to leave participants keen on research
involving vigilance intrigued, but confused (as described in a later part of this chapter).
Understanding the differing perspectives on task engagement is crucial to both the present
dissertation and broader scientific understanding of motivation’s relationship with vigilance.

Table 1. The table below lists important distinctions between each theory of information
processing in relation to vigilance.
Information
Processing
Required
Overload

Cause of the
Vigilance
Decrement
Resource depletion

Use of Task
Engagement to
offset the Decrement
Cognitive and/or
behavioral
engagement

Mindlessness
Theory

Underload

Task monotony

Not described

Mind-wandering
Theory

Underload

Task monotony in
conjunction with
intentional or unintentional
mind-wandering

Behavioral
engagement

Resource
Theory

Resource Theory as a Means of Explaining the Vigilance Decrement

Resource theory has arguably been the reigning account of the vigilance decrement,
particularly since the decline of unitary arousal theory (Hancock & Warm, 1989). Resource
theory suggests that declines in performance stem from overload of information processing
capacities induced by either the task environment. Resource theory relies on the assumption that
individuals are capacity-limited, meaning only so much information can be processed at a given
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time (Wickens, 1984). Research suggests that such capacity limitations result from the depletion
of “resources” as time on task and task demands increase. This assumption implies that resource
depletion can be either task-induced (i.e., high demand, high task complexity) or state-induced
(i.e., high stress, high fatigue) (Caggiano & Parasuraman, 2004).
Traditionally, resources have been defined as pools of energy (or cognitive capacity;
Moray, 1967) that can be both drained or restored (Hirst & Kalmar, 1987). Resources have been
described either as a general underlying attentional process (Kahneman, 1973) or as separate
task-specific capacities (Wickens, 1984, 2002). The latter is referred to as multiple-resource
theory, which delineates between the types information processing resources associated with task
specificity (i.e., auditory tasks, visual tasks, etc.). However, some researchers oppose multiple
resource theory and propose that only two types of resources are involved in vigilance tasks. One
type of resource is involved in sustained information transfer (i.e., long-term memory transfer)
and the other is involved in short-term memory processing (Humphreys & Revelle, 1984).
To summarize, resource theorists tend to argue that cognitive resources underpin the
ability to efficiently attend to and process information over time. Resource theory also assumes
that if individuals are overstimulated or overloaded, fewer resources are available for
information processing and the quality of performance subsequently declines. In more
demanding attention tasks, a greater decrement will be observed because more resources are
depleted with time on task (Parasuraman, Warm, & Dember, 1987).
Importantly, resource theory is not without its limitations and has garnered several
criticisms. First, the logic of resource theory is circular: performance declines because of
resource overload, and when resources are overtaxed, performance subsequently declines
(Navon, 1984; Szalma & Matthews, 2015, pg. 221). Furthermore, it is difficult to pinpoint
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where, exactly, resources are located in the brain and what a resource may consist of
physiologically. But, it is worth noting that the neurological phenomena associated with
resources and information processing is currently under investigation (Langner & Eickhoff,
2013; Matthews, Warm, Reinerman-Jones, Langheim, Washburn, & Tripp, 2010b; ReinermanJones, Matthews, Langheim, & Warm, 2011). It is also difficult to physiologically discern
between the resources that are dedicated to specific processing or unitary processing, or if these
resources are paradoxically both (Hancock & Szalma, 2003, 2008; Szalma, Hancock, &
Hancock, 2012).
For these reasons, resource theory is extremely difficult to falsify (Popper, 1959).
However, due to emerging physiological evidence (e.g., cerebral blood flow velocity) and other
imaging techniques (e.g., fMRI, transcranial Doppler ultrasonography), advocates of resource
theory are much closer to understanding how and where resources may reside in the brain based
on converging evidence (i.e., subjective individual ratings of stress and workload, objective
performance measures, and psychophysiological indicators).

The Mindlessness Explanation of the Vigilance Decrement

Despite the decline of drive and arousal theories, reincarnations of these theories have
recently surfaced (see Fraulini et al., 2017). Under these new accounts of information processing,
it is suggested that vigilance arises from underload or understimulation, which manifests as
mindlessness (Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999; Robertson, Manly, Andrade,
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) or mind-wandering (Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler,
2006).
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The mindlessness account of vigilance assumes that the task induces understimulation
through monotony (Manly et al., 1999; Robertson et al., 1997), which produces the vigilance
decrement. The rarity of threats and the monotony of the task environment lead to increases in
boredom and fatigue as time on task increases. Furthermore, the monotonous task environment
results in inattentive responding and the detection of fewer threats over time (Robertson et al.
1997). Mindlessness theory posits that the mind inactively processes information for a period of
time, which causes lapses in attention and threats to potentially go undetected. This idea very
much parallels the theory of automaticity, which argues that behavioral responses to cognitive
tasks become thoughtless over time and with repetition, thus leading to performance errors when
the environment or scenario becomes novel (Logan, 1980, 1992).
Researchers in support of mindlessness theory suggest that simple tasks, compared to
complex or demanding tasks, will be more likely to facilitate the onset of the vigilance
decrement. From this perspective, the task structure of simple tasks is boring, thus mindlessness
quickly sets in, and performance on the vigilance task declines. According to the mindlessness
assumption, if vigilance tasks were designed to be more behaviorally engaging, performance
would not decrease as a function of time. Additionally, there would be less mental demand or
workload associated with the task. If the task is engaging, the individual is less likely to perform
mindlessly or thoughtlessly.
While the mindlessness theory of vigilance accounts for fatigue and performance
declines, it is not without its limitations. The mindlessness explanation has been criticized for its
inability to explain the high demand and stress reported by individuals post-task. Individuals
should not report high stress and workload when engaged in a ‘mindless’ activity, since
cognition is limited when the mind is thoughtless or blank. Moreover, a number of vigilance
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studies have indicated that attention does not merely ‘slip away over time,’ as mindlessness
theory seems to suggest (Thomson et al., 2015). In the same vein, another issue with
mindlessness theory is that it does not describe the underlying attentional mechanisms associated
with mindlessness or the recovery of attention (Pashler, 1998). For instance, it is unclear whether
mindlessness occurs because of a lack of available resources, or whether mindlessness is induced
because of a habituation or automatic responding (Logan, 1980, 1992; Pashler, 1998). Moreover,
mindlessness theorists do not discuss what happens to the mind when ‘attention drifts away’
(Thomson et al., 2015, pg. 82), or the mechanisms by which attention toward the task is
recovered.
Another limitation of mindlessness theory is that it cannot explain the performance
increment, which is an improvement in performance as a function of time on task (Hancock,
2013). These theorists could possibly argue that the task is not a vigilance task if it does not
induce mindlessness, but that seems counterproductive, especially if it is a traditional vigilance
task known to induce the decrement in some individuals. In the same vein, mindlessness theory
cannot explain the performance of Parasuraman’s (2011) “cognitive superstars.” The monotony
associated with the vigilance task should afford thoughtlessness, which results in poor
performance, not superb performance.

The Mind-Wandering Account of the Vigilance Decrement

The theory of mind-wandering was developed to overcome some of the issues with
mindlessness theory. For example, mind-wandering theory attempts to explain what happens to
the mind when it disengages from the task and how engagement with the task is potentially
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recovered. Champions of mind-wandering theory suggest that attention becomes directed inward
and away from the vigilance task (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Thomson et al., 2015). Inward
reflection results in more self-related thoughts or thoughts about task-related performance
(Thomson et al., 2015). According to mind-wandering theory attention can also be directed
outwards and away from the vigilance task (Thomson et al., 2015). Behaviorally, this shift in
attention is exemplified by an increase in thoughts related to daydreaming (Thomson et al.,
2015), or task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Matthews et al., 2002).
Because attentional resources that could be directed toward the vigilance task are instead
directed inward or outward, performance declines due to an attentional shift (Smallwood, 2010).
Mind-wandering theory also distinguishes between two overarching types of mindwandering: intentional and unintentional (Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016a,b). Intentional mindwandering occurs when an individual makes an intentional, conscious choice to abandon focus
on the task at hand (Seli et al., 2016b). This is also referred to as deliberate mind-wandering (Seli
et al., 2016a,b). Conversely, unintentional mind-wandering occurs when the individual does not
deliberately intend to disengage attention from the task, rather attention from the task has merely
slips away because the participant loses focus or spontaneously begins to daydream (Seli et al.,
2016a,b; Seli, Wammes, Risko, & Smilek, 2015). This is also referred to as spontaneous mindwandering (Seli et al., 2016a,b).
Like mindlessness theory, mind-wandering theorists propose that vigilance tasks are
inherently monotonous and induce underarousal because of the repetitive environment and rarity
of threats (Thomson et al., 2015). Intentional or unintentional mind-wandering thereby occurs
because of task monotony (Seli et al., 2016; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008).
However, if the task were designed to be more engaging, or the stimuli more interesting, then
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mind-wandering should not occur and individuals will remain engaged with the task (Eastwood
et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2015). This assumption overcomes the issue with mindlessness
theory, which cannot explain the cognitive increment in some individuals, by arguing that
participants demonstrating a performance increment are superb at self-regulating task-unrelated
thoughts and controlling mindless cognition. However, there is no evidence to support this claim,
rather this is simply a common retort from mind-wandering theorists.

The Land of Confusion: Information Processing Theories and Issues with the
Operationalization of ‘Engagement’

One issue that is particularly relevant to this dissertation is the lack of consistency
between definitions of ‘task engagement’ across each of the aforementioned information
processing theories. For example, the mind-wandering theory suggests that vigilance tasks do not
‘engage’ individuals (Thomson et al., 2015, pg. 84), therefore mind-wandering increases with
time on task and results in a “larger decrement.” Mind-wandering theorists argue that vigilance
tasks that require ‘engagement’ will result in improved performance. But, in mind-wandering
theory, engagement is never clearly defined. It appears across several publications that under the
mind-wandering account engagement refers to some form of physical engagement with the task
(i.e., push a button, use a mouse to click on a threat; Thomson et al., 2015, 2014, 2013; Seli et
al., 2016a,b).
In contrast, resource theory suggests that task engagement is highlighted by energetic
arousal toward the task and the desire to succeed in performing the task (Matthews, 2016;
Matthews et al., 2002; Matthews, Warm, Reinerman-Jones, Langheim, & Saxby, 2010a;
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Matthews et al., 2010b). In this vein, task engagement includes “energy, interest in the task, and
concentration” (Saxby, Matthews, Warm, Hitchcock, Neubauer, 2013, pg. 3). Task engagement
in the resource theory instantiation has more to do with cognition and information processing,
than physical, behavioral engagement. Task engagement, as operationally defined by resource
theory, has also been found to be more reliable in predicting vigilance performance than worry or
distress (Helton, Matthews, & Warm, 2009). Higher levels of task engagement manifest
behaviorally as higher proportions of correct detections and fewer false alarms (Matthews,
Warm, Shaw, & Finomore, 2014; Salcedo, Lackey, Maraj, & Reinerman-Jones, 2014). Lower
task engagement is associated with “a prototypical fatigue state characterized by tiredness, lack
of motivation, and distractibility” (Matthews, 2016, pg. 803).
To date, only one study has indicated that tasks, which afford physical engagement,
improve vigilance performance. And as a result, this study tends to be heavily cited by
proponents of mind-wandering theory. In this particular study, Pop, Stearman, Kazi, and Durso
(2012) had participants ‘engage’ by clicking on an incoming airplane in a flight collision
detection task. Participants who had to use a mouse to click on an incoming aircraft
outperformed participants who had to simply monitor planes for possible collisions (Pop et al.,
2012). Mind-wandering theorists strongly cling to this study and use it to support many of their
arguments about engagement (Thomson, Besner, & Smilek, 2016). It is possible that this
behavioral engagement task supports the idea of Hancock (2013), in that engagement in the task
is determined by the design of the task (Hancock et al., 2016).
In one instance, Thomson et al. (2015) cites the Pop et al. (2012) study to demonstrate
how a “more engaging” task results in “completely abolishing the vigilance decrement” (pg. 87).
If this is the case, then tasks that require a great deal of physical engagement should yield similar
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results. However, as research demonstrates, situations that require constant physical engagement
(like the Sustained Attention to Response Task) actually result in some of the worst vigilance
performance (c.f., Wilson, Head, de Joux, Finkbeiner, & Helton, 2015a; Wilson, Russell, and
Helton, 2015b).
In the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), participants withdraw a physical
response to threats and must hold a button or the spacebar during all neutral events (i.e., nonsignals) and release this button when a target stimulus is presented. Following the logic of mindwandering theory, the mere action of keeping the button or spacebar pressed in the vigilance task
should result in more task engagement and thereby better performance. However, several studies
have demonstrated that individuals have substantially worse performance on the SART than
traditional vigilance tasks. In one study, Dillard et al. (2014) found that the SART was highly
mentally demanding and effortful, which is not in line with the assertions of mind-wandering
theory, which implies that vigilance tasks are not effortful (Thomson et al., 2015, pg.84). Others
have indicated that the SART affords impulsive responding (Helton, Kern, & Walker, 2009;
Dillard et al., 2014), which makes it difficult to distinguish between intentional performance and
impulsivity, or intentional impulsive responding.
In an effort to replicate SART research in a more ‘engaging’ context, Head and Helton
(2012) used non-repeating naturalistic or urban stimuli analog of the numeric SART. They found
that this version of the SART task was no more ‘engaging’ than the numeric SART, which does
not support mind-wandering theory. Participants performed poorly and were clearly not
cognitively engaged with the task (as measured by the DSSQ and NASA-Task Load Index),
though they were quite behaviorally engaged in the task (e.g., repeatedly pressing down a
button).
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To summarize, behavioral engagement may not correspond to cognitive engagement,
consequently it should not be assumed that because individuals are physically engaged with the
task that they are therefore cognitively engaged in the task. This is not the first time in the history
of psychology that researchers have tried to equate behavior with cognition (to revisit the
downfall of behaviorism and cognitive revolution see Goldstein, 2014). This dissertation urges
researchers interested in attention and engagement to focus on the cognitive aspects of task
engagement, not the physical, and clearly operationalize their conceptualization of engagement.

Attenuating the Vigilance Decrement
The overarching goals of vigilance research include: 1) understanding the mechanisms
underlying sustained attention, and 2) attenuating the vigilance decrement. While the above
information processing theories serve to explain the attentional mechanisms, other streams of
research attempt focus on methods of diminishing or eliminating the vigilance decrement
through the study of individual differences, differences in task types, and differences in task
demands.

The Effect of Individual Differences on the Vigilance Decrement

Individual differences have been important in guiding our understanding of vigilance
over time. Research has indicated that low levels of boredom proneness (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995;
Scerbo, 1998; Thackray, Bailey, & Touchstone, 1977), advanced occupational training (Donald
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& Donald, 2015; Donald, Donald, & Thatcher, 2015), greater control of attention (Ilkowska &
Engle, 2010), greater self-control/self-regulation (Becker, Mandell, Tangney, Chrosniak, &
Shaw, 2015), high levels of intellect (Craig, 1984; Lehman, Olson, Aquilino, & Hall, 2006;
McGrath 1963a) and aptitude (McGrath, 1963a, 1963b; Wiener, 1975), and higher working
memory capacity (Caggiano & Parasuraman, 2004; Helton & Russell, 2011, 2013; Matthews,
Warm, Shaw, & Finomore, 2014; McGrath 1963a, 1963b) can all influence the performance
decrement.
In this same vein, many studies have examined how individual differences in personality
may influence vigilance performance. Of the span of individual differences, a relatively great
deal of attention has been directed toward the study of traits related to the “Big Five” (e.g.,
extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness; Costa & McCrae,
1992; Mandell, Becker, VanAndel, Nelson, & Shaw, 2015; Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman,
2003; Matthews, 2001; Shaw, Matthews, Warm, Finomore, Silverman, & Costa, 2010). A
number of studies have indicated that introverts outperform extroverts on vigilance tasks
(Mackworth, 1969; Rose, Murphy, Byard, & Nikzad, 2002), though the effect size for this trait
has collectively been rather small (Koelega, 1992). Higher extraversion in particular has been
associated with poorer performance in cognitive-based vigilance tasks (Revelle, 1993; Shaw et
al., 2010). Similarly, participants high in conscientiousness tend to outperform participants low
in conscientiousness in vigilance tasks (Rose et al., 2002). High neuroticism has been associated
with greater performance decrements (Revelle, 1993, pg. 351), which is in line with other
research that indicates individuals high in neuroticism tend to be more prone to stress (Costa &
McCrae, 1992; Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2009). However, these results have become
more mixed over time.
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One individual difference variable relevant to this dissertation is motivation. A number of
studies have indicated that motivation may attenuate the decrement and vigilance performance.
For example, recent meta-analytic evidence has indicated that extrinsic motivators are rather
limited in their effect on performance and may only work in the short-term (Cerasoli, Nicklin, &
Ford, 2014), whereas intrinsic motivators improve performance in the long run. In one study,
when observers were given a monetary reward (an extrinsic motivator), motivation was
undermined and performance suffered (c.f., Esterman, Reagan, Liu, Turner, & DeGutis, 2014;
Murayama & Kuhbander, 2011). In an earlier study, Montague and Webber (1965) found that
monetary rewards had little effect on performance in an extremely long vigil (e.g., 6 hours).
Thus, the research on extrinsic motivators and performance tends to demonstrate limited effects,
which are generally improvements in the short-term, but not over time.
In a similar vein, Unsworth and McMillan (2013) found that poorly motivated (i.e., low
intrinsic motivation) students engaged in more mind-wandering and had worse performance than
their peers higher in intrinsic motivation in a long-duration reading task (which some argue is a
cognitive vigilance task). In another cognitive vigilance task, Dember, Warm, Bowers, and
Lanzetta (1984) found that intrinsic motivation facilitated consistent performance (e.g.,
conservative responses to both correct detections and false alarms) in the task over time. In
sensory vigilance tasks, it seems that intrinsic motivation may be one of the most predictive
variables related to vigilance performance (Matthews, Davies, & Lees, 1990). Intrinsic
motivation resulted in better performance in a sensory sustained attention task (Matthews,
Davies, & Lees, 1990).
Reward pathways in the brain, which are related to motivation, have also been implicated
in performance on vigilance tasks (Kelley & Berridge, 2002; Wise, 1985). In one physiological
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study, Bonnefond et al. (2011) administered a 60-minute Flanker Task to participants. The
results indicated that motivation regulated activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which
is an area of the brain that corresponds to sustained attention abilities. Higher activation in this
area of the brain corresponded with better performance. Matthews, Warm, Reinerman-Jones,
Langheim, and Saxby (2010a) have also reported similar results. In two studies, physiological
measures of energy expenditure (in this case cerebral blood flow velocity and blood
oxygenation) were obtained. Higher activation in areas of the brain related to reward (i.e.,
dopaminergic pathways) of the brain corresponded to improved performance in a vigilance task
(Matthews et al., 2010a; Matthews et al., 2010b).

The Effect of the Type and Design of the Task on the Vigilance Decrement

In addition to personality and motivational differences, the type of vigilance task can also
influence the vigilance decrement. For example, tasks that are more ‘game-like’ in nature may
better facilitate motivation or include a task structure designed to afford more motivation and
engagement in the vigilance task (Hancock & Szalma, 2003; Szalma, Schmidt, Teo, & Hancock,
2014; Szalma, 2014). Furthermore, in one meta-analytic review of the sensitivity decrement, See
et al. (1995) reported a greater vigilance decrement for sensory simultaneous tasks, than sensory
successive tasks, in conditions with a low event rate. Successive tasks require the observer to
compare new stimuli to stimulus representations held in memory, whereas simultaneous tasks
require observers to compare stimulus elements presented at the same point in time (see Figure
2). Additionally, Parasuraman and Mouloua (1987) found that successive discrimination tasks
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are more mentally demanding than simultaneous discrimination tasks (c.f., Desmond, Matthews,
Bush, 2001), especially in low event rate conditions.

Figure 2. A redrawing of the simultaneous and successive stimuli used in Desmond et al. (2001)
is included to demonstrate the differences between the two task types. In Desmond et al. (2001)
participants were asked to discriminate between slightly larger digits and include a button
response when a difference in digit size was detected.

In the same meta-analysis, See et al. (1995) indicated that cognitive tasks tend to be more
complex, and for this reason can decrease the vigilance decrement, since these types of tasks are
thought to be more “engaging” (Becker, Warm, Dember, & Howe, 1994; Parasuraman, Warm, &
Dember, 1987; Warm & Dember, 1998). Different types of tasks may afford more or less
cognitive engagement (Szalma, 2014), and thus attenuate the vigilance decrement differently.
For example, cognitive tasks require the individual to manipulate the information presented in
the task to identify a threat or critical signal. Sensory tasks require observers to monitor
perceptual or physical changes to some attribute of the stimuli or the task environment. The
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distinction between these two task categories is important because different information
processing systems may be utilized for each task (i.e., top-down versus bottom-up processing).
In terms of the vigilance decrement, See et al. (1995) reported that greater decrements
tend to occur in sensory vigilance tasks than cognitive vigilance tasks, but this is dependent on
event rate and task type as well. In one study, Deaton and Parasuraman (1988) observed that
cognitive vigilance tasks were “more resistant to the decrement over time than sensory
vigilance” (pg. 1458). In this same study, participants in the high event rate cognitive condition
were most susceptible to performance errors (i.e., fewer hits, more false alarms). There was no
effect of event rate (e.g., high or low) on performance in the sensory condition, which is
interesting given that previous research has indicated that correct detections can decrease as
event rate increases (Parasuraman, 1985).
Another aspect of vigilance tasks that can affect the decrement is information processing
load, or task complexity. Less demanding or less complex tasks tend to have a low event rate
(i.e., less than five critical hits per minute; Galinsky, Dember, & Warm, 1989) and do not require
much effort beyond mere perception of the critical signal or threat. These types of tasks tend to
be defined as “simple” tasks in the literature. One example of a simple task could be the
simultaneous sensory task used by Desmond et al. (2001; Figure 2). Participants had to observe
two sets of digits and determine which set of digits was slightly larger than the other (the number
“12” in the example). Contrasting this, the successive sensory task used by Desmond et al.
(2001) argued by researchers to be more demanding, especially temporally demanding.
Participants in this condition had to remember the size of the previously presented digit set and
compare the size of the previous set to the following set, then indicate a difference in physical
size using a button response.
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Furthermore, complex tasks can also attenuate or reverse the vigilance decrement (Warm,
Dember, Lanzetta, Bowers, & Lysaght, 1985). More demanding or more complex tasks typically
require a greater degree of thinking than less demanding or less complex tasks. Complex tasks
also tend to involve a working memory component and symbolic manipulation. This could
explain why better performance is observed in complex tasks than simple tasks, especially
considering that many simple tasks tend to be sensory (Levine, Romashko, & Fleishman, 1973).
Take for example one study by Molloy and Parasuraman (1996). They found that participants
completing a complex-single task condition actually outperformed participants in a complex
multi-task condition or simple single-task condition. This suggests that performance is better
with some degree of complexity (Warm, Howe, Fishbein, Dember, & Sprague, 1984), but it also
demonstrates an optimal level of complexity: the task was neither too simple nor too demanding.
It is possible that “the effect [of complexity] is most likely based upon motivational rather than
learning factors” (Warm et al., 1985, pg. 19). In this vein, complex or demanding tasks may
afford (Szalma, 2014) more cognitive engagement. However, these latter claims require more
empirical testing, thus the impetus for the present research.
It is also worth noting that very little agreement exists in the vigilance literature regarding
which tasks are more or less demanding. And, there is also disagreement about what qualifies as
a cognitive task. There is a large discrepancy between what may be simple or sensory to some,
but complex or cognitive to others (the vigilance literature is rife with examples). Generally, it
appears that the researchers subjectively choose which task is more complex versus simple a
priori. Therefore, to overcome any ambiguity and to distinguish between the tasks prior to any
experimentation in this dissertation, Table 2 is included as a guide to the most commonly
accepted definitions of sensory, semantic, cognitive, successive, and simultaneous vigilance
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tasks. Examples of each task are also included in this Table. These operationalizations and
examples are used throughout the present dissertation.

Table 2. The table below includes a definition for each type of task, as well as examples of the
type of vigilance task.
Task
Type

Definition

Simultaneous Compare critical signals
or neutral events at the
same point in time.
Compare critical signals
Successive
or neutral events to
previously displayed
critical or neutral stimuli
(compared at different
points in time).
Require observers to
Cognitive
manipulate information.

Sensory

Require observers to
detect a perceptual or
physical difference
between stimuli.

Semantic

Require observers to
process the meaning of
text.

Simple

Low event rate; low task
demand; typically
sensory in nature

Example

Figure 2 (Desmond et al.,
2001).
Figure 2 (Desmond et al.,
2001).

Information
Processing
Type
Simultaneous

Successive

Perform addition or
Symbolic;
subtraction to observe a
top-down processing
critical signal vs. neutral
event (Szalma & Teo,
2012).
Critical signals are bolded Perceptual; bottomor italicized, whereas
up processing
neutral events are normal
text (Szalma & Teo,
2012).
Critical signals include
Symbolic;
four-legged animals,
top-down processing
whereas neutral events are
non-four-legged animals
(Thomson, Besner, &
Smilek, 2016).
Critical signals occur
Low
when one digit of a twoprocessing
digit pair is slightly larger
load
than another digit; neutral
events consist of samesized digit pairs (Deaton
& Parasuraman, 1988;
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Task
Type

Definition

Example

Information
Processing
Type

Desmond et al., 2001).
Complex

Greater task demands;
typically involve a
working memory
component; dual-tasks

Critical signals include
four-legged animals (e.g.,
cow, horse, rabbit, etc.),
neutral events include
non-four-legged animals
(e.g., barn, chair, rock,
etc.), and distractors
(referred to in this
manuscript as ‘lures’)
include two- or no-legged
animals (e.g., eel,
sparrow, etc.) (Thomson,
Besner, & Smilek, 2016).

High
processing
load

The Importance of Time on Task

The perception of time associated with the pace of the task or the perceived length of the
vigil can have an effect on subsequent perception of task complexity and task demand. The
duration of the vigilance task is a critical factor influencing the magnitude of the performance
decrement. Typically, the vigilance decrement manifests within the first fifteen minutes of the
task (Teichner, 1974). But, as Smit, Eling, and Coenen (2004) have pointed out, highly
demanding vigilance tasks can produce a vigilance decrement in a matter of minutes. Others
have found that when a vigilance task is complex or difficult, it is possible to observe a decline
in performance within a very short amount of time (i.e., five to ten minutes; Helton, Dember,
Warm, & Matthews, 2000; Helton et al., 2007; Nuechterlein, Parasuraman, & Jiang, 1983). Even
short vigilance tasks are hard mental work even if time is perceived to pass quickly (Finomore,

24

McClernon, Amick, Pee, Funke, & Warm, 2016). In this vein, the length of the task is also
associated with the perception of the task being more or less demanding or difficult.

The Effect of Task Instructions on Vigilance Performance
Another factor that impacts the observer’s perception of the task is the phrasing of the
task and the language used to communicate task instructions. The way in which a task is framed
drastically changes how subsequent information is processed. For example, in one study
conducted by Matthews, Panganiban, and Hudlicka (2011) observers who received task
instructions framed in terms of ‘threat’ (or danger) were more motivated to seek out these
harmful stimuli and had a higher proportion of hits compared to participants who received
neutral task instructions. The type of instructions changed the type of information participants
focused on and differently directed their attention.
In another study, Matthews and Desmond (2002) found that subjective fatigue in a
driving task was moderated by motivational task instructions (i.e., the words “MEASURING
DRIVING SKILL” were presented on screen for a brief period of time) (pg. 673). Participants
receiving the motivating instructions imputed more effort into a driving task and demonstrated
superior driving performance (as measured by slower speeds on corners, less drifting, smaller
angles of the steering wheel) because they believed their driving skills were being assessed at
this moment in time.
In an early study of motivational instructions, Lucaccini et al. (1968) found that when
instructions framed the vigilance task as a ‘challenge,’ and not as a ‘monotonous’ task, no
decrement was observed. Interestingly, when the task was framed as being ‘monotonous,’
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participants viewed the vigilance task more negatively and had a much lower proportion of hits
compared to participants who were instructed that the task was ‘challenging’ (Lucaccini et al.,
1968). However, false alarm and response time data were not reported in this study, thus it is
unknown how these changes to instructions might affect criterion setting or response time.
The findings of Lucaccini et al. (1968) are particularly intriguing given that Deci,
Eghrari, Patrick, and Leone (1994) found that when a task is acknowledged as being boring,
participants are more likely to reengage with the task when left alone with the task for a brief
period of time. Therefore, it is possible that this is why Lucaccini et al. (1968) did not observe
similar effects of task instructions. Although the seminal task used by Deci et al. (1994) was not
a traditional vigilance task, it does approximate a monotonous computer-based vigilance task. In
this study, participants were required to perform an 8-minute dot monitoring task. Deci et al.
(1994) found that when an experimenter provided acknowledgement of the ‘boring’ aspects of
the task, rationale for performing the task, and gave participants some control during the
experiment, there was a longer duration of engagement (defined in this study as the length of
time participants spent on the task) in the monotonous dot task when the experimenter left the
room. The goal of Deci et al. (1994) was to demonstrate that when acknowledgement, rationale,
and autonomy (i.e., choice) are provided in boring tasks, individuals are more likely to engage in
the task on their own. However, because of the aim Deci et al. (1994) was mainly to study
engagement, performance on the dot task was unfortunately not measured. This is particularly
intriguing for vigilance, because this study is the first of its kind to demonstrate that boring,
monotonous tasks do not necessarily induce disengagement when the correct ingredients are
combined.
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In a very recent study of instruction manipulations, Salcedo, Lackey, Maraj, and
Reinerman-Jones (2014) did not find any effects of motivating instructions on performance in a
human-robot interaction vigilance task. This evidence demonstrates that manipulations to task
instructions may have an effect in some cases, but not in every instance. Additionally, the
sporadic reporting of performance data and differences in performance metrics (i.e., correct
detections vs. steering wheel angle) in vigilance studies makes it difficult to synthesize the
effects of instruction manipulations across task types. The differences in significant results
between studies and the lack of research on task instructions in general, make it difficult to draw
conclusions from these mixed findings. Therefore, the present pilot work for this dissertation and
present set of studies described in this dissertation seek to capitalize on the research on human
motivation. This dissertation should further elucidate the relationship between sustained attention
and motivational processes.

Pilot Work
A pilot study was conducted for this dissertation to test the claims of Deci et al. (1994),
as well as establish a clearer pattern of results in terms of the effect of motivational
manipulations on task instructions in vigilance task. The goal of this study was to replicate as
best as possible the work of Deci et al. (1994) and control for individual differences in intrinsic
motivation, which may also influence performance on the vigilance task, especially if the
instructions are manipulated to be more or less motivating. For example, the seminal research of
Deci and colleagues’ (1994) indicated that motivational instructions (i.e., a sense of autonomy,
acknowledgement for participation in the study, and rationale for completing the study) had a
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positive effect on engagement with the task such that participants who received motivating
instructions spent more time on a boring dot monitoring task than any of the other available tasks
(i.e., reading magazines, etc.). In the present pilot work, we utilized the original Deci et al.
(1994) instructions, but had participants perform a traditional (sensory) vigilance task. The
original Deci et al. (1994) study did not report performance data on the dot task, so the effect of
their instructional manipulations on performance cannot be evaluated from their study. The only
dependent measure collected in the original Deci et al. (1994) was ‘free’ time spent on the task.
In sum, the present pilot work attempts to partially replicate the results of Deci et al. (1994) in a
vigilance paradigm and to determine whether the effects of motivating instructions can facilitate
performance. We seek to expand upon this research by collecting performance data as well.

Task Conditions

Participants were randomly assigned to either a motivating instruction condition or
neutral instruction condition. The motivating instruction conditions could include the presence of
acknowledgment, rationale, and autonomy. Before the mean split on the data (which allowed us
to split the group into participants high and low in motivation), 24 participants were randomly
assigned to received meaningful rationale (19 participants did not receive any rationale), 25
participants received acknowledgement of the boredom associated with the task (18 participants
did not receive any acknowledgement of the task demands), and 22 participants received
autonomous instructions, which used language supportive of choice, (21 participants received
neutral instructions) during the experiment. The original wording of these task instructions can
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be found in Deci et al. (1994) and the original instructions have been modified for the present set
of experiments, which are discussed later in this dissertation.

Measures

Differences in intrinsic motivation were assessed using the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory
(IMI; Deci et al., 1994). All self-report measures used in this study were counterbalanced across
participants to control for order effects and included: the IMI (Deci et al., 1994; Ryan, 1982),
DSSQ (Matthews et al., 2002), NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988), and a demographics form.
All measures were administered online using Qualtrics survey software on a desktop computer.

Procedures

Participants completed the experiment on a desktop computer in a quiet laboratory space.
Data were collected from one participant at a time. All participants were required to surrender
any timepieces, such as watches or mobile phones prior to their participation in the study. First,
participants were given an informed consent and then completed pre-task measures. Participants
were then introduced to the sensory vigilance task by the researcher (for the protocol and stimuli
see Szalma, 2011). All participants completed the same sensory task. Task type was not
manipulated in this experiment. Participants completed a short block of practice trials, which
lasted approximately two minutes and oriented them to the pace and format of the task.
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After this practice session, participants were asked if they had any questions and the
researcher left the room for the duration of the vigil. After the experiment, participants then
completed all post-task measures and demographics.

Task Design and Stimuli

The entire vigilance task was approximately 24 minutes in length and had an event rate of
26 events per minute. The task consisted of monitoring the movements of three dots positioned
above three bar graphs (see Szalma, 2011 for study stimuli; Teo et al., 2011). A critical signal
resulted when the uniformity in spacing was unequal between the dots and graphs. Twelve
critical signals appeared at random intervals during each of the four 6-minute periods on watch.
Neutral events were cases in which all three dots were an equal distance from their respective bar
graphs. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar on the keyboard when a critical signal
was detected and withhold response to neutral events.

Participants

The sample consisted of 43 (32 females; 11 males) undergraduate students (60.6%
freshmen; 7.0% sophomores; 23.3% juniors; 9.3% seniors) recruited from the research
participation system at the University of Central Florida. The average age of participants was
20.02 years (Median = 19.00 years, SD = 2.92 years). The oldest student in this sample was 33years-old and the youngest student was 18 years of age. All participants reported normal or
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corrected-to-normal vision. Participants reported that they did not consume caffeine prior to
participation in this study.

Results

A significant difference between intrinsic motivation at pre-test was not observed
between men (M = 152.45, SD =28.35) and women (M = 164.06, SD = 28.27), t(41) = -1.174,
p = .247. Given this, a mean split was performed on intrinsic motivation scores, collapsed across
participant sex. Twenty-one participants had high intrinsic motivation (scores greater than or
equal to 166) and 22 participants had low intrinsic motivation (less than or equal to 165). The
means and standard deviations for all measures are reported in Table 3.
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Table 3. The table below includes the means and standard deviations across intrinsic motivation,
stress, and workload measures (N = 43).
Measure

High Intrinsic
Low Intrinsic
Motivation
Motivation
(N = 21)
(N = 22)
184.24**
139.00**
IMI
(15.83)
(18.17)
20.14**
15.79**
Pre-IM
(4.81)
(4.25)
11.52
8.65
Post-IM
(6.82)
(6.85)
23.05
21.09
Pre-SM
(6.19)
(5.99)
19.67
17.58
Post-SM
(8.42)
(7.50)
19.95
20.05
Pre-TRTs
(7.37)
(6.48)
22.05
24.44
Post-TRTs
(6.59)
(7.12)
17.14
15.25
Pre-TUTs
(8.26)
(6.11)
16.15
18.01
Post-TUTs
(7.14)
(8.05)
60.87
56.45
Workload
(17.17)
(14.40)
Note. IM = intrinsic motivation. SM = success motivation. TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs =
task-unrelated thoughts. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. * = p < 0.05,
** = p < 0.01.

Participants higher in intrinsic motivation reported significantly more intrinsic motivation
at pre-test than participants low in intrinsic motivation on both the IMI and pre-DSSQ subscale.
No significant differences in success motivation were observed between participants low and
high in intrinsic motivation at pre-task or post-task. No significant differences in TRTs, TUTs, or
global workload scores were observed between participants low and high in intrinsic motivation
at pre-task or post-task.

32

A 2 (high motivation vs. low motivation) x 2 (motivating instructions vs. neutral
instructions) x 4 (watch period) mixed measures factorial ANOVA was performed for each of
the performance measures collected in this study. There was no significant main effects or
interactions for period on watch. Additionally, there were no significant main effects or
interactions of intrinsic motivation on motivating or neutral instructions across any of the
performance measures.
A 2 (High Motivation vs. Low Motivation) x 2 (Acknowledgement present vs.
Acknowledgement absent) x 4 (Period on Watch) mixed factorial ANOVA was performed for
hits and false alarms. There were no significant main effects or interactions for intrinsic
motivation or acknowledgement. There were no significant main effects or interactions for
watch.
A 2 (High Motivation vs. Low Motivation) x 2 (Rationale present vs. Rationale absent) x
4 (Period on Watch) mixed factorial ANOVA was performed for hits and false alarms. There
were no significant main effects or interactions for intrinsic motivation or rationale. There were
not significant main effects or interactions for watch.

Discussion

The present study expanded upon the original experiment by Deci et al. (1994) by
measuring performance outcomes as a function of intrinsic motivation, meaningful rationale,
acknowledgement, and motivating instructions. In the original study, Deci and colleagues (1994)
found that participants engaged with a boring dot task for longer periods of time when they
received a rationale for completing the task, the researcher acknowledged that the task was
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boring, and the participants had some autonomy over the task during the study. However, based
on the present results, it does not appear that these findings do not necessarily translate to all
boring tasks (at least not traditional vigilance tasks).
Generally, the results indicated that motivational manipulations to task instructions had
different effects on performance outcomes in terms of accuracy for participants high or low in
intrinsic motivation, but these differences were not statistically significant. A classic vigilance
decrement in performance was only observed in the autonomous instruction condition for
participants low in intrinsic motivation, otherwise performance was consistently poor across
conditions and by intrinsic motivation. This is a major limitation of this study. Many participants
found it difficult to discern between critical signals and neutral events and reported very low hit
rates over time across all conditions. This is not in line with Szalma (2011), which established
this task a monotonous vigilance task and resulted in a drastic vigilance decrement.
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CHAPTER THREE: MOTIVATION
“Control leads to compliance, autonomy leads to engagement.” – Daniel Pink (2009, pg. 56).

Autonomous Motivation

One theory that aims at facilitating intrinsic motivation and autonomous engagement in
activities is self-determination theory (SDT; Deci et al., 1994; Ryan & Deci, 2008; Ryan, 2012).
SDT suggests that all individuals, to differing degrees, innately desire to be actively engaged in
activities and wish to become competent at their work (Ryan & Deci, 2008). Self-determination
theory also suggests that people are inherently motivated to internalize the goals and values of
uninteresting, but important tasks (Deci et al., 1994).
SDT assumes that people are at least initially engaged with the task or activity at hand
through a combination of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2012a). This
engagement is directly related to the extent that individuals feel controlled by the task or feel
some control over the task (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2012a). According to SDT, when people act
with a sense of volition and experience choice, they are said to be autonomously motivated
(Gagné & Deci, 2005; McBride et al., 2010). In contrast, controlled motivation occurs when
performing an activity feels forced (McBride et al., 2010; Sheldon & Elliot, 1998). SDT also
“maintains that knowing whether people’s motivation is more autonomous or more controlled is
far more important for making predictions about the quality of people’s engagement,
performance, and well-being” (Deci & Ryan, 2012a, pg. 86). Autonomy also inherently exists on
a continuum, wherein some activities begin through extrinsic motivation and progress toward
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intrinsic motivation through the regulation of certain types of needs, but the reverse is also
possible.
According to Ryan and Deci (2000, 2008), autonomous regulation occurs for several
reasons. Self-determination theory states that three contextual factors can influence autonomous
motivation, such as meaningful rationale (e.g., explaining the purpose of the activity),
acknowledging the individual’s feelings (e.g., understanding how that person feels about the
activity), and facilitating more autonomy (e.g., giving the person some choice or control in the
activity). SDT assumes that when the task environment incorporates these three factors, the
activity will be experienced as fully autonomous.
Moreover, SDT posits that three universal needs also facilitate motivation and autonomy.
Importantly, these needs are not forced homeostatic deficiency mechanisms, but are more like
omnipresent “nutriments” for sustaining well-being (Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996).
Needs can also be thought of as “necessities” that each person must have in order to grow and to
flourish (Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). These needs include autonomy, competence,
and relatedness. Autonomy is the degree of choice in activities or tasks, or an experience of
personal control (Ryan & Deci, 2008). Activities and lifestyles that thwart the need for autonomy
may deplete energy and therefore result in amotivation, or a lack to engage in the task at hand
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). According to SDT, it is crucial to have some choice over the engagement
in activities or tasks because this may serve to bolster intrinsic motivation toward the activity
over time (Ryan & Deci, 2000, 2008).
Autonomous motivation is also influenced by both individual traits and the
environmental context, much like a symbiotic relationship (Ryan & Deci, 2008). Competence is
efficacy in that individuals feel effective in what they do and the knowledge they utilize when
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performing a task or activity (Deci & Ryan, 1985; White, 1959). Relatedness is the feeling of
connectedness with others and belonging to others socially (Ryan & Deci, 2008), which is akin
to Baumeister’s conceptualization of belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Additionally,
individuals can differ in the strength of each need, but the needs themselves are universal and
generally autonomy and competence account for the most variance when measuring engagement
in a given task or activity (Ryan & Deci, 2008). Autonomy is an important human need that must
be fulfilled regardless of gender, social status, or cultural climate (e.g., collectivist or
individualistic; Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Autonomous motivation has been found to significantly influence performance across
many domains, such as school (Black & Deci, 2000; Cordova & Lepper, 1996; Deci & Ryan,
1987, 2012b; Reeve & Lee, 2014; Reeve, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2013), work (Gagné & Deci,
2005), and health-related behaviors (Ryan, Patrick, Deci, & Williams, 2008). Students
autonomously motivated in school perform better on examinations and can write more creatively
(Ryan & Deci, 2012). Students high in autonomous motivation also tend to study for longer
periods of time and have better relationships with their teachers (Black & Deci, 2000).
Studies of workplace motivation indicate that work tasks which are structured to be more
complex or challenging, are more likely to be viewed as more meaningful and more likely to
prompt autonomous motivation (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Stone, Deci, & Ryan, 2009). Work tasks
that are perceived as mundane are found to lead to lower satisfaction and prompt controlled
motivation toward these tasks (Gagné & Deci, 2005).
In terms of the domain of health, those that chose to participate in healthy activities and
healthy lifestyles had a lower incidence of disease (Ryan, Patrick, Deci, & Williams, 2008).
Furthermore, when healthcare providers offered patients some degree of choice in their medical
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treatments, patients exhibited better health over time and better relationships with their providers
(Ryan, Patrick, Deci, & Williams, 2008).

Achievement Motivation

Much like self-determination theory, the research on achievement motivation maintains
that individuals seek to excel in what they do and actively strive to accomplish goals. Goals are
future-based ideals used to approach the achievement of an outcome or the avoidance of an
outcome (Elliot, 1999). More specifically, achievement goals “relate to wanting to develop,
attain, or demonstrate competence” (Harackiewicz, Barron, & Elliot, 1998, pg. 2). The approachavoidance distinction comes from Elliot (1999), who argued that approach goals are utilized to
pursue success and seek out positive outcomes, whereas avoidance goals are important in
avoiding negative outcomes like failure (McClleland, 1985; Muis, Winne, & Edwards, 2009).
Another important dimension of the achievement goal framework is the quality of the
goal pursued, which is determined by the type of outcome (e.g., develop competence, a mastery
goal, versus demonstrate competence, a performance goal). According to Ames (1992; Ames &
Archer, 1988), mastery goals are used to integrate the task value into one’s current value system,
bolster self-efficacy, and foster deep learning. Conversely, performance goals are important in
accomplishing tasks, outperforming others, or completing something quickly with minimal effort
(Ames, 1992; Murayama, Elliot, & Friedman, 2012). Individuals driven primarily by
performance goals tend to complete work well, but do not glean any additional knowledge from
the task, unlike individuals driven primarily by mastery goals.
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Together, the theories of mastery and performance goals, and approach and avoidance
goals comprise the 2 x 2 achievement goal model (see Figure 3 for an illustration). The 2 x 2
achievement goal framework has been used in a myriad of studies on achievement motivation
and performance, particularly scholastic achievement (Bipp & van Dam, 2014).

Mastery-Approach
Goals

Performance-Approach
Goals

Mastery-Avoidance
Goals

Performance-Avoidance
Goals

Valence

Positive
(Success)

Performance

Negative
(Failure)

Mastery

Figure 3. A redrawing of the 2 x 2 achievement goal model (Ames, 1992; Ames & Archer,
1988; Elliot, 1999).

In academic settings, approach goals are important in student perceptions of interest and
value of the activity, as well as persistence in their academic efforts (Pintrich, 2000). On the
other hand, avoidance goals in academia have been linked to maladaptive behaviors like cheating
and plagiarism (Pintrich, 2000). In a study of students majoring in accounting, Dull, Schleifer,
and McMillan (2015) found that both mastery and performance approach-goals were integral to
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student success in the accounting course. Others have found mastery-approach goals to be
important in predicting student affect, and performance-avoidance goals to predict anxiety
toward school and more boredom in school (Ranellucci, Hall, & Goetz, 2015).
Mastery-avoidance achievement goals helped students to strive to avoid academic losses
(i.e., failing a test, losing points on a homework assignment) (Senko & Freund, 2015). In a
similar vein, Michou, Vansteenkiste, Mouratidis, and Lens (2014) found that autonomous versus
controlled motivation influenced student performance in school and had a significant impact on
the types of goals (e.g., mastery, performance, approach, avoidance) adopted by the students.
Students who engaged in their coursework autonomously had higher needs for achievement
(Michou et al., 2014). These students also reported allocating more effort to their studies and
education (Michou et al., 2014), than participants reporting more controlled motivation.
To summarize, the research on achievement motivation suggests that people innately
strive for successful performance on a given activity (McClleland, 1961; Nicholls, 1984). High
achievement motivation may help individuals approach their work, study, or leisure activities
with a need for success and skilled performance, which is supported by meta-analytic evidence
that achievement motivation in fact carries over into multiple domains (Van Yperen, Blaga, &
Postmes, 2014).

Pilot Work

Theories of achievement motivation argue that this construct is a stable trait that predicts
performance across domains. However, there has been little research examining the effect of
achievement motivation in a vigilance context. Because there is little research investigating the
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influence of achievement motivation in sustained attention tasks (Schneider & Eckelt, 1975;
Slade, 1988; Slade & Rush, 1991), the present pilot work remains relatively exploratory. Thus,
the goal of this pilot work is relatively simple in that the effects of achievement motivation on
vigilance performance, as well as dependent measures of perceived stress and workload, will be
examined to better inform the hypotheses that were developed for the present dissertation. One
limitation of this pilot work was that response time was unable to be collected due to an error in
the software. It is important to note that this error was addressed for all four experiments
described later in this dissertation.

Procedures
Data were collected from one participant at a time in a quiet laboratory space. All
participants were required to surrender any timepieces, such as watches or mobile phones prior
to participation in the study. It is important to note that participants were not aware of the length
of the vigil, but that the entire experiment would not exceed two hours. First, participants were
provided an informed consent and then completed pre-task measures (e.g., pre-DSSQ and the
AMS).
Following this, participants were introduced to the practice task, which required
approximately 1-2 minutes to complete. The practice task demonstrated the difference between
critical signals and neutral events, as well as allowed participants to acclimate to the task. After
the short practice task, participants completed the vigil. The researcher left the room at this time.
The entire task was approximately 24 minutes in length and consisted of four periods on watch
with the restriction that signals were presented on adjacent trials (i.e., one critical signal would
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never immediately follow another critical signal). Five critical signals appeared at random within
each six-minute period on watch. The second critical signal never appeared immediately after the
first signal.
After the vigil, participants then completed all post-task measures (e.g., post-DSSQ and
the NASA-TLX) and provided relevant demographic information. The order of self-report
measures used in this study were counterbalanced across participants to control for order effects
and included: the Ray Achievement Motivation Scale (AMS; Ray, 1979), DSSQ (Matthews et
al., 2002), NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988), and a demographics form. All measures were
administered using Qualtrics survey software on a desktop computer.

Participants

The sample consisted of 59 (39 females; 20 males) undergraduate students (76.3%
freshmen; 15.3% sophomores; 8.5% juniors) recruited from the research participation system at
the University of Central Florida. The average age of participants was 18.75 years (Median =
18.00 years, SD = 1.65 years). The oldest student in this sample was 27-years-old and the
youngest student was 18 years of age. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Participants were asked refrain from consuming caffeine 24 hours prior to participation
in this study.
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Conditions

Participants were randomly assigned to either a sensory-based vigilance task requiring
perceptual processing or cognitive-based task requiring symbolic processing (Szalma & Teo,
2012). Twenty-six participants were randomly assigned to the cognitive condition and 33 to the
sensory condition. For purposes of analyses, a median split was performed after data collection
to divide participants by high or low achievement motivation. Participants scoring under twentyone points (which was the average achievement motivation score reported by this sample) on the
AMS were categorized as being low in achievement motivation and participants scoring over
twenty-one points on the AMS formed the high achievement motivation group. After this mean
split was performed, sixteen participants low in achievement motivation (AchM) were assigned
to the cognitive condition and seventeen participants low in achievement motivation were
assigned to the sensory condition. Sixteen participants high in achievement motivation were
assigned to the sensory condition and ten participants high in achievement motivation were
assigned to the cognitive condition (note that different sample sizes are a result of data cleaning).

Results and Discussion

Participants low in AchM reported an average score of 19.03 (SD = 1.63) on the AMS,
whereas participants high in AchM reported an average score of 24.46 (SD = 2.52). AchM was
not significantly correlated with any measures of performance or with the condition to which
participants were assigned. Participants higher in AchM outperformed peers lower in
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achievement but only in a cognitive vigilance condition (Dewar & Szalma, 2016), which may
afford more engagement because it is more challenging and complex (Matthews, 2016).
Overall, participants reported a moderate degree of global workload associated with the
vigilance tasks (M = 43.50, SD = 17.33). Participants reported moderate levels of engagement
with the vigilance tasks at pre-test (M = 19.28, SD =4.65), low levels of distress prior to
completing the vigilance tasks (M = 5.79, SD = 4.07), and moderate levels of worry at pre-task
(M = 18.84, SD = 5.89).
In terms of performance, the average number of false alarms across conditions was 3.25
(SD = 4.24) and the proportion of correctly detected critical signals was 85% (SD = .19), while
performance is not perfect, the results indicate that all participants exuded some effort in each
vigilance task and performance was not subject to a floor effect. The means and standard
deviations for these data are reported in Figure 4.
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Mean Stress and Workload Scores
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Figure 4. The figure includes stress and workload changes from pre-task to post-task for
participants high or low in achievement motivation in the cognitive and sensory conditions.
Note: blue columns = cognitive task low AchM; red columns = cognitive task high AchM; green
columns = sensory task low AchM; purple columns = sensory task high AchM.

A two (high or low achievement motivation) by two (cognitive or sensory condition)
factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed for change scores for each of the three
factors on the DSSQ: engagement, distress, and worry. There was a significant interaction
between achievement motivation and condition for the change in distress scores between pre-task
and post-task, F(3, 55) = 3.73, p < .10, Ƞp2 = .06. There was a significant change in distress
scores from pre-task to post-task for participants low in achievement motivation in the sensory
condition and for participants high in motivation in the cognitive condition. No main effects of
achievement motivation or condition were observed for pre-task or post-task scores on the
distress subscale of the short DSSQ. The most dramatic increase in distress between pre-task and
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post-task was observed for participants high in achievement motivation in the cognitive
condition and participants low in achievement motivation in the sensory condition.
There was a significant interaction between achievement motivation and condition for the
change in worry scores between pre-task and post-task, F(3, 55) = 3.86, p < .10, Ƞp2 = .07.
Participants low in achievement motivation in the sensory condition and participants high in
achievement motivation in the cognitive condition reported the greatest change in worry on the
short DSSQ. All worry scores decreased post-task. No main effects of achievement motivation
were observed for pre-task or post-task scores on the worry subscale of the short DSSQ. Worry
decreased for all groups between pre-task and post-task.
There were no significant main effects for pre-task or post-task engagement scores. There
was no significant interaction for pre-task engagement, post-task engagement, or change in
engagement scores. However, engagement decreased between pre-task and post-task across all
groups.
A two (high or low achievement motivation) by two (cognitive or sensory condition)
factorial ANOVA was performed on global workload scores. No significant main effects or
interactions were observed. Participants in the cognitive condition did not report significantly
greater workload associated with the task than participants in the sensory condition. Participants
high in achievement motivation did not report significantly greater workload associated with the
task than participants low in achievement motivation.
A two (high or low achievement motivation) by two (cognitive or sensory condition) by
four (watch period) mixed measures factorial ANOVA was performed for proportion of hits and
errors of commission. There were no significant effects of watch period on proportion of hits.
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There was a significant main effect of condition on proportion of hits, F(3, 55) = 28.43, p <
.001, Ƞp2 = .34. No other significant main effects or interactions were observed. Participants in
high in motivation in the cognitive condition outperformed participants low in achievement
motivation, but participants in the sensory condition correctly detected more signals. This could
be due to the information processing requirements related to the task. Participants in the sensory
condition performed similarly, regardless of high or low achievement motivation. The average
proportion of correct detections per period on watch is reported in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. The average proportion of correct detections are reported for the present pilot study for
participants low and high in AchM for both the sensory and cognitive conditions. Note: blue line
= cognitive task low AchM; red line = cognitive task high AchM; green line = sensory task low
AchM; purple line = sensory task high AchM.
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A two (high or low achievement motivation) by two (cognitive or sensory condition) by
four (watch period) mixed factorial ANOVA was performed for number of false alarms. There
was a significant effect of watch on proportion of false alarms, F(3, 55) = 9.47, p < .001,
Ƞp2 = .147. There was a significant watch by motivation interaction, F(3, 55) = 2.46, p < .10,
Ƞp2 = .043. Participants high in achievement motivation in the cognitive condition showed
consistently low rates of false alarms across all periods on watch. Interestingly, participants high
in achievement motivation did not commit any false alarms in the cognitive condition.
Participants high in achievement motivation in the sensory condition performed similarly to
participants low in achievement motivation in the cognitive and sensory conditions. False alarms
tended to decrease over time on watch. No other significant main effects or interactions were
observed. The average number of false alarms over time is reported in Figure 6.

10
9

Number of False Alarms

8
7
6
Cognitive Condition Low AchM

5

Cognitive Condition High AchM

4

Sensory Condition Low AchM

3

Sensory Condition High AchM

2
1
0
1

2

3

4

Period on Watch

Figure 6.The average number false alarms are reported for the present pilot study for
participants low and high in AchM for both the sensory and cognitive conditions. Note: blue line
= cognitive task low AchM; red line = cognitive task high AchM; green line = sensory task low
AchM; purple line = sensory task high AchM.
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The performance data indicated that participants high in achievement motivation behave
more like conservative responders. However, participants high in motivation in the sensory
condition performed similarly to participants low in motivation in the sensory and cognitive
conditions. Participants low in achievement motivation indicated some of the worst performance
in the cognitive vigilance task. Thus, it appears that achievement motivation impacts response
bias. Participants high in motivation in the cognitive condition did not achieve as much correct
detection as participants in the sensory condition. This performance effect is most likely an
artefact of the difficulty associated with the cognitive condition. The sensory task merely
requires perceptual sensitivity and does not include a symbolic manipulation component like the
cognitive task. Importantly, participants in the cognitive condition high in achievement
motivation committed the fewest false alarms.
Achievement motivation appears to be related to overall performance, at least in the
cognitive condition. This could be due to the challenge associated with the task, but this is a
speculation that will require further testing and hopefully an answer will be divulged in this
dissertation. Since the cognitive condition requires a working memory component, which may
appeal to participants high in achievement motivation, these individuals may approach this task
with a sense of mastery goals in mind: make as few mistakes as possible (i.e., false alarms,
misses) and correctly detect as many critical signals as possible.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRESENT RESEARCH

While a handful of studies examining extrinsic motivation or intrinsic motivation in
vigilance exist, there has been relatively little research on other possible manifestations of
motivation in vigilance (i.e., motivational manipulations to task perception, manipulations to task
instructions, etc.). Therefore, the present dissertation seeks to extend the understanding of the
role of motivation in vigilance. In this dissertation, two forms of motivation, achievement
motivation (a trait measure) and autonomous motivation (a state measure) will be examined in
relation to their effect on sustained attention in varying vigilance conditions.
Achievement motivation, which is the motivation to experience success, is associated
with the need to perform a given task in a manner that meets goal completion criteria.
Achievement motivation is not necessarily the innate joy of performing a specific activity, but it
may be closely related to intrinsic motivation. In a similar vein, autonomous motivation may
incorporate some facets of intrinsic motivation, but this type of motivation is another type of
motivation. Autonomous motivation, which is the motivation to experience and perceive choice,
focuses more on the need for choice or control over an aspect of the task, and less on the pure
enjoyment associated with the activity. Again, autonomous motivation should be related to
intrinsic motivation, but it is ultimately distinct. Importantly, pilot work demonstrated that
achievement motivation might help to offset the vigilance decrement, but does so differently than
autonomous motivation or other forms of motivation. The present dissertation will attempt to
further elucidate under which conditions these types of motivation influence vigilance
performance.
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To summarize, the present dissertation seeks to better understand the role of achievement
motivation and autonomous motivation on human performance in several vigilance tasks that
require different types of information processing (e.g., cognitive vs. sensory) and manipulate the
types of instructions surrounding the task (i.e., motivational or controlling). No study, to date,
has examined the role of instruction manipulations of motivation in conjunction with state and
trait measures of motivation across several vigilance conditions. It is possible that the way in
which a task is framed may influence vigilance performance by activating motivational schemas
(i.e., high or low autonomous motivation or high or low achievement motivation) linked to
performance.

Implications for Theory
As previously discussed in the literature review, there is substantial disagreement
regarding the mechanisms subsuming attention and information processing during vigilance
tasks. There is also disagreement amongst the three theories of vigilance over the role of
individual differences in vigilance performance. For example, as Thomson et al. (2015)
incorrectly propose that, “manipulations of task engagement should either have no effect on the
vigilance decrement or they should increase the decrement” (pg. 86). This would be untrue in
instances where motivation was used to manipulate engagement in the vigilance task.
Motivation, by definition, facilitates engagement in tasks, even in unimportant or boring tasks
(Deci et al., 1994; Ryan & Deci, 2000, 2008). Motivation is important in assisting the human
operator to “understand and cope with the task demands” (Matthews, 2016, pg. 801).
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Moreover, Thomson et al. (2015) argue that an “engagement condition would arguably
place the highest demand on attentional resources and should therefore have displayed a great
decrement according to the [resource-] depletion account” (pg. 87). This postulation fails to
consider motivational theories, which suggest that motivation directs and drives attention, as well
as behavior (Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013; Della Libera & Chelazzi,
2009; Hughes & Zaki, 2015; Zedelius, Broadway, & Schooler, 2015; Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts,
2012). Because of the debate betwixt these three theories of information processing, the present
dissertation seeks to understand the role of both achievement motivation and autonomous
motivation across several types of sustained attention tasks.

Goals for this Dissertation
There are several goals for the present dissertation. An overarching goal for this
dissertation is to systematically demonstrate the extent to which the design of the vigilance task
induces a performance decrement and how individual differences in motivation can potentially
offset this decline in performance over time. This research would support the theoretical idea that
the vigilance decrement may in fact be a phenomena constructed entirely by the researcher,
wherein the decrement can only be “defeated” based on the design of the task and appropriate
selection of individual differences (Hancock, 2013; Hancock et al., 2016).
The four following experiments seek to empirically compare the arguments proposed by
the three theories of information processing (i.e., the resource-depletion model, the mindlessness
account, and mind-wandering theory) in vigilance. This dissertation will consider the importance
of manipulating task type (i.e., cognitive, sensory) and task load (i.e., complexity) within a single
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study, as the results linked to motivation may differ based on the task type (as demonstrated by
pilot work and the broader vigilance literature). Different tasks require different forms of
information processing, thus individual differences may be better elucidated in one type of task
over another. Each study is explained in detail in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXPERIMENT ONE

Experiment One of this dissertation examined the role of individual variation in
autonomous motivation and achievement motivation with respect to engagement in vigilance
tasks, stress and workload associated with sustained attention, and vigilance performance across
task types. These individual differences in motivation have been selected because of their
influence on task engagement and potential influence on attention.

Hypotheses

Engagement and Motivation Measures

1) Achievement motivation (AchM) and autonomous motivation (AuM) should be
significantly related to the level of engagement and motivation at post-task. Task
engagement and motivation will be measured by energetic arousal, concentration, success
motivation, intrinsic motivation, task-related thoughts (TRTs), and task-unrelated
thoughts (TUTs). Cognitive task engagement will be measured using concentration,
TRTs, and TUTs.

Note: TRTs and TUTs are typically associated with the Worry dimension of the Dundee
Stress State Questionnaire. However, mind-wandering theory suggests that these
subfactors are unique byproducts of vigilance performance. This claim was tested across
each of the four experiments included in this dissertation.
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2) Specific hypotheses related to cognitive engagement were developed given the three
theories of information processing:
a. Under the resource theory account of vigilance, AchM and AuM should be
significantly related to concentration at post-task, but not under the mindlessness
or mind-wandering account.

b. If cognitively engaged with the task, AchM or AuM should be significantly
related to an increase in TRTs at post-task under the resource-depletion account.

c. According to mindlessness theory, there should be few if any TRTs.

d. Under the mind-wandering assumption, there will be high TRTs at pre-task and
low TRTs at post-task, regardless of the type of motivation involved in vigilance.

e. Assuming a resource theory perspective, if individuals are engaged with the task,
participants AchM or AuM should be related to a significant decrease in TUTs at
post-task.

f. According to mindlessness theory, there should be more TUTs as the mind drifts
away from the task because vigilance tasks afford this behavior.
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g. Under the mind-wandering assumption, there will be high TUTs if disengaged
with the task, especially at post-task as inward or outward task-unrelated thoughts
increase during the vigil.

Stress and Workload Measures

1) Achievement motivation (AchM) and autonomous motivation (AuM) may affect stress
and workload. Stress and workload will be measured by tense arousal, hedonic tone,
anger/frustration, and global workload. Thus, the hypotheses are as follows:

a. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to tense arousal. Participants
lower in motivation will lack effective coping strategies to overcome the
monotony associated with the task.

b. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to higher hedonic tone because
these individual differences are related to finding enjoyment in the task.

c. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to anger/frustration. Participants
lower in motivation will lack effective coping strategies related to managing
perceived anger and frustration.
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2) It is hypothesized that the cognitive task will be perceived as more work than the sensory
task based on previous evidence from the existing literature on vigilance.

a. However, participants high in AchM and AuM may be significantly related to
global workload. It is possible that participants high in AchM or AuM will
approach the cognitive task as if it is a complex challenge, which may reduce
overall perceived workload.

Performance Measures

1) Proportion of correct detections, number of false alarms, average response time, and
signal detection theory measures of sensitivity and response bias will serve as measures
of performance.

2) AchM and AuM should be significantly related to the proportion of correct detections
because individuals high in these differences want to strive toward success and perceive
control over their performance.

3) Similarly, AchM and AuM should be significantly related to the number of false alarms
because individuals high in these differences want to strive toward success and perceive
control over their performance, thus reporting a low number of false alarms over time.
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4) AchM and AuM may be significantly related to mean response time because previous
literature has demonstrated that motivation is linked to attention.

Participants

An a priori power analysis for ANCOVA was conducted for Experiment One using
G*Power Version 3.1 with a medium effect size and conventional criteria (α = 0.05, 1-β = 0.80;
Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007), which is useful tool that allows researchers in the
social, psychological, and biomedical sciences to estimate power and effect sizes prior to data
collection. This power analysis indicated that 72 participants needed to be recruited from the
University of Central Florida’s research participation system (SONA) for Experiment One. To
qualify for participation in the present study, participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and were at least 18 years of age or older. ANCOVA was selected as the method of data
analysis because the covariates AchM and AuM are continuous variables. ANCOVA permits
testing interactions between each of these continuous variables and both between-groups
(cognitive vs. sensory task condition) and within-groups (period on watch) independent
variables.
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Data Cleaning and Final Sample
One hundred participants were collected from the online SONA study pool for
Experiment One. Five of these participants were removed from the sample for incomplete
SuperLab data and three participants were removed for incomplete survey data.
The inclusion criteria were as follows: participants achieved a minimum score of 70%
correct detections (i.e., hits) in the first period on watch and did not commit more than two or
three standard deviations above ten false alarms in any given watch period. This inclusion
criteria was utilized for two reasons: 1) it is a common performance threshold utilized in the
vigilance literature, and 2) if the performance criteria were made stricter, the amount of data
included in the present study could be substantially reduced and another potential issue of
restriction of range could become present.
After data cleaning based on the inclusion criteria, the final sample for this study
consisted of 79 undergraduate students. Thirteen participants (10 cognitive task; 3 sensory task)
were removed for performance deviations that required them to be excluded from the present
analyses.

Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: cognitive or sensory. The
number of participants in each condition are included in Table 4.
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Table 4.The table below indicates the two conditions to which participants were randomly
assigned in Experiment One.
Task Type

Cognitive

Number of
Participants Assigned
to Each Condition
35

Sensory

44

In the sensory task, participants were asked to monitor only one specific quadrant at a
time (see Figure 7 for an example). The specific quadrant, which participants monitored, was
randomized across conditions to control for any effects related to quadrant location (i.e., top,
bottom, left, right). No such effects of the location were observed. Critical signals were cases in
which one of the digits in the two-digit pair was physically larger in font size than the other (see
Figure 7). Participants were instructed to press the spacebar on a keyboard when they detected a
critical signal. All other two-digit pairs were considered neutral events and participants were
asked to withhold response to these non-signals. This task required no symbolic manipulation,
merely perceptual processing, which is similar to bottom-up processing or spatial magnitude
processing.
Participants in the cognitive task were instructed to respond to critical signals that result
from symbolic manipulation (i.e., subtraction). Critical signals were cases in which the
difference between the two-digit pair was equal to -1, 0, or 1 (see Figure 7). Participants were
instructed to press the spacebar on a keyboard when they believed a critical signal had appeared
on the screen. All other difference solutions (i.e., -5, -3, 6, 8) were considered neutral events and
participants were asked to withhold response to these stimuli.
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An Example of Cognitive Stimuli

An Example of Sensory Stimuli

98

63

98

63

55

19

55

19

Instructions: Each display will
Instructions: Each display will
contain a 2-digit number. A critical
contain a 2-digit number. A critical
Figure 7. An example
of the
cognitive
versus sensory signal
stimuli
withwhen
task one
instructions
included for
signal happens
when
the difference
happens
digit is
between
the numbers
is -1,
0, or Teo
1.
clarification (from
Szalma
& Teo,
2012;
et al., 2011).
The
two
types
of tasks
bolded.
If no
critical
signals
are are redrawn
If no critical signals
are detected,
you should
not make a
together for comparison.
The red
highlighting indicatesdetected,
the display
participants
were asked to
you should not make a response.
response.

monitor (note: the red highlighting disappeared once the vigil began). Display location was
randomized once per participant.

Task Stimuli and Environment

Each experimental task consisted of four blocks of 123 neutral events and five critical
signals (i.e., signal probability of 0.039), or a total of 20 critical signals and 492 neutral events
over the course of a 21-minute vigil. Stimuli were presented for 2500 milliseconds using
SuperLab 4.0 software on a Dell Optiplex 745 desktop computer. The stimuli are adapted from
Szalma and Teo (2012). These stimuli have been psychophysically equated for discrimination
difficulty across a number of studies in our laboratory and across several other studies (Deaton &
Parasuraman, 1985; Fraulini, Claypoole, Dewar, & Szalma, 2016; Szalma & Teo, 2012).
Participants were seated approximately 50.8 centimeters from the desktop computer
monitor in a uniformly lit, quiet cubicle. Data were collected from only one person at a time. A
researcher was not present in the room for the vigil, but did return to administer the post-task
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surveys. All participants shut down electronic devices (e.g., cellphones, tablets, laptops, etc.) and
surrendered watches (if worn) to the researcher prior to beginning the experiment.

Measures

The survey software controlled for order effects during administration by randomly
counterbalanced pre- and post-task measures. All measures were completed prior to beginning
the vigil (with the exception of the demographic information, post-Dundee Stress State
Questionnaire, and NASA-TLX, which are post-task measures and administered at the end of the
vigil). All measures were completed online using the Qualtrics system survey software on the
desktop computer. Participants could leave an item blank if they did not wish to respond to it
(this is in accordance with IRB protocol; i.e., no forced response). Participants could ask the
researcher any questions at any time, except during the vigil in which the researcher left the
room.

Individual Difference Measures of Motivation

Intrinsic Motivation Inventory

The Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI; Deci et al., 1994; Ryan, 1982) is a state measure
of subjective experience related to intrinsic motivation and self-regulation. The IMI has been
found to have strong reliability and validity across samples (McAuley, Duncan, & Tammen,
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1989). The 25-item IMI consists of three subscales: perceived interest/enjoyment (8 items),
value/usefulness (9 items), and choice/autonomy over (8 items) a selected activity.
Given the manipulations to the instructions in subsequent studies of this dissertation and
the pilot work for this dissertation, only the autonomy/choice subscale of the IMI was utilized in
the present study. Higher scores on the IMI autonomy/choice subscale indicate that participants
feel more autonomous motivation toward the task than controlled motivation. The reliability of
this measure for Experiment One is reported in Appendix I.

Achievement Motivation Scale

The Ray Achievement Motivation Scale (AMS; Ray, 1979) is a trait index of student
achievement. The AMS has been cross-culturally validated and the average of the crossvalidation reliabilities indicated that Cronbach’s α = .70. The short form of the AMS consists of
fourteen questions, with seven items requiring reverse scoring. Higher scores on the AMS
indicate stronger motivation toward achievement and success. The reliability of this measure for
Experiment One is reported in Appendix I.
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Stress and Workload Measures
Dundee Stress State Questionnaire

The Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews et al., 2002) was used to assess
the subjective stress levels of participants in the experiment. The long version (i.e., 70 to 90-item
version, Matthews et al., 2002) yields eleven primary scales that measure the following: mood
and affect, motivation, cognitive state, and thinking style, all of which are of particular interest to
this dissertation. After reverse-scoring relevant items, the items corresponding to each subscale
are then summed to compute a score for that particular subscale. Higher scores indicate more of
that factor. For example, higher scores on the motivation subscales indicate higher motivation
toward the task at pre- or post-task.

NASA-Task Load Index

The NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988) has been used extensively to measure the
perceived workload associated with sustained attention tasks (Warm, Dember, & Hancock,
1996). The NASA-TLX is comprised of six subscales: Mental Demand, Physical Demand,
Temporal Demand, Performance, Frustration, and Effort. These six subscales are used to
calculate an overall, or “global,” workload score. Participants rate each subscale from 0 – 100,
with 100 indicating a high level of workload and 0 reflecting very little. Next, participants
completed fifteen paired comparisons. Participants are asked which subscale in each pair
contributed more to workload, and these were used to compute a weighted scale score. Higher
scores are indicative of greater workload.
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Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory and were seated at a cubicle in the data collection
room. Next, participants read and signed an electronic informed consent. Participants then
proceeded to complete the pre-task individual difference measures (e.g., AMS,
Autonomy/Choice subscale of the IMI) and pre-task stress measures (e.g., pre-DSSQ).
Participants then completed a short set of practice trials (approximately one-two minutes in
duration), which were designed to facilitate understanding of the presentation pace, as well as
practice recognizing and responding to critical signals.
After the brief practice trial, participants completed either the cognitive or sensory
vigilance task (participants were randomly assigned to either condition). Instructions within this
practice trial explained how to complete the task. Participants were asked to press the spacebar if
they detected a critical signal. When the vigil ended, participants completed all post-task
measures (e.g., post-DSSQ, NASA-TLX). Demographic information was collected at the end of
the study. Participants were given a post-participation form and thanked for their participation in
the study. A visual representation of the procedures is illustrated in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. A pictorial representation of the procedures used in the present dissertation. Double
arrows represent randomized counterbalancing of the measures to control for order effects.

Descriptive Statistics

Data from 79 undergraduate students (53 females; 26 males) was collected from the
research psychology pool (SONA) at the University of Central Florida for Experiment One. Of
the students who participated, 58.2% were freshmen, 15.2% were sophomores, 19.1% were
juniors, and 7.6% were seniors. The average age of participants was 19.25 years (Median = 19.00
years, SD = 1.95 years). The oldest student in this sample was 30-years-old and the youngest
student was 18 years of age. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Participants indicated that they did not to consume caffeine 24 hours prior to this study.
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The participants included in the present study did not differ substantially from those
excluded from Experiment One (based on inclusion criteria). For example, the average age of
participants that were excluded was 19.08 years of age (Range: 18 – 24), 3 male participants
were removed, and 10 female participants were removed. There was only one significant
difference between participants that were included and those that were excluded from analyses.
Participants differed significantly across post-task tense arousal; participants excluded
from the present analyses reported a higher average post-task tense arousal score, which had a
relatively large effect. The complete engagement, motivation, stress, and workload scores for the
participants removed from Experiment One are listed in Appendix J. The effect sizes for
analyses on the excluded data are included in Appendix K.

Results

Engagement and Motivation Measures
The average AchM score was 22.32 (SD = 3.68; Range: 16.00 – 32.00) and the average
AuM score was 35.15 (SD = 10.36; Range: 7.00 – 49.00). There was a slight negative skew for
AchM scores and a strong positive skew for AuM scores. AchM and AuM scores were used as
covariates to conduct separate one-way Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) with task type as
the independent variable and pre-task and post-task engagement and motivation measures as the
dependent variables.
The purpose of the ANCOVA was to test for interactions between the individual
difference variables (e.g., AchM and AuM, respectively) and the independent variables (e.g.,
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task type, time on watch). Thus, the main effects of condition and time are not of primary
concern in this dissertation, but are included for the purposes of completeness. The means and
standard deviations of these measures are reported in Table 5. The means and standard
deviations for the full DSSQ are reported in Appendix D.

Table 5. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of
engagement and motivation (N = 79).
Cognitive Task
Sensory Task
Overall
(N = 35)
(N = 44)
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
22.63
22.07
22.32
AchM
(4.23)
(3.22)
(3.68)
33.34
36.59
35.15
AuM
(9.47)
(10.91)
(10.36)
21.11
19.89
20.75
19.73
20.91
19.80
Success
(5.58)
(7.05)
(6.53)
(7.49)
(6.09)
(7.25)
Motivation
Intrinsic
Motivation

25.43
(3.51)

15.97
(4.92)

24.43
(6.01)

14.84
(5.26)

24.87
(5.05)

15.34
(4.92)

Energetic
Arousal

16.40
(4.49)

17.57
(4.41)

16.70
(3.80)

17.05
(4.02)

16.57
(4.10)

17.28
(4.18)

Concentration

15.09
(6.25)

7.94
(6.56)

15.88
(5.99)

6.23
(7.22)

15.53
(6.08)

6.99
(6.95)

TRTs

19.51
(7.78)

24.29
(7.49)

20.18
(8.15)

23.11
(7.00)

19.89
(7.94)

23.63
(7.20)

TUTs

17.86
(7.65)

15.03
(7.10)

17.50
(8.67)

14.77
(7.30)

17.66
(8.18)

14.89
(7.17)

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs
= task-unrelated thoughts. TRTs and TUTs are proposed to be indicators of engagement under
the mind-wandering account of vigilance. However, resource theorists argue that task
engagement manifests through intrinsic motivation, success motivation, concentration and
energetic arousal.
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There was a significant main effect of AchM, but not condition, on pre-task energetic
arousal, F(1, 75) = 5.44, p = .022, Ƞp2 = .068, and post-task energetic arousal, F(1, 75) = 5.36, p
= .023, Ƞp2 = .067. There were no additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations
to report for these analyses.
There was a significant interaction between AuM and task type on post-task intrinsic
motivation, F(1, 76) = 3.28, p = .074, Ƞp2 = .041. There was a significant main effect of AuM,
but not task type, on post-task energetic arousal, F(1, 75) = 6.13, p = .016, Ƞp2 = .076, pre-task
intrinsic motivation, F(1, 76) = 6.55, p = .012, Ƞp2 = .079, and post-task task-unrelated thoughts,
F(1, 76) = 5.90, p = .018, Ƞp2 = .072. There was a significant correlation between AuM scores
and pre-task intrinsic motivation (r = .261, p < .004) and post-task intrinsic motivation (r = .426,
p < .004). No additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations were observed for
these analyses. These correlations are reported in Appendix C.

Stress and Workload Measures

AchM and AuM scores were used as covariates to conduct separate one-way ANCOVAs
with task type as the independent variable and pre-task and post-task stress and workload
measures as the dependent variables. The means and standard deviations of these measures are
reported in Table 6. The means and standard deviations for the full NASA-TLX are reported in
Appendix E.
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Table 6. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of stress
and workload (N = 79).
Cognitive Task
(N = 35)
Pre
Post
12.86
17.03
(4.61)
(5.92)
25.54
22.23
(4.25)
(4.22)
7.46
11.03
(3.16)
(4.46)

Sensory Task
(N = 44)
Pre
Post
13.05
15.40
(3.67)
(4.93)
25.70
22.11
(3.73)
(4.36)
8.02
11.50
(3.61)
(4.65)

Global
Workload

38.37
(14.37)

38.68
(12.50)

38.55
(13.27)

Mental
Demand

42.91
(28.04)

31.55
(27.11)

36.58
(27.93)

Temporal
Demand

36.85
(28.39)

34.32
(25.95)

35.44
(26.91)

Physical
Demand

9.00
(8.34)

9.61
(9.77)

9.34
(9.11)

Perceived
Performance

33.86
(25.45)

48.45
(34.51)

41.98
(31.50)

Effort

36.43
(26.50)

26.45
(23.22)

30.87
(25.06)

Frustration

34.69
(31.06)

34.98
(35.00)

34.84
(33.10)

Tense
Arousal
Hedonic
Tone
Anger/
Frustration

Overall
Pre
12.96
(4.08)
25.63
(3.94)
7.77
(3.41)

Post
16.13
(5.42)
22.16
(4.27)
11.29
(4.55)

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Raw subscale averages and standard
deviations are reported for the NASA-TLX and are included for completeness.

There were no significant main effects or interactions when AchM was entered as the
covariate. However, there was a significant correlation between AchM scores and pre-task
anger/frustration, (r = -.300, p < .01), and post-task anger/frustration (r = -.485, p < .01). No
additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations were observed for these analyses.
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There was a significant effect of AuM, but not task type, on post-task tense arousal, F(1,
75) = 3.81, p = .055, Ƞp2 = .048, post-task hedonic tone, F(1, 76) = 21.31, p < .001, Ƞp2 = .219,
pre-task anger/frustration, F(1, 76) = 8.55, p = .005, Ƞp2 = .101, and post-task anger/frustration,
F(1, 76) = 25.305, p < .001, Ƞp2 = .250. There were no additional significant main effects,
interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses. These correlations are reported in
Appendix F.

Performance Measures

Mixed-measures ANCOVAs with task type as the between-subjects variable, period on
watch as the within-subjects variable, and AchM or AuM entered as the covariate were
performed on all dependent measures related to performance (e.g., proportion of correct
detections, number of false alarms, mean response time, sensitivity, and response bias). Separate
ANCOVAs were performed for each of these dependent variables. The correlations between
each type of motivation and the proportion of correct detections, number of false alarms, and
mean response time are reported in Appendix G.
There were no significant main effects or interactions to report for proportion of correct
detections when either AchM or AuM was entered into the separate mixed-measures
ANCOVAs. However, performance in terms of correct detections tended to be variable. The
proportion of correct detections tended to increase in Periods 2 and 4 for participants in the
cognitive condition, while performance decline for participants in the sensory condition until
Period 4 where an increase in proportion of correct detections was observed. The average
proportion of correct detections over time is displayed in Figure 9.
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Figure 9.The average proportion of hits with standard errors bars are reported for the sensory
and cognitive conditions for Experiment One.

Participants in the cognitive task tended to report fewer false alarms than participants in
the sensory condition. Participants in the cognitive task also tended to report fewer false alarms
as time on task increased.
When AuM was entered as the covariate into the mixed-measures ANCOVA, there was a
significant main effect of period on watch on number of false alarms committed, F(3, 225) =
3.41, p = .039, Ƞp2 = .043, ɛ = .619. There was a significant decline in the number of false alarms
committed as a function of period on watch. There were no additional significant main effects or
interactions to report for this analysis. There were no significant main effects or interactions
observed when AchM was entered into the mixed-measures ANCOVA. The average number of
false alarms committed over time is reported in Figure 10.
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Figure 10.The number of false alarms with standard error bars are reported for the sensory and
cognitive conditions for Experiment One (N = 79).

Participants in the sensory task reported lower response times for each period on watch,
compared to participants in the cognitive task. This finding is not unexpected given that the
cognitive task requires symbolic processing (i.e., performing simple subtraction) and the sensory
task requires perceptual processing (i.e., discriminating between larger and smaller digits).
There was a nearly significant main effect of AuM when it was entered into the mixedmeasures ANCOVA as the covariate, F(1, 75) = 3.57, p = .063, Ƞp2 = .046. Average response
time tended to decrease as autonomous motivation scores increased, according to correlation
analyses, which were albeit non-significant. There were no significant main effects or
interactions for response time when AchM was entered into the mixed-measures ANCOVA. The
means and standard deviations for response time are reported in Figure 11.
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Figure 11. The figure above includes the means and standard errors for the average response
time between conditions (N = 79). Note. Response time is reported in milliseconds.

Sensitivity and Response Bias

The proportion of correct detections and false alarms were used to compute indices of
sensitivity (d’; reported in Figure 12) and response bias (c; reported in Figure 13; See et al.,
1995). Separate mixed-measures ANCOVA with task type as the between-subjects variable,
period on watch as the within-subjects variable, and AchM or AuM as the covariate were
performed for sensitivity and response bias. While the cognitive and sensory task stimuli have
been psychophysically equated previously in the literature, it cannot be determined if they are
equated in the present Experiment. There were significant differences between the two task types
in terms of response bias, but both groups generally trended toward more conservative
responding over time.
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There was a main effect of watch period, but not task type or AchM, on sensitivity, F(3,
73) = 2.60, p = .053, Ƞp2 = .033. Pairwise comparisons indicated that there was a significant
difference in sensitivity between Periods 1 and 2 (p < .001), Periods 1 and 4 (p = .587), Periods 2
and 3 (p = .006), and Periods 3 and 4 (p = .003). The results indicated that sensitivity increased
between Periods 1 and 2 and then Periods 3 and 4, but decreased between Periods 2 and 3.There
were no other significant pairwise comparisons for period of watch. There were no other
significant main effects or interactions to report for these analyses. Achievement motivation was
not significantly correlated with sensitivity.
There were no significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for period
on watch, task type, or AchM on response bias. Achievement motivation was not significantly
correlated with response bias. Response bias tended to increase for both conditions, which
indicates that participants were more conservative in their responses over time.
There were no significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for period
on watch, task type, or AuM on sensitivity or response bias. Correlations are reported in
Appendix H.
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Figure 12. The figure above includes the means and standard errors for changes in sensitivity
across conditions and over time (N = 79).
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Figure 13. The figure above includes the means and standard errors for changes in response bias
across conditions and over time (N = 79).

Discussion

Engagement and Motivation

The results of Experiment One indicated that motivation is not necessarily a unified
construct; rather specific types of motivation may influence specific components of vigilance
performance. For example, achievement motivation was negatively related to energetic arousal at
pre-task and post-task, but autonomous motivation was not. However, achievement motivation
and autonomous motivation were both related to post-task cognitions, or post-task unrelated
thoughts. This implies that achievement motivation and autonomous motivation likely change
perceptions of the task once it is completed, or dictate the amount of energy required of the
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individual prior to beginning the vigilance task. The following three experiments included in this
dissertation will test this claim.
One issue identified in Experiment One was the lack of convergence between
achievement motivation and success motivation. Theoretically, both measures of motivation
should indicate a moderate, positive, and significant correlation, despite one measure being a
state measure and the other being a trait measure. However, this was not the case in Experiment
One. This finding calls into question the validity and reliability of the selected measure of
achievement motivation, the Ray Achievement Motivation Scale. To further elucidate the
reliability of this measure, it will be utilized in Experiments Two and Three to establish
reliability across two new samples of undergraduate students. It is important to note that it is
unlikely that success motivation in the DSSQ is operationalized poorly due the robust item
selection procedures that were utilized in the generation of the original DSSQ (Matthews et al.,
2002). It is suspected that the Ray Achievement Motivation Scale may have issues because it has
not been cross-culturally validated in a North American sample and the short version of the scale
has received less testing and validation than the long form. In a reliability analysis, the
Achievement Motivation Scale (Ray, 1979) demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha of .530 (14 items),
which is not indicative of a strong reliability. Furthermore, participant data indicated a slight
negative skew in achievement motivation, which indicates that participants in the sample in fact
reported lower scores for this trait measure (this is potentially a restriction of range issue).
In relation to the theories of information processing, the evidence demonstrated an
increase in post-task task-related thoughts, which indicates that participants were concerned
about their performance and cogitating on that performance at post-task. Anecdotally, many
participants were interested to know how they performed when the task concluded and asked the
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researcher if they could see their results. This desire to have knowledge of their results is not
particularly unexpected considering performance feedback was not provided during this study.
The findings related to cognitive engagement (i.e., post-task task-related and unrelatedthoughts) do not align with the assumptions of mind-wandering theory, which suggests that
participants either actively or passively disengage during a vigilance task causing the decrement.
These findings also do not support the mindlessness theory of vigilance, which suggests the mind
is thoughtless during vigilance performance and this results in the performance decrement. No
such decrement, as it is traditionally defined in the vigilance literature, was observed in either
task. In order to support mind-wandering theory, an increase in task-related thoughts at post-task
should not be observed; rather an increase in task-unrelated thoughts at post-task would need to
be observed. To conclude, preliminary evidence suggests that motivation could offset some
performance declines associated with vigilance performance, albeit it may not be a significant
effect of motivation on performance.

Stress and Workload

Participants in the cognitive task did not report significantly more global workload than
participants in the sensory condition. However, there was a significant difference between task
types in the amount of perceived mental effort that the task required. As hypothesized,
participants in the cognitive condition reported that the task was moderately effortful (Grier,
2015). These results support resource theory in that more resources are required for processing
due to the effortful nature of the cognitive task.
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There were no significant correlations between achievement motivation and any of the
stress and workload measures. This is indicates that achievement motivation is unlikely to be
related to perceiving and coping with stress. However, as previously noted, the selected measure
of achievement motivation may have not been appropriate as it has not been normed in a North
American sample.
Interestingly, autonomous motivation was significantly related to post-task tense arousal,
hedonic tone, and anger/frustration, which implies that autonomous motivation may affect the
stress and workload that are perceived post-vigil. Autonomous motivation appeared to
moderately correlate with lower tense arousal and anger/frustration at pre-task and post-task. It is
possible that autonomous motivation may act as a coping mechanism, which serves to lower
anger and frustration toward the task. However, additional studies are required to test this claim.
This finding is important for informing Experiment Three as motivation should further offset the
negative aspects of the vigilance task when compounded with task instructions that support
autonomy.
To summarize, achievement motivation does not appear to be helpful in coping with the
stress and workload associated with the task and has some limited involvement with engagement
in vigilance. The evidence seems to indicate that participants higher in autonomous motivation
may be more resilient to the demand and stress associated with vigilance tasks. It is likely the
case that autonomous motivation is a coping mechanism for the negative aspects of the vigilance
task, but Experiments Two, Three, and Four are required to test this idea.
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Performance

In terms of performance, it was clear that the cognitive task was more challenging to
perform than the sensory task. Participants in the cognitive condition exhibited longer response
times, less correct detection, and tended to commit more false alarms than participants in the
sensory task. Furthermore, the signal detection analyses indicate an increase in response bias
over periods on watch, which implies a shift toward more conservative responses over time for
both groups. Analysis of sensitivity scores indicated that the two groups were equivalent in their
ability to distinguish critical signals from neutral events. While the cognitive task may have
required more information processing and was perceived as more mentally demanding and
frustrating, the sensory task was not immune to the vigilance decrement (at least in terms of
correct detections reported for Periods 1 through 3 on watch). The lack of challenge associated
with the detection of perceptual stimuli resulted in a vigilance decrement during these periods of
watch.
To summarize, the results of the data from Experiment One related to engagement, stress,
workload, and performance tend to support to the resource-depletionist account of vigilance,
which suggests that cognitive resources are required to maintain vigilance. The respective effects
of achievement motivation and autonomous motivation suggest that motivation changes these
aspects of vigilance, which could explain the sporadic improvements in performance in the
cognitive condition and an increase in performance toward the end of the vigil in the sensory
condition.
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CHAPTER SIX: EXPERIMENT TWO

Experiment Two extended the work of Experiment One by increasing the information
processing requirements of the task by incorporating source complexity (i.e., increasing the
number of displays) into the task design. One purpose of this study was to understand the role of
motivation in varyingly complex vigilance tasks. Experiment Two demonstrated how changes in
task type and source complexity interact with motivational differences. This experiment tested
the idea that individual differences in motivation can offset or potentially eliminate the vigilance
decrement.
In addition to studying how motivation affects performance, another goal of this study is
to manipulate task design to elicit a vigilance decrement. In this study, it was possible to test the
claim that vigilance is a psychological phenomenon afforded by the task (Hancock, 2013;
Hancock et al., 2016). To conclude, in Experiment Two participants were randomly assigned to
monitor one, two, or four displays and were randomly assigned to the two types of vigilance
tasks (e.g., cognitive or sensory).

Hypotheses
Engagement and Motivation Measures

1) Achievement motivation (AchM) and autonomous motivation (AuM) should be
significantly related to the level of engagement and motivation at post-task. Task
engagement and motivation will be measured by energetic arousal, concentration, success
motivation, intrinsic motivation, task-related thoughts (TRTs), and task-unrelated
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thoughts (TUTs). Cognitive task engagement will be measured using concentration,
TRTs, and TUTs.

2) Specific hypotheses related to cognitive engagement were developed given the three
theories of information processing:

a. Under the resource theory account of vigilance, AchM and AuM should be
significantly related to concentration at post-task, but not under the mindlessness
or mind-wandering account.

b. If cognitively engaged with the task, AchM or AuM should be significantly
related to increased TRTs at post-task under the resource-depletion account.

c. According to mindlessness theory, there should be few if any TRTs.

d. Under the mind-wandering assumption, there will be high TRTs at pre-task and
low TRTs at post-task, regardless of the type of motivation involved in vigilance.

e. Assuming a resource theory perspective, if individuals are engaged with the task,
participants AchM or AuM should be related to a significant decrease in TUTs at
post-task.
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f. According to mindlessness theory, there should be more TUTs as the mind drifts
away from the task because vigilance tasks afford this behavior.

g. Under the mind-wandering assumption, there will be high TUTs if disengaged
with the task, especially at post-task as inward or outward task-unrelated thoughts
increase during the vigil.

Stress and Workload Measures

3) Achievement motivation (AchM) and autonomous motivation (AuM) may affect stress
and workload. Stress and workload will be measured by tense arousal, hedonic tone,
anger/frustration, and global workload. Thus, the hypotheses are as follows:

a. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to tense arousal. Participants
lower in motivation will lack effective coping strategies to overcome the
monotony associated with the task.

b. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to higher hedonic tone because
these individual differences are related to finding enjoyment in the task.

c. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to anger/frustration. Participants
lower in motivation will lack effective coping strategies related to managing
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perceived anger and frustration.

4) It is hypothesized that the cognitive task will be perceived as more work than the sensory
task based on previous evidence from the existing literature on vigilance.

a. However, participants high in AchM and AuM may be significantly related to
global workload. It is possible that participants high in AchM or AuM will
approach the cognitive task as if it is a complex challenge, which may reduce
overall perceived workload.

Performance Measures

1) Proportion of correct detections, number of false alarms, average response time, and the
signal detection theory measures of sensitivity and response bias.

2) AchM and AuM should be significantly related to the proportion of correct detections
because individuals high in these differences want to strive toward success and perceive
control over their performance.

3) Similarly, AchM and AuM should be significantly related to the number of false alarms
because individuals high in these differences want to strive toward success and perceive
control over their performance, thus reporting a low number of false alarms over time.
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4) AchM and AuM may be significantly related to mean response time because previous
literature has demonstrated that motivation is linked to attention.

Participants

An a priori power analysis was conducted for Experiment Two using G*Power Version
3.1 with a medium effect size and conventional criteria (α = 0.05, 1-β = 0.80; Faul et al., 2007) to
estimate power and effect sizes prior to data collection. Following this analysis, approximately
130 participants needed to be recruited from the University of Central Florida’s psychology
research participation system (SONA) to achieve the desired statistical power. ANCOVA was
utilized for statistical analyses because the covariates AchM and AuM are continuous variables.
To qualify for participation in Experiment Two, participants reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were at least 18 years of age or older. Participants were not
allowed to participate in multiple forms of this study, meaning if participants completed
Experiment One, they were not able to participate in Experiments Two, Three, or Four. A new
sample of SONA participants was obtained for each experiment in this dissertation. Participants
indicated that they did not consume caffeine 24 hours prior to the study.
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Data Cleaning and Final Sample

One hundred and thirty participants were collected from the SONA study pool for
Experiment Two. Six of these participants were removed from the sample for incomplete
SuperLab data.
The inclusion criteria were as follows: participants achieved a minimum score of 70%
correct detections (i.e., hits) in the first watch period and did not commit more than ten false
alarms in any given watch period, and participants had not previously participated in Experiment
One. The same rationale from Experiment One for the use of this performance cutoff applies to
Experiment Two.
After data cleaning, the final sample for this study consisted of 105 undergraduate
students. Nineteen participants were removed from this sample because of performance
deviations that did not meet the inclusion criteria. More specifically, three participants were
removed from the sensory one display condition, two participants were removed from the
sensory two display condition, five participants were removed from the sensory four display
condition, three participants were removed from the cognitive one display condition, one
participant was removed from the cognitive two display condition, and five participants were
removed from the cognitive four display condition.
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Design

In Experiment Two, participants were randomly assigned to either the cognitive or
sensory task and were required to monitor one, two, or four displays (randomized and
counterbalanced) to increase the complexity of the task to facilitate changes in processing
demand and observe the effect of motivation in a much more complex vigilance task (see Table
7).

Table 7. The table below indicates the conditions to which participants were randomly assigned
in Experiment Two.
Task Type

Source Complexity

Cognitive

One Display

Number of Participants
Assigned to Each Condition
13

Two Displays

20

Four Displays

9

One Display

20

Two Displays

26

Four Displays

17

Sensory

Task Stimuli and Environment

The task stimuli and experimental environment used in Experiment Two were identical to
participants used in Experiment One.
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Measures
The same measures from Experiment One were used in Experiment Two. The reliabilities
of these measures for Experiment Two are reported in Appendix I.

Procedure

The procedure for Experiment Two was the same as Experiment One, with one
exception. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions: 1) a cognitive task with
one display, 2) a cognitive task with two displays, 3) a cognitive task with four displays, 4) a
sensory task with one display, 5) a sensory task with two displays, or, 6) a sensory task with four
displays.

Descriptive Statistics

One hundred and five undergraduate students (68 females; 35 males; 2 transgender) were
recruited from the SONA psychology research pool at the University of Central Florida for
Experiment Two. Of participants who participated, 63.1% were freshmen, 15.2% were
sophomores, 13.2% were juniors, and 8.5% were seniors. The average age of participants was
19.44 years (Median = 19.00 years, SD = 2.40 years). The oldest student in this sample was 32years-old and the youngest student was 18 years of age. All participants reported normal or
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corrected-to-normal vision. Participants indicated that they did not to consume caffeine 24 hours
prior to this study.
The participants included in the present study did not differ substantially from those
excluded from Experiment Two (based on inclusion criteria). For example, the average age of
participants that were excluded was 19.74 years of age (Range: 18 – 29), 5 male participants
were removed, and 14 female participants were removed. There was only one significant
difference between participants that were included and those that were excluded from analyses.
Participants differed significantly across pre-task concentration; participants excluded
from the present analyses reported a higher average pre-task concentration score, which had a
relatively large effect. The complete engagement, motivation, stress, and workload scores for the
participants removed from Experiment Two are listed in Appendix J. The effect sizes for
analyses on the excluded data are included in Appendix K.

Results
Engagement and Motivation Measures
The average AchM score was 21.92 (SD = 3.40; Range: 17.00 – 32.00) and the average
AuM score was 35.47 (SD = 9.35; Range: 13.00 – 49.00) across all conditions. There was a
moderate negative skew for achievement motivation scores and a robust positive skew for
autonomous motivation scores, which indicates that many participants in this sample reported
being high in this state motivation.
A two (condition) x three (number of displays) ANCOVA with AchM or AuM as the
covariate was performed on all dependent measures related to motivation and engagement (note:
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the same measures from Experiment One were used). Separate ANCOVAs were performed for
each pre-task and post-task measure. The means and standard deviations of these measures
across task types are reported in Table 8. The means and standard deviations of these measures
across number of displays are reported in Table 9. Correlations of AchM and AuM with the
engagement and motivation measures are reported in Appendix C.

Table 8. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of
motivation and engagement across task type (N = 105).

Success
Motivation

Cognitive Task
(N = 42)
Pre
Post
22.40
(3.43)
34.07
(9.56)
12.36
16.95
(7.57)
(6.90)

Sensory Task
(N = 63)
Pre
Post
21.60
(3.37)
36.41
(9.17)
14.92
19.94
(8.28)
(6.42)

Pre
21.94
(3.39)
35.37
(9.37)
13.92
(8.03)

18.79
(6.74)

Intrinsic
Motivation

21.86
(4.63)

11.74
(4.66)

21.03
(5.07)

11.60
(5.23)

21.32
(4.88)

11.63
(4.97)

Energetic
Arousal

15.95
(3.72)

17.19
(4.07)

16.98
(4.03)

17.22
(4.30)

16.56
(3.91)

17.18
(4.18)

Concentration

21.88
(5.49)

9.36
(6.34)

21.82
(6.35)

6.63
(6.73)

21.78
(6.00)

7.71
(6.65)

TRTs

10.93
(8.66)

21.21
(7.17)

11.37
(8.28)

20.75
(5.51)

11.25
(8.38)

20.94
(6.17)

TUTs

9.76
(8.99)

14.19
(7.17)

9.95
(8.64)

16.06
(6.63)

9.93
(8.72)

15.25
(6.88)

AchM
AuM

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations.
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Overall
Post

Table 9. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of
motivation and engagement across the number of displays (N = 105).

Success
Motivation

One Display
(N = 33)
Pre
Post
22.24
(2.86)
35.42
(9.65)
14.21
19.52
(9.13)
(7.65)

Two Displays
(N = 46)
Pre
Post
21.67
(3.54)
34.63
(9.53)
14.13
17.83
(7.43)
(5.12)

Four Displays
(N = 26)
Pre
Post
21.96
(3.93)
37.44
(8.74)
13.00
19.80
(8.14)
(7.92)

Intrinsic
Motivation

21.03
(4.21)

11.06
(5.28)

21.85
(4.94)

12.28
(4.81)

20.72
(5.67)

11.20
(5.05)

Energetic
Arousal

16.06
(3.95)

16.48
(4.66)

17.23
(3.65)

17.73
(3.62)

16.08
(4.39)

17.44
(4.43)

Concentration

21.64
(6.57)

7.82
(7.25)

20.82
(5.99)

8.13
(5.99)

24.08
(4.38)

6.76
(7.36)

TRTs

10.21
(9.05)

19.06
(6.04)

12.00
(7.43)

21.26
(5.27)

11.12
(9.46)

22.96
(7.46)

TUTs

9.36
(8.26)

14.00
(6.78)

10.76
(8.05)

15.08
(6.78)

8.96
(10.53)

17.38
(6.95)

AchM
AuM

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations.

There was a significant interaction between task type and number of displays, but not
AchM, on post-task task-related thoughts, F(2, 93) = 3.40, p = .038, Ƞp2 = .068. Participants in
the cognitive condition observing four displays reported the greatest number of post-task taskrelated thoughts (M = 24.75, SD = 9.59), whereas participants in the sensory condition observing
only one display reported the fewest post-task task-related thoughts (M = 19.52, SD = 4.59).
There was a significant three-way interaction between condition, number of displays, and
AuM, on post-task energetic arousal, F(2, 93) = 3.43, p = .037, Ƞp2 = .069. In follow-up
ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables on post-task
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energetic arousal, only one result was significant. There was a significant effect of the covariate
AuM on post-task energetic arousal in the cognitive task wherein participants monitored only
one display, F(1, 11) = 4.92, p = .049, Ƞp2 = .309.
Participants in the sensory condition observing only one display (M = 16.38, SD = 4.05)
and four displays (M = 16.23, SD = 4.29) reported the lowest levels of energetic arousal at posttask. There was also a significant main effect of number of displays on post-energetic arousal,
F(2, 93) = 4.59, p = .012, Ƞp2 = .089. Participants in the cognitive task observing two (M =
17.40, SD = 2.96) or four displays (M = 18.75, SD = 4.33) reported the most energetic arousal at
post-task. Participants in the sensory task displayed some of the lowest energetic arousal at posttask, which is similar to what was observed at pre-task.
There was also a significant main effect of task type on post-task concentration, F(1, 93)
= 3.41, p = .068, Ƞp2 = .035. Participants in the cognitive task reported more concentration at
post-task than participants in the sensory condition.
There was a significant correlation between autonomous motivation and post-task success
motivation (r = .227, p < .05), pre-task intrinsic motivation (r = .344, p < .01), post-task intrinsic
motivation (r = .355, p < .01), and pre-task concentration (r = .217, p < .05). No additional
significant correlations, main effects, or interactions were observed with autonomous motivation
as a covariate.

Stress and Workload Measures

A two (condition) x three (number of displays) ANCOVA with either AchM or AuM as
the covariate was performed on all outcome measures related to stress and workload. Separate
93

ANCOVAs were performed for each pre-task and post-task measure. The means and standard
deviations of these measures by task type are reported in Table 10. The means and standard
deviations of these measures by number of displays are reported in Table 11. The means and
standard deviations for the full DSSQ and NASA-TLX are reported in Appendix D. The
correlations between measures of stress and workload and the covariates are included in
Appendix F.
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Table 10. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of stress
and workload across task types (N = 105).
Cognitive Task
(N = 42)
Pre
Post
12.14
15.50
(3.40)
(5.92)
25.21
21.74
(4.02)
(3.64)
7.24
10.52
(2.66)
(4.44)

Sensory Task
(N = 63)
Pre
Post
13.02
15.13
(3.41)
(4.42)
25.67
22.62
(4.14)
(4.10)
8.56
10.89
(3.72)
(4.02)

Global
Workload

41.45
(13.23)

31.17
(24.05)

39.25
(12.84)

Mental
Demand

43.26
(27.63)

32.35
(25.36)

36.61
(26.71)

Temporal
Demand

34.38
(28.54)

23.68
(22.50)

28.26
(25.58)

Physical
Demand

11.05
(15.45)

8.76
(8.50)

9.96
(12.07)

Perceived
Performance

60.45
(31.92)

48.62
(32.84)

53.75
(32.93)

Effort

35.74
(27.88)

25.22
(22.33)

29.91
(25.47)

Frustration

30.81
(29.53)

33.24
(30.79)

32.81
(30.55)

Tense
Arousal
Hedonic
Tone
Anger/
Frustration

Overall
Pre
12.65
(3.40)
25.46
(4.07)
8.00
(3.38)

Post
15.29
(5.03)
22.22
(3.94)
10.83
(4.25)

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Raw subscale averages and standard
deviations on the NASA-TLX subscales are reported for purposes of completeness.
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Table 11. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of stress
and workload across number of displays (N = 105).
One Display
(N = 33)
Pre
Post
12.46
13.54
(2.89)
(4.29)
25.06
22.57
(4.37)
(4.24)
8.26
11.26
(3.18)
(4.83)

Two Displays
(N = 46)
Pre
Post
12.72
15.59
(3.99)
(4.53)
25.30
22.02
(4.18)
(4.00)
7.89
10.34
(3.68)
(4.01)

Four Displays
(N = 26)
Pre
Post
12.80
17.20
(2.97)
(6.13)
26.32
22.08
(3.38)
(3.49)
7.84
11.12
(3.16)
(3.89)

Global
Workload

39.59
(9.33)

35.49
(13.20)

45.09
(13.86)

Mental
Demand

38.37
(27.12)

31.61
(25.17)

44.19
(27.86)

Temporal
Demand

23.83
(22.77)

23.78
(20.43)

42.81
(31.89)

Physical
Demand

12.14
(13.79)

9.98
(12.81)

6.81
(6.49)

Perceived
Performance

43.46
(33.89)

61.72
(32.74)

53.73
(28.27)

Effort

29.27
(23.90)

28.63
(26.71)

31.04
(24.60)

Frustration

24.45
(27.51)

37.02
(30.59)

33.77
(31.78)

Tense
Arousal
Hedonic
Tone
Anger/
Frustration

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Raw subscale averages and standard
deviations on the NASA-TLX subscales are reported for purposes of completeness.

There was a significant main effect of condition on post-task tense arousal, F(1, 93) =
6.32, p = .014, Ƞp2 = .063. Participants in the cognitive condition (M = 19.50, SD = 7.03) and
sensory condition (M = 16.12, SD = 5.56) observing four displays reported the greatest post-task
tense arousal across the groups. Participants observing only one display in either the sensory or
cognitive condition reported the lowest levels of post-task tense arousal. No additional main
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effects or interactions were observed with achievement motivation as a covariate. No significant
correlations between AchM and the workload and stress measures were observed.
There was a significant main effect of AuM on post-task hedonic tone, F(1, 93) = 3.62,
p < .001, Ƞp2 = .131. Similar post-task hedonic tone was reported across participants in the
sensory conditions, regardless of the number of displays. Participants in the cognitive condition
monitoring two (M = 21.25, SD = 2.84) or four displays (M = 21.87, SD = 3.72) reported the
lowest post-task hedonic tone. Participants in the sensory condition observing only one display
reported the most anger/frustration at post-task (M = 11.90, SD = 4.47).
There was a significant correlation between AuM and pre-task hedonic tone (r = -.212, p
< .05), post-task hedonic tone (r = .402, p < .01), pre-task anger/frustration (r = -.277, p < .05),
and post-task anger/frustration (r = -.212, p < .05). It is possible that participants high in
autonomy may have found the lack of autonomy in the study stressful before completing the
task. However, the correlation between post-task hedonic tone and AuM reversed direction. No
further significant correlations, main effects, or interactions were observed with autonomous
motivation as a covariate.

Performance Measures

Mixed-measures ANCOVAs with task type and number of displays as the betweensubjects factor, period on watch as the within-subjects factor, and AchM or AuM as the covariate
were performed on all measures related to. Separate ANCOVAs were performed for each of
these dependent measures. Performance varied greatly based on task type and number of
displays. Correlations between the measures of performance and the covariates are included in
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Appendix G. The means and standard deviations of the proportion of correct detections are
reported in Figures14, 15, and 16.
There was a nearly significant interaction between task type and period, but not AuM, on
proportion of correct detections, F(3, 279) = 2.62, p = .051, Ƞp2 = .027. There was also a
significant main effect of period on watch on proportion of correct detections, F(3, 279) = 3.944,
p = .009, Ƞp2 = .041. Participants in the sensory condition detected significantly more targets
than participants in the cognitive condition over time. There was also a significant correlation
between AuM and the proportion of correct detections in Period 3 of watch (r = .306, p < .01)
and overall correct detections (r = .208, p < .05). No additional significant main effects,
interactions, or correlations could be reported when AuM was entered as the covariate.
There were no significant main effects or interactions to report when AchM was entered
into the ANCOVAs as the covariate in analyses performed on proportion of correct detections.
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Figure 14. The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
for each of the conditions in Experiment Two.

99

100.00%
90.00%

Proportion of Hits

80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

Cognitive

89.52%

72.86%

80.48%

80.48%

Sensory

98.73%
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Figure 15. The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
across task type for Experiment Two.
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Figure 16. The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
across source complexity for Experiment Two.
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The means and standard deviations of the number of false alarms demonstrated in
Experiment Two are reported in Figures 17, 18, and 19. There was a significant main effect of
period, but not number of displays, or AchM on the number of false alarms, F(3, 279) = 2.87, p =
.037, Ƞp2 = .030. Participants observing four displays demonstrated higher false alarm rates over
time, regardless of assignment to the four display sensory condition or cognitive condition. No
additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations for AuM or AchM could be
reported.

Number of False Alarms

4
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3
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2
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1
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Cognitive - One Display

1.29
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0.14

0.14

Cognitive - Two Displays

1.65

0.5
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0.85

Cognitive - Four Displays

2.38

1.5

1

0.5

Sensory - One Display

1.55

0.5

0.6

0.1

Sensory - Two Displays

1.31

0.35

0.85

0.15

Sensory - Four Displays

1.29

1.06

0.94

0.47

Figure 17. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported for each of
the conditions in Experiment Two.
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Figure 18. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported across task
type in Experiment Two.
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1.46

0.41
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0.46

Four Display

1.62

1.19
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Figure 19. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported across
source complexity in Experiment Two.

There was a significant three-way interaction between period, number of displays, and
the covariate AuM on response time, F(6, 279) = 2.19, p = .044, Ƞp2 = .045. In follow-up
ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables on period and AuM,
only one result reached significance. There was a main effect of period on mean response time
for participants randomly assigned to the sensory task with one display to monitor, F(3, 16) =
8.68, p = .001, Ƞp2 = .325, ɛ = .728. There was also a significant interaction between period and
AuM on mean response time for participants in the sensory task with one display to monitor,
F(3, 16) = 4.42, p = .016, Ƞp2 = .197, ɛ = .728. Based on the data from participants assigned to
this condition, the results of a linear regression indicated that as autonomy motivation increased;
mean response time decreased over period on watch. But, AuM was not significantly correlated
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with the average response time across any of the periods on watch for participants assigned who
monitored one display in the sensory task (r for Period 1 = .288, r for Period 2 = -.251, r for
Period 3 = -.372, r for Period 4 = -.193).
There were no additional significant correlations, main effects, or interactions to report
for these analyses or for ANCOVAs performed utilizing AchM as the covariate. The average
response times across each period of watch are included in Figures 20, 21, and 22.
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Figure 20.The average response time with standard errors bars are reported for each of the
conditions in Experiment Two. Note response time was not recorded for one participant in
Period 2.
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Figure 21. The average response time with standard errors bars are reported across task type in
Experiment Two.
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Figure 22. The average response time with standard errors bars are reported across source
complexity in Experiment Two.

Sensitivity and Response Bias

The proportion of correct detections and false alarms were used to compute indices of
sensitivity (d’; reported in Figures 23-25) and response bias (c; reported in Figure 26-28; See et
al., 1995). Response bias tended to increase over time, indicating that participants were
becoming more conservative in their response to stimuli across each period on watch.
Mixed-measures ANCOVAs with task type and number of displays as the betweensubjects variables, period on watch as the within-subjects variable, and AchM or AuM as the
covariate were performed on all measures related to these indices. Separate ANCOVAs were
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performed for each of these dependent variables. Correlations between the measures of
sensitivity, response bias, and the covariates are included in Appendix H.
There was a significant main effect of task type on sensitivity, F(1, 93) = 5.03, p = .027,
Ƞp2 = .051, but not achievement motivation. There were no additional significant main effects,
interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses. There were no significant main effects,
interactions, or correlations when AchM was entered as the covariate for analyses related to
response bias. There were no significant main effects or interactions when AuM was entered as
the covariate in the analyses on sensitivity.
There was a significant two-way interaction between period and AuM on response bias,
F(3, 279) = 3.21, p = .023, Ƞp2 = .033. There was a significant main effect of period on response
bias, F(3, 279) = 4.95, p = .002, Ƞp2 = .051. There was a significant difference in response bias
between Periods 1, 2, 3, and 4. There was a significant correlation between AuM and Period 2 (r
= -.201, p < .05), and Period 3 (r = -.222, p < .05), in terms of response bias. There were no
additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
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Figure 23.The figure above includes the means and standard errors for changes in sensitivity
across conditions and over time (N = 105).
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Figure 24. The figure above includes the means and standard errors for changes in sensitivity
across task type.
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Figure 25. The figure above includes the means and standard errors for changes in sensitivity
across source complexity.
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Figure 26. The figure above includes the means and standard errors for changes in response bias
across conditions and over time (N = 105).
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Figure 27. The figure above includes the means and standard errors for changes in response bias
across task type.
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Figure 28. The figure above includes the means and standard errors for changes in response bias
across source complexity.

Discussion

Engagement and Motivation

Participants monitoring more displays in the cognitive task tended to report significantly
more post-task task-related thoughts than participants assigned to the sensory task. Thus, it could
be argued that the sensory condition fails to produce cognitive engagement, or, it is possible that
this task does not afford much intellectual engagement. The lower energetic arousal scores
reported by participants in the sensory task and participants that only monitored one display
during the vigil support this latter claim. In the Matthews et al. (2002; see also Matthews, 2016)
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instantiation of post-task task-unrelated thoughts, these results could also imply that the
cognitive task induces more worry about one’s performance.
In terms of motivation, all display conditions indicated lower pre-task achievement
motivation, followed by a numerical increase in reported post-task success motivation. However,
an inverse relationship occurred for intrinsic motivation. Each condition reported higher intrinsic
motivation scores at pre-task with subsequent declines in intrinsic motivation at post-task. A
similar trend occurred for pre- and post-task concentration. Clearly, individuals entered the task
with initially modest degrees of motivation and concentration; however, upon conclusion of the
vigil, motivational resources were significantly depleted.
This claim is supported by the significant three-way interaction observed between
autonomous motivation, task type, and number of displays on post-task intrinsic motivation.
Participants in the cognitive condition observing four displays demonstrated the highest degree
of post-task intrinsic motivation, whereas participants in the sensory conditions reported some of
the lowest post-task intrinsic motivation scores. Similarly, participants in the cognitive two- and
four-display conditions reported the highest degree of post-task energetic arousal. Participants in
the sensory conditions reported some of the lowest post-task energetic arousal scores.
Coupled with the high rate of attrition in the cognitive four-display condition, it is likely
the case that complex cognitive vigilance tasks require an autonomously motivated individual to
perform, while sensory-based complex tasks may not. Conversely, it is possible that
autonomously motivated individuals are prepared to complete a more cognitively demanding
task, whereas participants in the sensory conditions perceive more monotony, which is afforded
by the nature of the task. Experiments Three and Four seek to further test these claims.
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Stress and Workload

Perceived stress scores for pre-task and post-task were similar across the task types and
the number of displays, prior to entering achievement motivation and autonomous motivation
separately as covariates. There was a significant interaction between task type, number of
displays, and achievement motivation on post-task tense arousal. Participants in the cognitive
condition observing four displays reported the greatest post-task tense arousal in all conditions.
Participants in the sensory condition monitoring only one display reported some of the lowest
levels of post-task tense arousal when achievement motivation was covaried with task type and
number of displays.
Similar trends in the data were observed when autonomous motivation was entered as the
covariate. However, this variable appeared to interact with task type and display for post-task
hedonic tone, and to a lesser extent with post-task tense arousal. For example, the significant
three-way interaction between task type, number of displays, and autonomous motivation
indicated that participants in the cognitive condition monitoring two or four displays reported
some of the lowest post-task hedonic tone. In the same vein, the significant three-way
interactions observed between task type, number of displays, and autonomous pre- and post-task
anger/frustration yielded similar results. Participants in the single display sensory condition
reported some of the highest anger/frustration at pre- and post-task. There were also significant
correlations between autonomous motivation and post-task hedonic tone and pre-task
anger/frustration, respectively, which indicated that participants higher in autonomous
motivation perceive more pleasantness (i.e., hedonic tone) associated with the task and less
anger/frustration associated with the task. Autonomous motivation may engage effective coping
strategies to combat the negative aspects of the vigilance task (i.e., repetition, monotony, etc.).
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In terms of global workload, there were no significant differences to report between task
types when AchM or AuM were entered as covariates. Although the difference was not
significant, participants in the cognitive task reported more global workload than participants in
the sensory condition, which indicates that this task type requires more mental work and demand.
Participants in the cognitive two-display conditions reported some of the lowest levels of global
workload compared to participants monitoring only one display or observing all four displays.
This manifests as a sort of “Goldilocks effect,” wherein the experimenter is able to create a task
that is somewhat engaging, but not overly demanding in terms of workload and stress.

Performance

Similar trends to participants observed in Experiment One were observed in Experiment
Two: participants in the sensory task tended to outperform participants in the cognitive task.
Participants in the sensory conditions outperformed participants in the cognitive condition, but as
previously indicated, there was less motivation and greater stress and workload associated with
performing the sensory task. Participants in the sensory single display condition demonstrated
nearly perfect performance in correct detections over time; however, this group reported some of
the lowest motivation and highest stress and workload upon conclusion of the vigil. Meanwhile,
the traditional vigilance decrement was observed only for participants in the sensory four-display
condition.
In each instantiation of the cognitive condition, temporal effects on performance tended
to be variable in terms of the proportion of correct detections with these values decreasing, and
then increasing over time. This could in part be due to the nature of the cognitive task. However,
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this trend is most likely attributed to autonomous motivation, which was significantly correlated
with period on watch. It is possible that cognitive task may afford more cognitive engagement
and when combined with an individual difference such as high autonomous motivation,
participants strive to perform as well as possible, rather than submit to the boredom and
monotony associated with the vigilance task. The same conclusions cannot be formulated for the
sensory task. It should be noted that these results do not necessarily align with some of the extant
literature (for a meta-analysis see See et al., 1995), which states that cognitive tasks may yield
better performance than sensory tasks. The reason for this difference could be in part due to the
event rate being relatively high.
In terms of false alarms, there was a significant effect of period on watch, but not
motivation. There were trends in the data that indicated as the number of displays increased, the
number of false alarms also increased. This makes sense given that participants were required to
monitor an increased amount of information in the four-display condition and may be more
likely to commit false alarms. Participants in the four display conditions reported more false
alarms over time than any other condition. It is likely the case that as source complexity
increases, false alarm-related performance becomes more error prone. This claim is supported by
significant interactions between time, number of displays, and achievement motivation. These
findings support the claim that the vigilance decrement could be a manifestation of both
individual differences influencing performance, as well as a symptom of the boredom and
monotony associated with performing the vigil.
In terms of response time, response time tended to become increasingly laggard over
time, with one exception. The average response time of participants assigned to the two-display
cognitive task demonstrated a decrease in response time as time on task increased. This finding is
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not typically observed in vigilance research. However, this result could be due to the significant
relationship between autonomous motivation, time, and the optimal amount of information to
process (i.e., two displays in the cognitive task). While it is argued that the vigilance decrement
is iatrogenically created, these results provide preliminary evidence indicating that the same can
be said for cognitive engagement in vigilance tasks, which implies that the level of engagement
could be caused by the task’s design.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EXPERIMENT THREE

Experiment Three extended the results of Experiment One by manipulating the type of
task instructions participants received. Instructions were adapted to facilitate the experience of
greater perceived autonomy (i.e., autonomy-supportive motivation) or less perceived autonomy
(i.e., controlled motivation). It was demonstrated in pilot work and a handful of previous
vigilance studies (Dember et al., 1992; Isard & Szalma, 2015) that manipulations to task
instruction types could influence engagement in the vigilance task at pre- and post-task. It was
hypothesized that autonomy-supportive instructions would result in an increased motivation to
perform the task.

Hypotheses

Engagement and Motivation Measures

1) Achievement motivation (AchM) and autonomous motivation (AuM) should be
significantly related to the level of engagement and motivation at post-task. Task
engagement and motivation will be measured by energetic arousal, concentration, success
motivation, intrinsic motivation, task-related thoughts (TRTs), and task-unrelated
thoughts (TUTs). Cognitive task engagement will be measured using concentration,
TRTs, and TUTs.
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2) Specific hypotheses related to cognitive engagement were developed given the three
theories of information processing:

a. Under the resource theory account of vigilance, AchM and AuM should be
significantly related to concentration at post-task, but not under the mindlessness
or mind-wandering account.

b. If cognitively engaged with the task, AchM or AuM should be significantly
related to increased TRTs at post-task under the resource-depletion account.

c. According to mindlessness theory, there should be few if any TRTs.

d. Under the mind-wandering assumption, there will be high TRTs at pre-task and
low TRTs at post-task, regardless of the type of motivation involved in vigilance.

e. Assuming a resource theory perspective, if individuals are engaged with the task,
participants AchM or AuM should be related to a significant decrease in TUTs at
post-task.

f. According to mindlessness theory, there should be more TUTs as the mind drifts
away from the task because vigilance tasks afford this behavior.
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g. Under the mind-wandering assumption, there will be high TUTs if disengaged
with the task, especially at post-task as inward or outward task-unrelated thoughts
increase during the vigil.

3) Instruction manipulations to motivation should exacerbate engagement in the vigilance
task, as well as increase motivation to perform the task when instructions are autonomysupportive. Perceived choice in the activity will increase motivation to perform the
activity, thus there should be a significant relationship between the covariates measuring
motivation and the type of instructions participants receive.

Stress and Workload Measures

1) Achievement motivation (AchM) and autonomous motivation (AuM) may affect stress
and workload. Stress and workload will be measured by tense arousal, hedonic tone,
anger/frustration, and global workload. Thus, the hypotheses are as follows:

a. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to tense arousal. Participants
lower in motivation will lack effective coping strategies to overcome the
monotony associated with the task.

b. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to higher hedonic tone because
these individual differences are related to finding enjoyment in the task.
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c. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to anger/frustration. Participants
lower in motivation will lack effective coping strategies related to managing
perceived anger and frustration.

2) It is hypothesized that the cognitive task will be perceived as more work than the sensory
task based on previous evidence from the existing literature on vigilance.
a. However, participants high in AchM and AuM may be significantly related to
global workload. It is possible that participants high in AchM or AuM will
approach the cognitive task as if it is a complex challenge, which may reduce
overall perceived workload.

Performance Measures

1) Proportion of correct detections, number of false alarms, average response time, and
signal detection theory measures of sensitivity and response bias will serve as measures
of performance.

2) AchM and AuM should be significantly related to the proportion of correct detections
because individuals high in these differences want to strive toward success and perceive
control over their performance.

a. Instruction manipulations to motivation should exacerbate engagement in the
vigilance task, which should also manifest in changes to performance, meaning
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autonomous motivation, achievement motivation, and task instructions (i.e.,
autonomy-supportive instructions) should be significantly related to improved
performance in terms of proportion of correct detections.

3) Similarly, AchM and AuM should be significantly related to the number of false alarms
because individuals high in these differences want to strive toward success and perceive
control over their performance, thus reporting a low number of false alarms over time.

a. Instruction manipulations to motivation should exacerbate engagement in the
vigilance task, which should also manifest in changes to performance, meaning
autonomous motivation, achievement motivation, and task instructions (i.e.,
autonomy-supportive instructions) should be significantly related to a lower rate
of false alarms

4) AchM and AuM may be significantly related to mean response time because previous
literature has demonstrated that motivation is linked to attention.

a. Instruction manipulations to motivation should exacerbate engagement in the
vigilance task, which should also manifest in changes to performance, which
would result in a significant interaction between either AchM or AuM, period on
watch, and instruction type on mean response time. If instructions facilitate
participant engagement in the task, they should respond more quickly to correct
detections and report fewer false alarms, which effect average response time.
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Participants

An a priori power analysis was conducted for Experiment Three using G*Power Version
3.1 using a medium effect size and conventional criteria (α = 0.05, 1-β = 0.80; Faul et al., 2007)
to estimate power and effect sizes prior to data collection. Following this analysis, approximately
112 participants were recruited from the University of Central Florida’s psychology research
participation system (SONA).
To qualify for participation in the present study, participants reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were at least 18 years of age or older. Participants who completed
either Experiments One or Experiment Two were not able to participate in Experiments Three or
Four. Participants were asked not to consume caffeine 24 hours prior to the study.

Data Cleaning and Final Sample

One hundred and twelve participants were collected from the SONA study pool for
Experiment Three. Five of these participants were removed from the sample for incomplete
SuperLab data and three participants were removed for incomplete survey data.
The inclusion criteria were as follows: participants achieved a minimum score of 70%
correct detections (i.e., hit rate) in the first watch period and did not commit more than ten false
alarms in any given watch period. The same rationale from the previous experiments applies to
the use of this cutoff criteria for Experiment Three.
After further data cleaning based on inclusion criteria, the final sample for this study
consisted of 93 undergraduate students. Eleven participants were removed from this sample
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because of performance deviations that did not meet the inclusion criteria. More specifically,
data from eight participants in the cognitive task receiving controlling instructions and three
participants from the sensory task receiving controlling instructions were eliminated from the
following analyses. Interestingly, no participants removed from the autonomy-supportive
instruction conditions in terms of performance-based inclusion criteria.

Design

In Experiment Three, participants were randomly assigned to either the cognitive or
sensory vigilance task and receive either autonomy-supportive instructions or controlling
instructions (see Table 12). Participants were required to monitor one specific quadrant at a time.
The quadrant, which participants monitored, was randomized across conditions to control for any
effects related to the location of the quadrant (i.e., top, bottom, left, right). No such location
effects were observed.
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Table 12. The table below indicates the conditions to which participants were randomly assigned
in Experiment Three.
Task Type

Instruction Type

Cognitive

Autonomy-Supportive

Number of Participants
Assigned to Each
Condition
19

Controlling

22

Autonomy-Supportive

20

Controlling

32

Sensory

Autonomy-supportive instructions read (by the participant on a computer and aloud by a
research assistant) as follows (note this example is worded for the cognitive condition): “In the
following experiment, you will be asked to attend to 1, 2, or 4 displays (described on the next
slide). Each display will contain a 2-digit number (shown below). You will watch the display for
a critical signal. A critical signal appears when the difference between the 2 digits is -1, 0, or 1.
For example, 23 (2 minus 3 equals -1), 55 (minus 5 equals 0) and 10 (1 minus 0 equals 1) could
all be possible critical signals. But, 91 (9 minus 1 equals 8), 04 (0 minus 4 equals -4), and 68 (6
minus 8 equals -2) would not be critical signals. When you are ready, please press any key to
continue.” The last sentence of the instructions appeared on all subsequent instruction slides to
facilitate the perception of autonomy. Instructions were not present when the vigil began.
Participants could ask questions to the researcher, if they had any, prior to beginning the vigil.
The controlling instructions were read (by the participant on a computer and aloud by a
research assistant) as follows (note this example is worded for the cognitive condition): “In the
following experiment, you will be asked to attend to 1, 2, or 4 displays (described on the next
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slide). Each display will contain a 2-digit number (shown below). You will watch the display for
a critical signal. A critical signal appears when the difference between the 2 digits is -1, 0, or 1.
For example, 23 (2 minus 3 equals -1), 55 (minus 5 equals 0) and 10 (1 minus 0 equals 1) could
all be possible critical signals. But, 91 (9 minus 1 equals 8), 04 (0 minus 4 equals -4), and 68 (6
minus 8 equals -2) would not be critical signals. Press the spacebar to continue.” This last
sentence of the instructions appeared on all subsequent instruction slides to decrease the
perception of autonomy or choice in the activity. Instructions were not present when the vigil
began. Participants could ask questions to the researcher, if they had any, prior to beginning the
vigil.

Task Stimuli and Environment

The task stimuli and environment of Experiment Three were identical to participants used
in Experiment One.

Measures

The same measures from Experiment One were used in Experiment Three. The
reliabilities of these measures for Experiment Three are reported in Appendix I.
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Procedure

The procedure for Experiment Three was the same as Experiment One, with one
exception. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions: 1) a cognitive task with
autonomy-supportive instructions, 2) a cognitive task with controlling instructions, 3) a sensory
task with autonomy-supportive instructions, or, 4) a sensory task with controlling instructions.

Descriptive Statistics

Data from 93 undergraduate students (53 females; 39 males; 1 transgender) was collected
from the SONA pool for Experiment Three. Of participants who participated, 68.9% were
freshmen, 15.2% were sophomores, 9.7% were juniors, and 6.2% were seniors. The average age
of participants was 19.11 years (Median = 18.00 years, SD = 1.96 years). The oldest student in
this sample was 29-years-old and the youngest student was 18 years of age. All participants
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants indicated that they did not to
consume caffeine 24 hours prior to this study.
The participants included in the present study did not differ substantially from those
excluded from Experiment Three (based on inclusion criteria). For example, the average age of
participants that were excluded was 20.73 years of age (Range: 18 – 34), 2 male participants
were removed, and 9 female participants were removed. There were two significant differences
between participants that were included and those that were excluded from these analyses.
Participants differed significantly across pre- and post-task intrinsic motivation, which
are a part of the task engagement factor of the DSSQ. Participants excluded from the present
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analyses reported both higher pre- and post-task intrinsic motivation scores than those included
in the present sample, which is a finding accompanied by a very large effect and large effect,
respectively. The complete engagement, motivation, stress, and workload scores for the
participants removed from Experiment Three are listed in Appendix J. The effect sizes for
analyses on the excluded data are included in Appendix K.

Results
Engagement and Motivation Measures
The average AchM score was 21.84 (SD = 3.40; Range: 16.00 – 30.00). The average
AuM score was 34.97 (SD = 9.16; Range: 7.00 – 49.00). There was a strong positive skew for
the autonomous motivation scores, which indicates that many participants self-reported being
high in this state measure. Furthermore, there was a moderate negative skew for the achievement
motivation scores, which indicates that participants tended to self-report being somewhat lower
in achievement motivation.
AchM or AuM scores were used as covariates, and task type and instruction type were
used as independent variables to perform separate ANCOVAs on all engagement and motivation
outcome measures. Separate ANCOVAs were performed for each pre-task and post-task
measure. ANCOVA was used because the covariates are continuous variables.
The means and standard deviations for the measures of engagement and motivation by
task type are reported in Table 13. The means and standard deviations for the measures of
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engagement and motivation by instruction type are reported in Table 14. Correlations of AchM
and AuM with the engagement and motivation measures are reported in Appendix C.

Table 13. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of
motivation and engagement across the type of task (N = 93).

Success
Motivation

Cognitive Task
(N = 41)
Pre
Post
21.05
(3.32)
36.22
(9.32)
19.41
20.17
(9.07)
(6.79)

Sensory Task
(N = 52)
Pre
Post
22.46
(3.36)
33.98
(9.00)
20.50
18.77
(6.56)
(7.18)

Pre
21.84
(3.40)
34.97
(9.16)
20.02
(7.74)

19.39
(7.01)

Intrinsic
Motivation

18.51
(4.48)

11.46
(4.22)

17.69
(4.53)

12.88
(4.37)

18.05
(4.50)

12.26
(4.34)

Energetic
Arousal

17.83
(4.21)

18.39
(5.16)

16.33
(3.96)

16.92
(4.91)

16.99
(4.12)

17.57
(5.05)

Concentration

18.68
(6.94)

10.19
(6.49)

16.37
(5.91)

7.63
(7.27)

17.39
(6.46)

8.76
(7.02)

TRTs

15.07
(8.20)

19.61
(7.09)

16.13
(7.54)

18.88
(5.31)

15.67
(7.81)

19.20
(6.13)

TUTs

13.29
(8.41)

12.92
(6.96)

14.25
(7.56)

15.40
(6.59)

13.83
(7.91)

14.31
(6.83)

AchM
AuM

Overall
Post

Note. TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs = task-unrelated thoughts. Numbers in parentheses
represent standard deviations.
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Table 14. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of
motivation and engagement across instruction type (N = 93).

AchM
AuM
Success
Motivation

Autonomy-Supportive
Instructions
(N = 42)
Pre
Post
21.98
(3.61)
34.79
(9.58)
21.36
19.64
(7.31)
(6.42)

Controlling
Instructions
(N = 51)
Pre
Post
21.73
(3.24)
35.12
(8.90)
18.92
19.18
(7.98)
(7.52)

Intrinsic
Motivation

17.95
(3.39)

12.05
(4.49)

18.14
(5.28)

12.43
(4.25)

Energetic Arousal

16.83
(4.76)

17.45
(5.95)

17.12
(3.55)

17.67
(4.22)

Concentration

17.31
(6.01)

9.21
(5.94)

17.45
(6.86)

8.39
(7.83)

TRTs

16.60
(7.14)

20.26
(6.20)

14.90
(8.32)

18.33
(5.99)

TUTs

14.74
(7.79)

13.64
(5.46)

13.08
(8.00)

14.86
(7.79)

Note.
TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs = task-unrelated thoughts. Numbers in parentheses represent
standard deviations.

There was a significant interaction between the covariate AchM and task type on posttask intrinsic motivation, F(1, 85) = 7.91, p = .006, Ƞp2 = .085, as well as pre-task concentration,
F(1, 85) = 5.05, p = .027, Ƞp2 = .056. Participants in the sensory condition reported the highest
post-task intrinsic motivation scores (M = 12.88, SD = 4.37), but reported the lowest pre-task
concentration scores (M = 16.37, SD = 5.91) relative to the cognitive condition (M = 18.68, SD =
6.94).
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There was also a significant interaction between instruction type and task type on pretask concentration, F(1, 85) = 4.32, p = .041, Ƞp2 = .048, and pre-task task-unrelated thoughts,
F(1, 85) = 7.04, p = .009, Ƞp2 = .077. Participants in the cognitive condition receiving autonomysupportive instructions reported the highest degree of pre-task concentration (M = 19.27, SD =
4.57), whereas participants in the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions
reported the lowest pre-task concentration (M = 15.15, SD = 6.75).
There was a significant main effect of the covariate AchM, but not task type or
instruction type, on pre-task energetic arousal, F(1, 85) = 10.82, p = .001, Ƞp2 = .113, and posttask energetic arousal, F(1, 85) = 8.00, p = .006, Ƞp2 = .086. There was a significant correlation
between AchM and post-task success motivation (r = -.295, p < .004), pre-energetic arousal (r =
-.385, p < .004), and post-energetic arousal (r = -.326, p < .004). There were no additional
significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
There was a significant three-way interaction between instruction type, task type, and the
covariate AuM on pre-task concentration, F(1, 85) = 5.94, p = .017, Ƞp2 = .065, as well as a
significant interaction between instruction type and autonomous motivation on pre-task
concentration, F(1, 85) = 4.18, p = .044, Ƞp2 = .047. In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the
effects of each level of the independent variables on pre-task concentration, several results
reached significance. There was a significant effect of the covariate AuM on pre-task
concentration in both sensory tasks, which includes participants receiving autonomy-supportive
instructions, F(1, 18) = 5.87, p = .026, Ƞp2 = .246, and participants receiving controlling
instructions, F(1, 30) = 6.21, p = .018, Ƞp2 = .171. There was also a significant effect of the
covariate AuM on pre-task concentration in the cognitive task when participants were given
controlling instructions, F(1, 17) = 17.61, p = .001, Ƞp2 = .509. When AuM was entered as the
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covariate in these analyses, participants in the cognitive condition receiving autonomysupportive instructions reported the highest pre-task concentration (M = 19.27, SD = 4.57),
whereas participants in the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions
reported the lowest amount of pre-task concentration (M = 15.15, SD = 6.75).
There was also a significant interaction between autonomous motivation and instruction
type on post-task task-unrelated thoughts, F(1, 85) = 4.58, p = .035, Ƞp2 = .051. Participants
receiving controlling instructions reported fewer post-task task-unrelated thoughts, whereas
participants in the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions reported the
most post-task task-unrelated thoughts (M = 16.35, SD = 6.29).
There was a significant main effect of the covariate AuM, but not task type or instruction
type, on pre-task energetic arousal, F(1, 85) = 5.39, p = .023, Ƞp2 = .060, post-task energetic
arousal, F(1, 85) = 12.18, p = .001, Ƞp2 = .125, post-task success motivation, F(1, 85) = 9.28, p =
.003, Ƞp2 = .098, pre-task intrinsic motivation, F(1, 85) = 7.39, p = .008, Ƞp2 = .080, pre-task
concentration, F(1, 85) = 24.24, p < .001, Ƞp2 = .222, post-task concentration, F(1, 85) = 10.20, p
= .002, Ƞp2 = .107, pre-task task-unrelated thoughts, F(1, 85) = 7.54, p = .007, Ƞp2 = .082, and
post-task task-unrelated thoughts, F(1, 85) = 12.55, p = .001, Ƞp2 = .129.
There was a significant interaction between instruction type and task type on pre-task
concentration, F(1, 85) = 6.70, p = .011, Ƞp2 = .073, and pre-task task-unrelated thoughts, F(1,
85) = 4.88, p = .030, Ƞp2 = .054. As well, there was a significant main effect of instruction type
on pre-task concentration when AuM was entered as the covariate, F(1, 85) = 3.98, p = .049, Ƞp2
= .045, and post-task task-unrelated thoughts, F(1, 85) = 5.38, p = .023, Ƞp2 = .060. There was a
significant correlation between AuM and post-task success motivation (r = .330, p < .004), pretask concentration (r = .497, p < .004), post-task concentration (r = .347, p < .004), pre-task task-
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unrelated thoughts (r = -.321, p < .004), and post-task task-unrelated thoughts (r = -.396, p <
.004). There were no additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for
these analyses.

Stress and Workload Measures

An ANCOVA with task type and instruction type as the independent variables, and
AchM or AuM as the covariate, was performed on all outcome measures related to stress and
workload. Separate ANCOVAs were performed for each pre-task and post-task measure. The
means and standard deviations of stress and workload measures by task type are reported in
Table 15. The means and standard deviations for the measures of stress and workload measures
by instruction type are reported in Table 16. The means and standard deviations for the full
DSSQ are reported in Appendix D. The means and standard deviations for the full NASA-TLX
are reported in Appendix E.
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Table 15. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of stress
and workload across task type (N = 93).
Cognitive Task
(N = 41)
Pre
Post
11.95
13.97
(3.02)
(4.29)
26.24
23.15
(4.13)
(4.18)
7.34
9.63
(2.85)
(4.20)

Sensory Task
(N = 52)
Pre
Post
13.48
15.38
(3.46)
(3.74)
24.69
22.02
(4.87)
(4.20)
8.32
11.04
(3.95)
(4.27)

Global
Workload

41.72
(14.03)

36.01
(13.52)

38.53
(13.96)

Mental
Demand

43.63
(29.33)

28.37
(25.60)

35.10
(28.20)

Temporal
Demand

29.83
(26.03)

22.40
(21.93)

25.67
(23.98)

Physical
Demand

13.49
(19.94)

11.83
(16.39)

12.56
(17.96)

Perceived
Performance

47.46
(34.91)

45.90
(32.71)

46.59
(33.52)

Effort

35.63
(29.87)

29.25
(23.74)

32.06
(26.66)

Frustration

27.17
(30.35)

34.94
(31.58)

31.52
(31.12)

Tense
Arousal
Hedonic
Tone
Anger/
Frustration

Overall
Pre
12.81
(3.35)
25.38
(4.60)
7.89
(3.53)

Post
14.76
(4.04)
22.52
(4.21)
10.42
(4.28)

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Raw subscale averages and standard
deviations on the NASA-TLX subscales are reported for purposes of completeness.
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Table 16. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of stress
and workload across instruction type (N = 93).
Autonomy-Supportive
Instructions
(N = 42)
Pre
Post
12.31
14.69
(3.22)
(4.09)
25.26
22.38
(4.75)
(4.37)
7.64
10.40
(3.22)
(4.58)

Controlling
Instructions
(N = 51)
Pre
Post
13.22
14.82
(3.43)
(4.03)
25.47
22.63
(4.52)
(4.11)
8.10
10.43
(3.78)
(4.06)

Global
Workload

39.76
(14.33)

37.51
(13.72)

Mental
Demand

37.02
(28.04)

33.51
(28.51)

Temporal
Demand

24.12
(19.13)

26.96
(27.46)

Physical
Demand

8.98
(11.34)

15.51
(21.64)

Perceived
Performance

45.33
(34.41)

47.63
(33.08)

Effort

36.79
(27.14)

28.18
(25.87)

Frustration

36.12
(32.43)

27.73
(29.77)

Tense
Arousal
Hedonic
Tone
Anger/
Frustration

There was a significant interaction between instruction type, task type, and AchM on
global workload, F(1, 85) = 6.79, p = .011, Ƞp2 = .074. There was a significant interaction
between instruction type and task type on global workload, F(1, 85) = 5.59, p = .020, Ƞp2 = .062,
and significant interaction between instruction type and AchM on global workload, F(1, 85) =
7.10, p = .009, Ƞp2 = .077. There was a significant main effect of instruction type on global
workload, F(1, 85) = 5.17, p = .026, Ƞp2 = .057.
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In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on global workload, two results reached significance. There was a significant effect of the
covariate AchM on global workload in the cognitive task where participants received autonomysupportive instructions, F(1, 20) = 5.76, p = .026, Ƞp2 = .223, and in the cognitive task where
participants received controlling instructions, F(1, 5) = 6.62, p = .020, Ƞp2 = .280. Participants
receiving autonomy-supportive instructions reported more global workload in both the sensory
task (M = 38.15, SD = 12.54) and cognitive task (M = 41.21, SD = 15.94) relative to participants
receiving controlling instructions.
There was a significant main effect of AchM on pre-task hedonic tone, F(1, 85) = 7.10,
p = .009, Ƞp2 = .077, as well as post-task hedonic tone, F(1, 85) = 6.18, p = .015, Ƞp2 = .068.
There was a significant correlation between AchM and pre-task hedonic tone (r = -.320, p <
.003). There were no additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for
these analyses.
There was a significant main effect of AuM on post-task tense arousal, F(1, 85) = 7.10,
p = .009, Ƞp2 = .077, pre-task hedonic tone, F(1, 85) = 8.37, p = .005, Ƞp2 = .090, post-task
hedonic tone, F(1, 85) = 16.80, p < .001, Ƞp2 = .165, pre-task anger/frustration, F(1, 85) = 5.57, p
= .021, Ƞp2 = .061, and post-task anger/frustration, F(1, 85) = 8.60, p = .004, Ƞp2 = .092. There
was a significant correlation between AuM and post-task tense arousal (r = -.295, p < .01), pretask hedonic tone (r = .314, p < .003), post-task hedonic tone (r = .427, p < .003), pre-task
anger/frustration (r = -.274, p < .01), and post-task anger/frustration (r = -.343, p < .003). There
were no additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these
analyses.
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Performance Measures

Mixed-measures ANCOVAs with task type and instruction type as the between-subjects
factor, period on watch as the within-subjects factor, and AchM or AuM as the covariate were
performed on all outcome measures related to performance. Separate ANCOVAs were
performed for each pre-task and post-task measure. The means and standard deviations of the
proportion of correct detections are reported in Figures 29-31. The means and standard
deviations of the number of false alarms are reported in Figures 32-34. The average response
times per each period on watch are included in Figures 35-37. The correlations between
motivation and correct detections, false alarms, and mean response time are reported in
Appendix G.
There was a significant three-way interaction between instruction type, task type, and
AuM on proportion of correct detections, F(1, 85) = 4.27, p = .042, Ƞp2 = .048. There was also a
significant interaction between instruction type and task type on proportion of correct detections,
F(1, 85) = 4.26, p = .042, Ƞp2 = .048, as well as instruction type and AuM on proportion of
correct detections, F(1, 85) = 4.00, p = .049, Ƞp2 = .045. There was a significant main effect of
instruction type on proportion of correct detections, F(1, 85) = 4.27, p = .042, Ƞp2 = .048. There
was also a significant main effect of period on watch, but not AuM, on proportion of correct
detections, F(3, 255) = 3.06, p = .029, Ƞp2 = .035.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on period and AuM, only one result reached significance. There was a significant main effect of
AuM on proportion of correct detections for participants assigned to the cognitive task who
received autonomy-supportive instructions, F(1, 20) = 7.82, p = .011, Ƞp2 = .281. When correct
detection performance was plotted against AuM scores, there was a trend which indicated as
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AuM motivation increased, there was also a slight increase in the proportion of correct detections
over periods. Interestingly, observers in the sensory task receiving controlling instructions
reported the greatest proportion of correct detections over time. Participants in the cognitive task
demonstrated a decrease in performance during the second period on watch, but then
demonstrated an increase in performance during periods three and four (which is similar to what
was observed in Experiments One and Two). There were no additional significant main effects,
interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
There were no significant correlations, main effects, or interactions to report for the
proportion of correct detections when AchM was entered into the ANCOVA as the covariate.
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Figure 29. The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
for each of the conditions in Experiment Three.
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Figure 30. The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
across task type in Experiment Three.
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Figure 31. The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
across instruction type in Experiment Three.

There was a significant interaction between instruction type and period on watch, but not
AchM, on the number of false alarms, F(3, 255) = 2.71, p = .046, Ƞp2 = .031. Participants in the
sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions demonstrated some of the most
variable performance in terms of the number of false alarms reported over time. There were no
additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for the number of false
alarms when AchM was entered as the covariate.
There were no significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for the
number of false alarms when AuM was entered into the ANCOVA as the covariate.
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Figure 32. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported for each of
the conditions in Experiment Three.
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Figure 33. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported across task
type in Experiment Three.
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Figure 34. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported across
instruction type in Experiment Three.

There were no significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for mean
response time when AchM was entered into the ANCOVA as the covariate. There were no
significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for average response time when
AuM was entered into the ANCOVA as the covariate.
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Figure 35. The average response time with standard errors bars are reported for each of the
conditions in Experiment Three.
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Figure 36. The average response time with standard errors bars are reported across task type in
Experiment Three.

146

1600
1400

Response TIme in ms

1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

Autonomy-Supportive

886.7357

994.4356

1020.5595

989.7639

Controlling

840.0186

957.2961

932.8072

932.6003

Figure 37. The average response time with standard errors bars are reported across instruction
type in Experiment Three.

Sensitivity and Response Bias

The proportion of correct detections and number of false alarms were used to compute
indices of sensitivity (d’; reported in Figures 38-40) and response bias (c; reported in Figures 4143; See et al., 1995). Response bias tended to increase over time across task type, which
indicates that participants in both condition types were becoming more conservative in their
responding across each period on watch.
Mixed-measures ANCOVAs with task type and instruction type as the between-subjects
variables, period on watch as the within-subjects variable, and AchM or AuM as the covariate
were performed on all dependent measures related to these indices. Separate ANCOVAs were
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performed for each of these indices. Correlations between the measures of sensitivity and
response bias, and the covariates are included in Appendix H.
There were no significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for
sensitivity or response bias when AchM or AuM was entered into the ANCOVA as the covariate.
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Figure 38. Average sensitivity over time with standard errors bars is reported for each of the
conditions in Experiment Three.
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Figure 39. Average sensitivity over time reported across task type in Experiment Three.
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Figure 40. Average sensitivity over time reported across instruction type in Experiment Three.
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Figure 41. Average response bias over time with standard errors bars is reported for each of the
conditions in Experiment Three.
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Figure 42. Average response bias over time across task type in Experiment Three.
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Figure 43. Average response bias over time across instruction type in Experiment Three.

Discussion

Engagement and Motivation

For achievement motivation there were significant effects on both pre- and post-task
measures of engagement and motivation. Achievement motivation was significantly related to
pre-task energetic arousal, post-task energetic arousal, post-task intrinsic motivation, and pretask concentration. Participants in the cognitive task reported more intrinsic motivation at pretask, however participants in the sensory task reported slightly more intrinsic motivation at posttask (there was a significant decline in intrinsic motivation between pre- and post-task).
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Participants in the cognitive task receiving autonomy-supportive instructions reported the highest
degree of pre-task concentration.
It is important to note that this finding could be an artefact of the cleaning that occurred.
For example, to meet the inclusion criteria for data analyses, individuals in the cognitive
condition may have remained in the dataset due to unique individual differences in trait
motivation or state motivation (i.e., achievement motivation and autonomous motivation). The
results indicated that achievement motivation likely affects perception of the task at baseline
(i.e., pre-task), which in turn affects post-task success and intrinsic motivation.
Autonomous motivation significantly affected several measures of task engagement and
task-related motivation including concentration, intrinsic motivation, success motivation, and
task-unrelated thoughts. Autonomous motivation appeared to have more of an impact on the
engagement and motivation (compared to achievement motivation), which was evidenced by a
number of significant interactions with this covariate. These achievement motivation and
autonomous motivation could affect the engagement and motivation measures differently in
vigilance task, thus both achievement motivation and autonomous motivation will be retained in
the fourth experiment in this dissertation. It is also worth noting at this time that autonomous
motivation has been the more reliable measure of the two measures motivation and this is
important to bear in mind when reflecting on the present findings.
Instruction type and task type also affected task-related and task-unrelated thoughts. For
example, participants in the sensory task reported some of the highest rates of post-task taskunrelated thoughts, while observers in the cognitive task reported the fewest post-task taskunrelated thoughts. Participants in the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive
instructions reported the most task-unrelated thoughts at post-task. In this vein, it could be
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argued that task-related and task-unrelated thoughts are not necessarily a product of mindlessness
or mind-wandering which occur during vigilance, rather these task-based cognitions which are
afforded by task type and task instructions. Thus, mind-wandering and mindlessness are not
symptoms of vigilance per se, but byproducts of an iatrogenically created state induced by the
researcher.

Stress and Workload

Achievement motivation and autonomous motivation impact the stress and workload
associated with vigilance differently. For example, achievement motivation tended to
predominantly affect hedonic tone, whereas autonomous motivation was implicated in tense
arousal, hedonic tone, and anger/frustration. Lower achievement motivation scores were
inversely correlated with hedonic tone, which implied that as achievement motivation increased,
pleasantness associated with the task decreased. However, autonomous motivation scores were
positively correlated with hedonic tone, which indicated that as autonomous motivation
increased, there was more pleasantness associated with the vigilance task at pre-task and posttask. Participants higher in autonomous motivation also reported less anger/frustration toward the
task at pre- and post-task, as well as less tense arousal at post-task. Based on these findings, it
appears that autonomous motivation may have an ameliorative effect on some of the more
‘negative’ aspects of vigilance performance such as anger, frustration, tense arousal, or
unpleasantness, which facilitates better coping with the vigilance task overall.
Interestingly, autonomous motivation did not have an effect on global workload, but
achievement motivation significantly affected workload in Experiment Three. Instruction type
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also influenced perceptions of workload associated with the task. For example, participants in the
autonomy-supportive instruction condition reported significantly higher global workload than
participants in the controlling instruction condition. Participants in the cognitive task reported
more global workload than participants in the sensory task, which was expected given the results
of Experiments One and Two.

Performance

Achievement motivation did not influence vigilance performance in terms of proportion
of correct detections, number of false alarms, average response time, sensitivity, or response
bias. Thus, specific hypotheses related to performance and AchM generally went unsupported for
Experiment Three.
In addition to task type and instruction type, autonomous motivation was significantly
related to the proportion of correct detections detected over time. Participants in the sensory task
outperformed participants in the cognitive task, which is likely due to the fact that the cognitive
task requires symbolic processing and the sensory task requires perceptual processing. However,
participants in the sensory task demonstrated a decline in proportion of correct detections over
time. Participants in the cognitive task actually indicated a cognitive increment in performance
over time, albeit there was a significant decline in performance between Periods 1 and 2 of watch
for participants in either cognitive task, but a substantial increase in performance between
Periods 3 and 4. This improvement in performance is likely due to a combination of factors: an
important individual difference (i.e., autonomous motivation) and task design (i.e., the cognitive
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task affords more cognitive engagement). Interestingly, autonomous motivation did not influence
false alarm rates, response time, sensitivity, or response bias in Experiment Three.
Instruction type did influence false alarm performance in Experiment Three. Participants
assigned to the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions responded more
liberally to false alarms in Periods 1 and 3, which implies that autonomy-supportive instructions
may shift the response criteria of observers. Participants in the cognitive condition receiving
autonomy-supportive instructions demonstrated a numerical, liberal shift in responding between
Periods 3 and 4 of watch, which could have influenced their improvement in performance toward
the end of the task. That said, there was a shift toward better discrimination between critical
signals and non-signals, as well as a general trend toward more conservatism in response to
critical signals over time.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: EXPERIMENT FOUR

Experiment Four extended the results of Experiments One, Two, and Three by varying
the vigilance task across three factors: 1) source complexity, 2) task type, and 3) instruction type.
In Experiment Four, participants were randomly assigned to one of twelve conditions: 1) a
cognitive task with autonomy-supportive instructions and one display, 2) a cognitive task with
autonomy-supportive instructions and two displays, 3) a cognitive task with autonomysupportive instructions and four displays, 4) a cognitive task with controlling instructions and
one display, 5) a cognitive task with controlling instructions and two displays, 6) a cognitive task
with controlling instructions and four displays, 7) a sensory task with autonomy-supportive
instructions and one display, 8) a sensory task with autonomy-supportive instructions and two
displays, 9) a sensory task with autonomy-supportive instructions and four displays, 10) a
sensory task with controlling instructions and one display, 11) a sensory task with controlling
instructions and two displays, or 12) a sensory task with controlling instructions and four
displays.

Hypotheses
Engagement and Motivation Measures

1) Achievement motivation (AchM) and autonomous motivation (AuM) should be
significantly related to the level of engagement and motivation at post-task. Task
engagement and motivation will be measured by energetic arousal, concentration, success
motivation, intrinsic motivation, task-related thoughts (TRTs), and task-unrelated
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thoughts (TUTs). Cognitive task engagement will be measured using concentration,
TRTs, and TUTs.

2) Specific hypotheses related to cognitive engagement were developed given the three
theories of information processing:

a. Under the resource theory account of vigilance, AchM and AuM should be
significantly related to concentration at post-task, but not under the mindlessness
or mind-wandering account.

b. If cognitively engaged with the task, AchM or AuM should be significantly
related to increased TRTs at post-task under the resource-depletion account.

c. According to mindlessness theory, there should be few if any TRTs.

d. Under the mind-wandering assumption, there will be high TRTs at pre-task and
low TRTs at post-task, regardless of the type of motivation involved in vigilance.

e. Assuming a resource theory perspective, if individuals are engaged with the task,
participants AchM or AuM should be related to a significant decrease in TUTs at
post-task.
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f. According to mindlessness theory, there should be more TUTs as the mind drifts
away from the task because vigilance tasks afford this behavior.

g. Under the mind-wandering assumption, there will be high TUTs if disengaged
with the task, especially at post-task as inward or outward task-unrelated thoughts
increase during the vigil.

Stress and Workload Measures

1) Achievement motivation (AchM) and autonomous motivation (AuM) may affect stress
and workload. Stress and workload will be measured by tense arousal, hedonic tone,
anger/frustration, and global workload. Thus, the hypotheses are as follows:

a. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to tense arousal. Participants
lower in motivation will lack effective coping strategies to overcome the
monotony associated with the task.

b. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to higher hedonic tone because
these individual differences are related to finding enjoyment in the task.

c. AchM and AuM should be significantly related to anger/frustration. Participants
lower in motivation will lack effective coping strategies related to managing
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perceived anger and frustration.

2) It is hypothesized that the cognitive task will be perceived as more work than the sensory
task based on previous evidence from the existing literature on vigilance.

a. However, participants high in AchM and AuM may be significantly related to
global workload. It is possible that participants high in AchM or AuM will
approach the cognitive task as if it is a complex challenge, which may reduce
overall perceived workload.

Performance Measures

1) Proportion of correct detections, number of false alarms, average response time, and
signal detection measures of sensitivity and response bias will serve as measures of
performance.

2) AchM and AuM should be significantly related to the proportion of correct detections
because individuals high in these differences want to strive toward success and perceive
control over their performance.

3) Similarly, AchM and AuM should be significantly related to the number of false alarms
because individuals high in these differences want to strive toward success and perceive
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control over their performance, thus reporting a low number of false alarms over time.

4) AchM and AuM may be significantly related to mean response time because previous
literature has demonstrated that motivation is linked to attention.

Participants

An a priori power analysis was conducted for Experiment Four using G*Power Version
3.1 with a medium effect size and conventional criteria (α = 0.05, 1-β = 0.80; Faul et al., 2007) to
estimate power and effect sizes prior to data collection. Following this analysis, approximately
158 participants were recruited from the University of Central Florida’s research participation
system (SONA).
To qualify for participation in this study, participants must have normal or corrected-tonormal vision and were at least 18 years of age or older. Participants who participated in
Experiments One, Two, or Three are not eligible for participation in Experiment Four.
Participants were asked to not consume caffeine 24 hours prior to the study.
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Data Cleaning and Final Sample

One hundred and fifty-eight participants were collected from the SONA study pool for
Experiment Four. Six of these participants were removed from the sample for incomplete
SuperLab data and four participants were removed for incomplete survey data.
The inclusion criteria were as follows: participants achieved a minimum score of 70%
correct detections (i.e., hit rate) in the first watch period and did not commit more than ten false
alarms in any given watch period. The same rationale for the cutoff criteria, which was used in
the previous studies, applies here as well.
After data cleaning based on the inclusion criteria for analysis, the final sample for this
study consisted of 121 undergraduate students. Twenty-seven participants were removed from
this sample because of performance deviations that did not meet the inclusion criteria. More
specifically, one participant was removed from the one-display cognitive task with controlling
instructions, four participants were removed from the two-display cognitive task with controlling
instructions, four participants were removed from the four-display cognitive task with controlling
instructions, four participants were removed from the two-display cognitive task with autonomysupportive instructions, four participants were removed from the four-display cognitive task with
autonomy-supportive instructions, one participant was removed from the one-display sensory
task with controlling instructions, two participants were removed from the two-display sensory
task with controlling instructions, one participant was removed from the four-display sensory
task with controlling instructions, three participants were removed from the two-display sensory
task with autonomy-supportive instructions, and one participant was removed from the fourdisplay sensory task with autonomy-supportive instructions.
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Design

In Experiment Four, participants were randomly assigned to either the cognitive or
sensory task and received either autonomy-supportive instructions or controlling instructions
condition and were required to monitor one, two, or four displays (see Table 17).

Table 17. The table below indicates the conditions to which participants were randomly assigned
in Experiment Four.
Task Type

Instruction Type

Source Complexity

Participants
Assigned to each
Condition

Cognitive

Autonomy-Supportive

One display

11

Two displays

7

Four displays

7

One display

7

Two displays

7

Four displays

9

One display

17

Two displays

11

Four displays

6

One display

20

Two displays

8

Four displays

11

Cognitive

Sensory

Sensory

Controlling

Autonomy-Supportive

Controlling
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Task Stimuli and Environment

The task stimuli and environment of Experiment Four were identical to participants used
in Experiments One, Two, and Three.

Measures

The same measures from Experiment One were used in Experiment Four. The
reliabilities of these measures for Experiment Four are reported in Appendix I.

Procedure

The procedure for Experiment Four was the same as that used in previous experiments,
with the exception that participants could be randomly assigned to one of the twelve conditions.

Descriptive Statistics

Data from 121 undergraduate students (81 females; 39 males; 1 student preferred to not
disclose) was collected from the SONA pool at the University of Central Florida for Experiment
Four. Of participants who participated, 68.5% were freshmen, 13.2% were sophomores, 12.4%
were juniors, and 4.2% were seniors. The average age of participants was 19.03 years (Median =
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18.00 years, SD = 1.73 years). The oldest student in this sample was 29-years-old and the
youngest student was 18 years of age. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Participants indicated that they did not to consume caffeine 24 hours prior to this study.
The participants included in the present study did not differ substantially from those
excluded from Experiment Four (based on inclusion criteria). For example, the average age of
participants that were excluded was 18.67 years of age (Range: 18 – 21), 6 male participants
were removed, and 21 female participants were removed. There were two significant differences
between participants that were included and those that were excluded from these analyses.
Participants differed significantly in pre-task intrinsic motivation and autonomous
motivation, which was one of the covariates included in the present study. Participants excluded
from the present analyses reported both higher pre-task intrinsic motivation and autonomous
motivation scores than those included in the present sample, which is a finding accompanied by
very large effect sizes. The complete engagement, motivation, stress, and workload scores for the
participants removed from Experiment Four are listed in Appendix J. The effect sizes for
analyses on the excluded data are included in Appendix K.

Results

Engagement and Motivation Measures
The average AchM score was 21.92 (SD = 3.71; Range: 16.00 – 34.00). The average
AuM score was 34.36 (SD = 9.08; Range: 13.00 – 49.00). There was a strong negative skew for
the achievement motivation scores, which implies that participants in this sample self-reported
lower achievement motivation than in previous samples. There was a slight positive skew for
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autonomous motivation, which indicates a trend toward higher autonomous motivation scores
being reported throughout the sample.
AchM or AuM scores were used as covariates, and task type, number of displays, and
instruction type were used as independent variables to conduct separate ANCOVAs for all
measures of motivation and engagement. Separate ANCOVAs were performed for each pre-task
and post-task measure. ANCOVAs were used to perform the analyses in the present experiment
because the covariates are continuous variables.
The means and standard deviations for the engagement and motivation measures across
task types are reported in Table 18. The means and standard deviations for the measures of
engagement and motivation by instruction type are reported in Table 19. The means and standard
deviations for the measures of engagement and motivation by number of displays are reported in
Table 20. Correlations of AchM and AuM with the engagement and motivation measures are
reported in Appendix C.
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Table 18. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of
motivation and engagement across task type (N = 121).

Success
Motivation

Cognitive Task
(N = 48)
Pre
Post
21.13
(3.32)
34.50
(8.47)
19.96
20.48
(7.31)
(6.64)

Sensory Task
(N = 73)
Pre
Post
22.44
(3.88)
34.26
(9.52)
20.42
19.68
(6.33)
(6.99)

Pre
21.92
(3.71)
34.36
(9.08)
20.24
(6.71)

20.00
(6.83)

Intrinsic
Motivation

18.15
(5.39)

12.44
(4.50)

17.07
(4.18)

12.54
(4.93)

17.50
(4.71)

12.50
(4.75)

Energetic
Arousal

18.06
(3.82)

18.71
(4.21)

17.60
(3.76)

18.08
(4.58)

17.79
(3.78)

18.33
(4.43)

Concentration

17.65
(5.90)

8.54
(6.04)

14.60
(6.56)

6.53
(7.42)

15.81
(6.45)

7.33
(6.95)

TRTs

17.94
(8.16)

21.90
(6.45)

17.62
(8.50)

19.71
(7.31)

17.74
(8.34)

20.58
(7.04)

TUTs

16.10
(9.48)

15.50
(7.19)

17.52
(9.09)

16.68
(8.07)

16.96
(9.23)

16.21
(7.72)

AchM
AuM

Overall
Post

Note. TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs = task-unrelated thoughts. Numbers in parentheses
represent standard deviations.
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Table 19. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of
motivation and engagement across instruction type (N = 121).

AchM
AuM
Success Motivation

Autonomy-Supportive
Instructions
(N = 59)
Pre
Post
21.78
(3.23)
35.31
(8.61)
20.00
19.61
(7.18)
(6.64)

Controlling
Instructions
(N = 62)
Pre
Post
22.05
(4.13)
33.45
(9.49)
20.47
20.38
(6.29)
(7.05)

Intrinsic
Motivation

17.20
(4.42)

12.05
(4.71)

17.77
(4.99)

12.93
(4.78)

Energetic Arousal

18.10
(2.95)

18.83
(4.67)

17.48
(4.43)

17.85
(4.16)

Concentration

16.51
(6.49)

7.14
(7.24)

15.15
(6.40)

7.52
(6.71)

TRTs

17.56
(9.13)

20.69
(7.72)

17.92
(7.58)

20.48
(6.37)

TUTs

17.39
(10.28)

17.03
(8.61)

16.55
(8.18)

15.41
(6.73)

Note. TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs = task-unrelated thoughts. Numbers in parentheses
represent standard deviations.
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Table 20. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of
motivation and engagement across number of displays (N = 121).

Success
Motivation

One
(N = 55)
Pre
Post
22.15
(3.36)
34.75
(8.42)
20.18
19.42
(6.49)
(6.31)

Two
(N = 33)
Pre
Post
21.45
(3.50)
31.79
(9.24)
20.27
20.91
(7.11)
(6.16)

Four
(N = 33)
Pre
Post
22.00
(4.47)
36.27
(9.66)
20.30
20.06
(6.88)
(8.32)

Intrinsic
Motivation

17.02
(4.38)

11.95
(3.97)

17.24
(4.39)

12.55
(5.33)

18.55
(5.47)

13.41
(5.31)

Energetic
Arousal

17.67
(3.54)

18.22
(4.39)

18.18
(3.81)

19.03
(4.38)

17.58
(4.18)

17.81
(4.60)

Concentration

16.04
(6.13)

6.84
(7.16)

15.61
(6.48)

8.06
(6.76)

15.64
(7.12)

7.44
(6.90)

TRTs

17.85
(8.35)

19.44
(5.97)

18.82
(7.46)

22.03
(7.01)

16.48
(9.20)

21.06
(8.51)

TUTs

16.95
(8.77)

15.49
(7.13)

16.94
(8.50)

17.12
(7.69)

17.00
(10.85)

16.50
(8.79)

AchM
AuM

Note. TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs = task-unrelated thoughts. Numbers in parentheses
represent standard deviations.

There was a significant four-way interaction between the covariate AchM, instruction
type, task type, and number of displays, on pre-task intrinsic motivation, F(2, 97) = 3.11, p =
.049, Ƞp2 = .060. There was also a significant interaction between AchM and instruction type on
pre-task intrinsic motivation, F(1, 97) = 8.57, p = .004, Ƞp2 = .081. In follow-up ANCOVAs
exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables on pre-task intrinsic motivation,
only one result reached significance. There was a significant effect of the covariate AchM on
pre-task intrinsic motivation in the sensory task that required participants to monitor one display
and when these participants received autonomous instructions, F(1, 15) = 5.85, p = .029, Ƞp2 =
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.281. Participants in the cognitive condition with controlling instructions monitoring four
displays reported the highest pre-task intrinsic motivation scores (M = 22.00, SD = 4.87).
Participants in the sensory condition monitoring four displays and receiving autonomysupportive instructions also reported high pre-task intrinsic motivation (M = 19.86, SD = 5.70).
It is important to note that this finding is likely an atrefact of data cleaning. For example,
in order to be included in the present analyses observers had to perform well enough to remain in
the sample and likely had an individual difference that enabled them to be included in the present
analyses. In this case, that individual difference was achievement motivation. This could be a
limitation to this study, but it does support the idea of accounting for individual differences,
especially in the implicit assumption that all participants are motivated to perform the task.
There was a significant four-way interaction between the covariate AchM, instruction
type, task type, and number of displays, on post-task concentration, F(2, 97) = 3.15, p = .047, Ƞp2
= .062. There was a significant three-way interaction between task type, number of displays, and
AchM, on post-task concentration, F(2, 97) = 5.15, p = .008, Ƞp2 = .097. There was a significant
three-way interaction between instruction type, task type, and number of displays, on post-task
concentration, F(1, 96) = 3.57, p = .032, Ƞp2 = .069, and post-task task-unrelated thoughts, F(2,
97) = 4.04, p = .021, Ƞp2 = .078. There was significant interaction between task type and number
of displays on post-task concentration, F(2, 97) = 4.82, p = .010, Ƞp2 = .091.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on post-task concentration, only one result approached significance. There was a nearly
significant effect of the covariate AchM on post-task concentration in the cognitive task wherein
participants monitored only one display and received controlling instructions, F(1, 5) = 6.62, p =
.050, Ƞp2 = .570. A similar result was observed for participants in the cognitive task with two
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displays and controlling instructions, F(1, 5) = 5.15, p = .073, Ƞp2 = .507. Participants in the
cognitive condition receiving controlling instructions and monitoring either two (M = 9.29, SD =
4.61) or four (M = 9.89, SD = 5.75) displays reported some of the highest post-task
concentration, whereas participants in the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive
instructions monitoring only one display reported some of the lowest post-task concentration (M
= 5.71, SD = 7.37).
There was a significant four-way interaction between the covariate AchM, instruction
type, task type, and number of displays, on post-task task-unrelated thoughts, F(2, 97) = 3.62, p
= .030, Ƞp2 = .070. There was a significant interaction between AchM and the number of displays
on post-task task-unrelated thoughts, F(2, 97) = 6.40, p = .002, Ƞp2 = .118. In follow-up
ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables on post-task taskunrelated thoughts, only one result reached significance. There was a significant effect of the
covariate AchM on post-task task-unrelated thoughts in the cognitive task wherein participants
monitored two displays and received autonomy-supportive instructions, F(1, 5) = 8.99, p = .030,
Ƞp2 = .643, and in the cognitive task wherein participants monitored two displays and received
controlling instructions, F(1, 5) = 15.67, p = .011, Ƞp2 = .758. Participants in the sensory
condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions monitoring two displays reported the
highest degree of post-task task-unrelated thoughts (M = 19.45, SD = 9.41), whereas participants
in the cognitive condition monitoring only one display and receiving either autonomy-supportive
instructions (M = 13.27, SD = 8.32) or controlling instructions (M = 14.43, SD = 6.75) reported
the fewest post-task task-unrelated thoughts.
There was a significant main effect of the covariate AchM, but not task type, instruction
type, or number of displays, on post-task success motivation, F(1, 97) = 8.76, p = .004, Ƞp2 =
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.084, pre-task energetic arousal, F(1, 97) = 4.15, p = .044, Ƞp2 = .041 (note that Levene’s Test of
the Equality of Error Variances was violated for this analysis, thus this result should be
interpreted with caution), and post-task task-related thoughts, F(1, 97) = 3.93, p = .050, Ƞp2 =
.039. There was a significant main effect of the number of displays on post-task task-unrelated
thoughts, F(2, 97) = 6.70, p = .002, Ƞp2 = .122. There was a significant main effect of instruction
type on pre-task intrinsic motivation, F(1, 97) = 8.31, p = .005, Ƞp2 = .079. There was a
significant negative correlation between AchM and post-task success motivation (r = -.327, p <
.004). There were no additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for
these analyses.
There was a significant three-way interaction between instruction type, task type, and
AuM on post-task intrinsic motivation, F(1, 97) = 5.80, p = .018, Ƞp2 = .057. There was a
significant interaction between number of displays and AuM on post-task intrinsic motivation,
F(2, 97) = 4.27, p = .017, Ƞp2 = .082. There was a significant interaction between instruction type
and task type on post-task intrinsic motivation, F(1, 97) = 4.77, p = .031, Ƞp2 = .047. There was a
significant main effect of number of displays on post-task intrinsic motivation, F(1, 97) = 4.61, p
= .012, Ƞp2 = .088.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on post-task intrinsic motivation, three results were significant. There was a significant effect of
the covariate AuM on post-task intrinsic motivation in the sensory task wherein participants
monitored four displays and received controlling instructions, F(1, 8) = 8.70, p = .018, Ƞp2 =
.521. There was also significant effect of the covariate AuM on post-task intrinsic motivation in
the cognitive task wherein participants monitored only one display and received controlling
instructions, F(1, 5) = 8.55, p = .033, Ƞp2 = .631, and in the same task wherein participants
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monitored two displays and received controlling instructions, F(1, 5) = 11.18, p = .020, Ƞp2 =
.691. Participants in the cognitive condition receiving controlling instructions reported the
highest post-task intrinsic motivation scores (M = 14.56, SD = 4.45; four display condition),
whereas participants in the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions
demonstrated the lowest post-task intrinsic motivation scores (M = 11.24, SD = 4.40; one display
condition).
There was a significant three-way interaction between task type, number of displays, and
AuM on post-task energetic arousal, F(2, 97) = 4.79, p = .010, Ƞp2 = .091. There was a
significant interaction between task type and number of displays on post-task energetic arousal,
F(2, 97) = 4.78, p = .011, Ƞp2 = .091. In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level
of the independent variables on post-task energetic arousal, two results were significant. There
was a significant effect of the covariate AuM on post-task energetic arousal in the cognitive task
wherein participants monitored only one display and received autonomy-supportive instructions,
F(1, 9) = 5.69, p = .041, Ƞp2 = .387, and in the same task where participants monitored one
display and received controlling instructions, F(1, 5) = 7.20, p = .044, Ƞp2 = .590. Participants
monitoring two displays across conditions reported the most post-task energetic arousal.
Participants in the sensory condition monitoring four displays reported the lowest amount of
post-task energetic arousal (M = 14.80, SD = 3.46).
There was also a significant interaction between instruction type and autonomous
motivation on pre-task success motivation, F(1, 97) = 8.13, p = .005, Ƞp2 = .077. Observers in the
controlling instruction condition reported slightly higher success motivation prior to completing
the task than participants receiving autonomy-supportive instructions.
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There was a significant main effect of the covariate AuM, on post-task success
motivation, F(1, 97) = 4.26, p = .042, Ƞp2 = .042, as well as pre-task intrinsic motivation, F(1,
97) = 8.30, p = .005, Ƞp2 = .079. There was a significant main effect of instruction type on pretask success motivation, F(1, 97) = 7.19, p = .009, Ƞp2 = .069, and pre-task energetic arousal,
F(1, 97) = 3.83, p = .053, Ƞp2 = .038. There were no additional significant main effects,
interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.

Stress and Workload Measures

An ANCOVA with task type, number of displays, and type of instructions as the
independent variables, and AchM or AuM as the covariate, was performed on all outcome
measures related to stress and workload. Separate ANCOVAs were performed for each pre-task
and post-task measure. The means and standard deviations of stress and workload measures by
task type are reported in Table 21. The means and standard deviations for the measures of stress
and workload measures by instruction type are reported in Table 22. The means and standard
deviations for the measures of stress and workload measures by number of displays are reported
in Table 23. The means and standard deviations for the full DSSQ are reported in Appendix D.
The means and standard deviations for the full NASA-TLX are reported in Appendix E.
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Table 21. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of stress
and workload across conditions (N = 121).
Cognitive Task
(N = 48)
Pre
Post
12.38
15.81
(3.55)
(5.21)
26.56
23.19
(4.04)
(3.53)
7.44
9.51
(2.86)
(3.48)

Sensory Task
(N = 73)
Pre
Post
13.36
15.64
(3.26)
(4.40)
25.65
22.44
(4.29)
(4.79)
7.86
10.18
(3.35)
(3.67)

Global
Workload

44.48
(17.04)

37.22
(13.42)

40.13
(15.33)

Mental
Demand

51.04
(29.14)

35.55
(27.79)

41.69
(29.22)

Temporal
Demand

33.79
(29.59)

25.82
(23.67)

28.98
(26.35)

Physical
Demand

11.77
(16.73)

9.62
(13.78)

10.47
(14.99)

Perceived
Performance

55.15
(32.00)

50.12
(32.55)

52.12
(32.29)

Effort

43.96
(27.26)

29.18
(25.51)

35.04
(27.10)

Frustration

32.94
(26.79)

30.62
(32.33)

31.54
(30.16)

Tense
Arousal
Hedonic
Tone
Anger/
Frustration

Overall
Pre
12.97
(3.40)
26.02
(4.20)
7.69
(3.16)

Post
15.71
(4.72)
22.74
(4.33)
9.92
(3.60)

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Raw subscale averages and standard
deviations on the NASA-TLX subscales are reported for purposes of completeness.
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Table 22. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of stress
and workload across instruction type (N = 121).

Tense Arousal
Hedonic Tone
Anger/Frustration

Autonomy-Supportive
Instructions
(N = 59)
Pre
Post
13.00
15.59
(3.40)
(4.71)
26.31
23.03
(4.50)
(4.47)
7.61
9.48
(3.20)
(3.22)

Controlled
Instructions
(N = 62)
Pre
Post
12.94
15.82
(3.43)
(4.77)
25.74
22.46
(3.91)
(4.20)
7.77
10.33
(3.14)
(3.91)

Global Workload

39.23
(15.46)

40.97
(15.27)

Mental Demand

43.29
(25.65)

40.18
(32.39)

Temporal Demand

27.08
(23.06)

30.79
(29.21)

Physical Demand

11.10
(13.85)

9.87
(16.09)

Perceived
Performance

51.95
(31.52)

52.27
(33.27)

Effort

36.56
(25.11)

33.60
(29.00)

Frustration

32.44
(29.82)

30.68
(30.71)

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Raw subscale averages and standard
deviations on the NASA-TLX subscales are reported for purposes of completeness.
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Table 23. The table below includes the means and standard deviations for all measures of stress
and workload across number of displays (N = 121).
One
(N = 55)
Pre
Post
12.47
15.47
(3.10)
(4.07)
25.84
22.49
(4.33)
(4.04)
8.18
10.39
(3.56)
(3.86)

Two
(N = 33)
Pre
Post
13.18
14.27
(3.99)
(4.77)
26.42
23.94
(3.61)
(4.18)
7.55
9.03
(2.99)
(3.32)

Four
(N = 33)
Pre
Post
13.58
17.59
(3.23)
(5.21)
25.91
21.94
(4.61)
(4.81)
7.03
10.03
(2.49)
(3.35)

Global
Workload

37.92
(13.68)

39.23
(16.35)

44.64
(16.31)

Mental
Demand

36.24
(26.93)

41.21
(26.14)

51.27
(33.90)

Temporal
Demand

23.93
(23.28)

26.97
(21.27)

39.42
(32.81)

Physical
Demand

11.91
(18.10)

7.67
(9.78)

10.88
(13.50)

Perceived
Performance

50.07
(31.75)

55.27
(34.69)

52.36
(31.43)

Effort

30.78
(24.31)

35.88
(26.52)

41.30
(31.33)

Frustration

27.25
(28.47)

32.76
(33.61)

37.45
(29.07)

Tense
Arousal
Hedonic
Tone
Anger/
Frustration

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. Raw subscale averages and standard
deviations on the NASA-TLX subscales are reported for purposes of completeness.

There was a significant four-way interaction between instruction type, task type, number
of displays, and AchM on global workload, F(2, 97) = 3.67, p = .029, Ƞp2 = .071. In follow-up
ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables on global workload,
none of the results approached significance and could be that this interaction is a spurious result.
That said, participants in the cognitive condition receiving controlling instructions and
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monitoring four displays (M = 52.01, SD = 22.00) reported the highest global workload, closely
followed by observers in the cognitive condition monitoring four displays and receiving
autonomy-supportive instructions (M = 48.15, SD = 15.17). Participants in the sensory condition
who received autonomy-supportive instructions and monitored only one display (M = 34.32, SD
= 14.52) reported some of the lowest global workload scores, as did participants in the sensory
condition receiving controlling instructions and monitoring two displays (M = 35.31, SD =
13.90).
There was also a significant interaction between number of displays and achievement
motivation on pre-task tense arousal, F(2, 97) = 3.36, p = .039, Ƞp2 = .065, and pre-task
anger/frustration, F(2, 97) = 3.51, p = .034, Ƞp2 = .067. Participants monitoring two and four
displays tended to reported higher pre-task tense arousal scores, but reported lower pre-task
anger/frustration than observers in the single display condition. There was a significant main
effect of number of displays on pre-task tense arousal, F(2, 97) = 4.05, p = .021, Ƞp2 = .077, as
well as pre-task anger/frustration, F(2, 97) = 3.21, p = .045, Ƞp2 = .062. There were no additional
significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
There was a significant four-way interaction between instruction type, task type, number
of displays, and AuM on pre-task tense arousal, F(2, 97) = 5.89, p = .004, Ƞp2 = .108. There was
a significant interaction between task type and AuM on pre-task tense arousal, F(1, 97) = 7.42, p
= .008, Ƞp2 = .071. There was a significant main effect of task type on pre-task tense arousal, F(1,
97) = 4.56, p = .035, Ƞp2 = .045.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on pre-task tense arousal, several results approached significance. There was a significant effect
of the covariate AuM on pre-task tense arousal in the sensory task wherein participants
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monitored two displays and received controlling instructions, F(1, 6) = 9.05, p = .024, Ƞp2 = .601,
and in the same task where participants monitored four displays and received controlling
instructions, F(1, 9) = 5.63, p = .042, Ƞp2 = .385. Participants in the sensory condition receiving
autonomy-supportive instructions and monitoring four displays reported some of the highest pretask tense arousal (M = 14.83, SD = 4.49). Similarly, participants in the sensory condition
receiving controlling instructions and monitoring two displays (M = 14.75, SD = 3.81) or four
displays (M = 14.72, SD = 2.57) also reported higher pre-task tense arousal. Participants in the
cognitive condition receiving controlling instructions and monitoring only one display reported
the lowest pre-task tense arousal (M = 11.14, SD = 2.19).
There was a significant three-way interaction between instruction type, task type, and
number of displays on post-task tense arousal, F(2, 97) = 5.54, p = .005, Ƞp2 = .102. There was a
significant main effect of AuM on post-task tense arousal, F(1, 97) = 6.35, p = .013, Ƞp2 = .062.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables on posttask tense arousal, none of the analyses reached significance, therefore these results could be
spurious and this interaction should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, participants in the
cognitive condition monitoring two displays and receiving autonomy-supportive instructions (M
= 13.14, SD = 3.58) and participants in the sensory condition monitoring two displays and
receiving controlling instructions (M = 12.63, SD = 3.16) reported some of the lowest post-task
tense arousal scores. Participants in the cognitive condition monitoring four displays and
receiving controlling instructions (M = 18.56, SD = 7.11) reported the highest post-task tense
arousal scores.
There was also a significant interaction between instruction type and AuM on global
workload, F(1, 97) = 7.50, p = .007, Ƞp2 = .072. There was a significant interaction between
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instruction type and task type on global workload, F(1, 97) = 4.17, p = .044, Ƞp2 = .042. There
was a significant main effect of instruction type on global workload, F(1, 97) = 7.40, p = .008,
Ƞp2 = .072.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on global workload, only one result approached significance. There was a nearly significant
effect of the covariate AuM on global workload in the sensory task where participants monitored
two displays and received controlling instructions, F(1, 6) = 4.97, p = .067, Ƞp2 = .453.
Participants in the cognitive condition receiving controlling instructions and monitoring four
displays reported the most global workload (M = 35.31, SD = 13.90), whereas participants in the
sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions reported some of the lowest global
workload. Observers in the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions and
monitoring only one display reported the lowest average global workload score (M = 34.32, SD =
14.52).
There was a significant main effect of AuM on post-task hedonic tone, F(1, 97) = 7.40, p
= .008, Ƞp2 = .072. There was a significant correlation between AuM and post-task hedonic tone
(r = .286, p < .003). There were no additional significant main effects, interactions, or
correlations to report for these analyses.

Performance Measures

Mixed-measures ANCOVAs with task type, type of instructions, and number of displays
as the between-subjects factors, period on watch as the within-subjects factor, and AchM or
AuM as the covariate were performed on all outcome measures related to performance. Separate
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ANCOVAs were performed for each pre-task and post-task measure. The means and standard
deviations of the proportion of correct detections are reported in Figures 44-47. The means and
standard deviations of the number of false alarms are reported in Figures 48-51. The average
response times per each period on watch are included in Figures 52-55. In some instances,
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was violated and a Huynh-Feldt epsilon correction is included in
the reported statistics where such a violation was observed.
There was a significant interaction between period, task type, number of displays, and
AuM on the proportion of correct detections over time, F(6, 291) = 2.22, p = .041, Ƞp2 = .044, ɛ =
1.00. There was a significant interaction between period and task type on proportion of correct
detections over time, F(3, 291) = 3.26, p = .022, Ƞp2 = .033, ɛ = 1.00. There was also a significant
interaction between AuM and period on watch on proportion of correct detections, F(3, 291) =
2.76, p = .042, Ƞp2 = .028, ɛ = 1.00. The results of a linear regression indicated that as autonomy
motivation increased, the proportion of correct detections slightly increased over time (i.e., the
slope of the line when plotted against the data were somewhat horizontally oriented, but this was
a rather small increase in slope. AuM was not significantly correlated with the proportion of
correct detections across any of the periods on watch (r for Period 1 = -.069, r for Period 2 =
.109, r for Period 3 = .115, r for Period 4 = .086).
There was also a significant main effect of period on proportion of correction detections
indicated over time, F(3, 291) = 6.25, p < .001, Ƞp2 = .061, ɛ = 1.00. There was also a significant
main effect of task type, F(1, 97) = 7.14, p < .001, Ƞp2 = .061, as well as autonomous motivation
on proportion of correct detections, F(1, 97) = 4.51, p = .036, Ƞp2 = .044.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on period and AuM, three results reached significance. There was a significant main effect of
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period on the proportion of correct detections for participants assigned to the cognitive condition
who monitored two displays and received autonomy-supportive instructions, F(3, 3) = 5.82, p =
.008, Ƞp2 = .538, as well as a significant interaction between AuM and period on watch on
proportion of correct detections for participants assigned to this condition, F(3, 3) = 3.82, p =
.032, Ƞp2 = .433. The results of a linear regression indicated that participants high in autonomous
motivation showed an increase in correct detections over time. Those low in autonomous
motivation achieved fewer correct detections over time. Thus, participants lower in AuM
appeared to exhibit a larger decrement in detections. AuM was significantly correlated with the
proportion of correct detections reported in Periods 1 (r = -.879, p < .05) and 2 (r = .880, p <
.05), but not Periods 3 (r = .183) or 4 (r = .491).
There was also a significant main effect of period on the proportion of correct detections
for participants assigned to the cognitive condition who monitored four displays and received
controlling instructions, F(3, 3) = 3.13, p = .048, Ƞp2 = .309. There were no additional significant
main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
There was a significant main effect of the covariate AchM (r = .015, p > .003), but not
task type, instruction type, or number of displays on proportion of correction detections indicated
over time, F(1, 97) = 4.52, p = .036, Ƞp2 = .045. There were no additional significant main
effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
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Figure 44.The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported for
each of the conditions in Experiment Four.
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Figure 45.The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
across task type for Experiment Four.
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Figure 46.The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
across instruction type for Experiment Four.
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Figure 47.The average proportion of correct detections with standard errors bars are reported
across source complexity for Experiment Four.

There was a significant interaction between period on watch, number of displays, and
AchM on number of false alarms, F(5.58, 291) = 2.72, p = .016, Ƞp2 = .053, ɛ = .930. There was
also a significant interaction between period and number of displays on number of false alarms,
F(5.58, 291) = 2.59, p = .021, Ƞp2 = .051, ɛ = .930.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on period and AchM, only two results reached significance. There was a significant interaction
between period on watch and AchM on the number of false alarms reported over time for
participants randomly assigned to the cognitive task with four displays and controlling
instructions, F(3, 7) = 3.49, p = .029, Ƞp2 = .279. The results of a linear regression indicated that
participants assigned to this specific condition and who had higher achievement motivation
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scores tended to commit fewer false alarms over time. However, AchM was not significantly
correlated with the number of false alarms committed during any of the watch periods (r for
Period 1 = .579, r for Period 2 = .640, r for Period 3 = -.158, r for Period 4 = -.330).
There was also a significant main effect of AchM on the number of false alarms
committed for participants randomly assigned to the sensory task who received autonomysupportive instructions and had two displays to monitor, F(1, 9) = 8.96, p = .015, Ƞp2 = .499. The
results of a linear regression indicated that participants higher in achievement motivation
committed slightly more false alarms over time. Interestingly, those lower in achievement
motivation made fewer false alarms over periods on watch. AchM was significantly correlated
with the number of false alarms committed in Periods 2 (r = .714, p < .05) and 3 (r = .771, p <
.01), but not Periods 1 (r = .596) or 4 (r = -.012). There were no additional significant main
effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
There was a significant interaction between number of displays and AuM on number of
false alarms, F(2, 97) = 4.51, p = .013, Ƞp2 = .085. There was a significant main effect of period
on number of false alarms, F(2.95, 291) = 5.31, p = .002, Ƞp2 = .052, ɛ = .984. There were no
additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
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Figure 48. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported for each of
the conditions in Experiment Four.
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Figure 49. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported across task
type in Experiment Four.
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Figure 50. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported across
instruction type in Experiment Four.
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Figure 51. The average number of false alarms with standard errors bars are reported across
source complexity in Experiment Four.

There was a significant interaction between period on watch, task type, number of
displays, and AchM on mean response time, F(6, 291) = 2.40, p = .028, Ƞp2 = .047, ɛ = 1.00.
There was a significant interaction between period on watch, instruction type, task type, and
AchM on mean response time, F(3, 291) = 4.71, p = .003, Ƞp2 = .046, ɛ = 1.00. There was a
significant interaction between period, task type, and number of displays on mean response time,
F(6, 291) = 2.14, p = .049, Ƞp2 = .042, ɛ = 1.00. There was a significant interaction between
period on watch, instructions, and task type on mean response time, F(3, 291) = 4.47, p = .004,
Ƞp2 = .044, ɛ = 1.00.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on period and AchM, several results reached significance. There was a significant effect of
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period, but not AchM, on the mean response time for participants in the sensory task with two
displays and controlling instructions, F(3, 7) = 3.44, p = .039, Ƞp2 = .365. There was also an
interaction between AchM and period for participants assigned to this condition, F(3, 7) = 3.08,
p = .054, Ƞp2 = .339. The results of a linear regression indicated that participants high in
achievement motivation, who were assigned to this specific condition, indicated increased
average response times across period on watch. AchM was not significantly correlated with the
average response time for any of the watch periods in this specific condition (r for Period 1 = .213, r for Period 2 = .697, r for Period 3 = .533, r for Period 4 = .162).
Similar results were observed for participants randomly assigned to the cognitive task
who received controlling instructions and had one display to monitor. There was a nearly
significant main effect of period, but not AchM, on mean response time for participants
randomly assigned to this condition, F(3, 3) = 3.53, p = .059, Ƞp2 = .414, ɛ = .764, as well as a
nearly significant interaction between AchM and period on mean response time for participants
randomly assigned to this condition, F(3, 3) = 3.60, p = .056, Ƞp2 = .419, ɛ = .764. The results of
a linear regression indicated that participants high in achievement motivation, who were assigned
to this specific condition, indicated longer average response times as a function of period on
watch. AchM was not significantly correlated with the average response time for any of the
watch periods in this specific condition (r for Period 1 = -.197, r for Period 2 = .295, r for Period
3 = -.363, r for Period 4 = .013).There were no additional significant main effects,
interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
There was a significant interaction between period on watch, task type, number of
displays, and AuM on mean response time, F(6, 291) = 2.25, p = .039, Ƞp2 = .044. There was also
a significant interaction between period on watch, instruction type, task type, and AuM on mean

192

response time, F(3, 291) = 3.52, p = .015, Ƞp2 = .035. There was a significant interaction between
period on watch, instruction type, number of displays, and AuM on mean response time, F(6,
291) = 3.90, p = .001, Ƞp2 = .075. There was a significant interaction between period on watch,
instruction type, task type, and number of displays on mean response time, F(6, 291) = 2.27, p =
.037, Ƞp2 = .045. There was a significant interaction between period on watch, instruction type,
and AuM on mean response time, F(3, 291) = 3.07, p = .028, Ƞp2 = .031. There was a significant
interaction between period on watch, task type, and number of displays on mean response time,
F(6, 291) = 3.10, p = .006, Ƞp2 = .060. There was a significant interaction between period on
watch, instruction type, and number of displays on mean response time, F(6, 291) = 4.64, p <
.001, Ƞp2 = .087. There was a significant interaction between period on watch, instruction type,
and task type on mean response time, F(3, 291) = 3.81, p = .011, Ƞp2 = .038. There was a
significant interaction between period on watch and number of displays on mean response time,
F(6, 291) = 2.19, p = .044, Ƞp2 = .043.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on period and AuM, only two results reached significance. There was a significant main effect of
period on watch on mean response time for participants randomly assigned to the sensory task
who monitored two displays and received controlling instructions, F(3, 3) = 3.35, p = .042, Ƞp2 =
.358.
There was a significant main effect of AuM on mean response time for participants
randomly assigned to the sensory task who monitored one display and received controlling
instructions, F(1, 18) = 5.16, p = .036, Ƞp2 = .223. The results of a linear regression indicated that
participants high in autonomous motivation, who were assigned to this specific condition,
exhibited faster average response times across period on watch. Thus, higher autonomous
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motivation was associated with improved performance (in terms of response time) over time on
watch. AuM was significantly correlated with the average response time only for Period 2 (r =
-.702, p < .01) and none of the additional periods on watch for this specific condition (r for
Period 1 = -.393, r for Period 2 = .640, r for Period 3 = -.443, r for Period 4 = -.312). There
were no additional significant main effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these
analyses.
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Figure 52. The average response time with standard errors bars reported for each of the
conditions in Experiment Four.
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Figure 53. The average response time with standard errors bars reported across task type in
Experiment Four.
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Figure 54. The average response time with standard errors bars reported across instruction type
in Experiment Four.
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Figure 55. The average response time with standard errors bars reported across source
complexity in Experiment Four.

Sensitivity and Response Bias

The proportion of correct detections and false alarms were used to compute indices of
sensitivity (d’; reported in Figures 56-59) and response bias (c; reported in Figures 60-63; See et
al., 1995). Response bias tended to increase over time, which is indicative of an increase in
conservative responding, across task type, instruction type, and for two of the source complexity
types.
Mixed-measures ANCOVAs with task type, instruction type, and the number of displays
as the between-subjects variables, period on watch as the within-subjects variable, and AchM or
AuM as the covariate were performed on these indices. Separate ANCOVAs were performed for
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each of these dependent measures. Correlations between the measures of sensitivity and response
bias, and the covariates are included in Appendix H.
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Figure 56. Sensitivity with standard errors bars is reported for each of the conditions in
Experiment Four.
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Figure 57. Sensitivity with standard errors bars is reported across task type in Experiment Four.
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Figure 58. Sensitivity with standard errors bars is reported across instruction type in Experiment
Four.
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Figure 59.Sensitivity with standard errors bars is reported across source complexity in
Experiment Four.

There was a significant five-way interaction between period on watch, instruction type,
task type, number of displays, and AchM on sensitivity, F(6, 291) = 2.20, p = .043, Ƞp2 = .043,
ɛ = 1.00. There was a significant interaction between instruction type, task type, number of
displays, and AchM on sensitivity, F(2, 97) = 4.17, p = .018, Ƞp2 = .079. There was also a
significant four-way interaction between period on watch, instruction type, task type, and
number of displays on sensitivity, F(6, 291) = 2.45, p = .025, Ƞp2 = .048, ɛ = 1.00. There was a
significant three-way interaction between instruction type, task type, and number of displays on
sensitivity, F(2, 97) = 4.39, p = .015, Ƞp2 = .083.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on period and AchM, only one result reached significance. There was a significant main effect of
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AchM for participants randomly assigned to the sensory task with four displays and autonomysupportive instructions on sensitivity, F(1, 4) = 8.21, p = .046, Ƞp2 = .672. The results of a linear
regression indicated that participants high in achievement motivation, who were assigned to this
specific condition, demonstrated a decline in sensitivity over time. AchM was not significantly
correlated with sensitivity across any of the watch periods in this specific condition (r for Period
1 = -.550, r for Period 2 = -.746, r for Period 3 = .205, r for Period 4 = -.633). Higher AchM
was associated with a steeper sensitivity decrement. There were no additional significant main
effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
There was a significant interaction between period on watch and AuM on sensitivity, F(3,
97) = 2.71, p = .046, Ƞp2 = .027. The results of a linear regression indicated virtually no steepness
(i.e., a nearly horizontal line or slope of 0), which indicated that those high or low in autonomous
motivation were not significantly different in their change in sensitivity as a function of time on
watch. Thus, it is possible that this significant interaction is potentially spurious and should
therefore be interpreted with caution. AuM was significantly correlated with sensitivity in Period
3 (r = -.180, p < .01), but none of the other periods on watch (r for Period 1 = .164, r for Period 2
= -.015, r for Period 4 = -.017). There was a significant main effect of period on watch on
sensitivity, F(3, 97) = 4.18, p = .006, Ƞp2 = .041. There were no additional significant main
effects, interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
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Figure 60. Response bias with standard errors bars is reported for each of the conditions in
Experiment Four.
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Figure 61. Response bias with standard errors bars is reported across task type in Experiment
Four.
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Figure 62. Response bias with standard errors bars is reported across instruction type in
Experiment Four.
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Figure 63. Response bias with standard errors bars is reported across instruction type in
Experiment Four.

There was a significant interaction between instruction type, task type, number of
displays, and AchM on response bias, F(2, 97) = 5.12, p = .008, Ƞp2 = .095. There was a
significant four-way interaction between period on watch, instruction type, task type, and
number of displays, but not AchM, on response bias, F(6, 291) = 2.14, p = .049, Ƞp2 = .042, ɛ =
1.00. There was a significant interaction between instruction type, task type, and number of
displays, F(2, 97) = 4.85, p = .010, Ƞp2 = .091.
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on period and AchM, only one result reached significance. There was a significant interaction of
period and AchM on response bias for participants randomly assigned to the cognitive task with
four displays and autonomy-supportive instructions, F(3, 3) = 5.00, p = .013, Ƞp2 = .500. There
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also a main effect of period, which was approaching significance, for participants assigned to this
same condition, F(3, 3) = 3.26, p = .051, Ƞp2 = .395. The results of a linear regression indicated a
slope close to zero (i.e., there was no significant difference in the change in response bias over
periods between participants high or low in achievement motivation) for participants assigned to
this specific condition. AchM was significantly correlated with the response bias only in Period 4
(r = .851, p < .05), but not for any of the other watch periods (r for Period 1 = -.666, r for Period
2 = .344, r for Period 3 = -.368). There were no additional significant main effects, interactions,
or correlations to report for these analyses.
There was a significant three-way interaction between period on watch, task type, and
AuM on response bias, F(3, 291) = 5.88, p = .001, Ƞp2 = .057. There was a significant interaction
between period on watch and AuM on response bias, F(3, 291) = 5.02, p = .002, Ƞp2 = .049.
There was a significant interaction between task type and period on watch on response bias, F(3,
291) = 7.86, p < .001, Ƞp2 = .075. There was a significant main effect of period on watch on
response bias, F(3, 291) = 10.74, p < .001, Ƞp2 = .010. There was a significant correlation
between response bias in Period 3 and AuM (r = -.254, p < .005).
In follow-up ANCOVAs exploring the effects of each level of the independent variables
on period and AuM, several results reached significance. There was a significant main effect of
period on response bias for participants assigned to the sensory condition monitoring two
displays and receiving controlling instructions, F(3, 3) = 7.94, p = .001, Ƞp2 = .569, participants
assigned to the sensory condition monitoring four displays and receiving autonomy-supportive
instructions, F(3, 3) = 5.74, p = .011, Ƞp2 = .589, participants assigned to the cognitive condition
monitoring one display and receiving autonomy-supportive instructions, F(3, 3) = 3.15, p = .041,
Ƞp2 = .259, participants assigned to the cognitive condition monitoring two displays and
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receiving controlling instructions, F(3, 3) = 4.03, p = .028, Ƞp2 = .446, and participants assigned
to the cognitive condition monitoring four displays and receiving controlling instructions, F(3, 3)
= 3.82, p = .025, Ƞp2 = .353.
There was a significant interaction between period and AuM on response bias for
participants assigned to the sensory condition monitoring two displays and receiving controlling
instructions, F(3, 3) = 7.48, p = .002, Ƞp2 = .555. The results of a linear regression indicated that
participants high in autonomous motivation, who were assigned to this specific condition,
showed a decline in response bias (increased leniency) over time. AuM was significantly
correlated only with Period 3 (r = -.839, p < .01), but none of the other periods on watch (r for
Period 1 = -.073, r for Period 2 = .373, r for Period 4 = -.227).
There was a significant interaction between period and AuM on response bias for
participants assigned to the sensory condition monitoring four displays and receiving autonomysupportive instructions, F(3, 3) = 4.02, p = .034, Ƞp2 = .501. The results of a linear regression
indicated that participants high in autonomous motivation, who were assigned to this specific
condition, exhibited a decline response bias (increased leniency) over time. AuM was not
significantly correlated any of the periods on watch (r for Period 1 = -.345, r for Period 2 = .113,
r for Period 3 = .662, r for Period 4 = -.662). There were no additional significant main effects,
interactions, or correlations to report for these analyses.
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Discussion
Engagement and Motivation

Achievement motivation, in addition to task type, instruction type, and source
complexity, was significantly related to pre-task intrinsic motivation, post-task concentration,
and post-task task-unrelated thoughts. Participants monitoring four displays tended to have
significantly higher intrinsic motivation at pre-task. It is possible that this latter result is due to
data cleaning procedures. In order to remain in the sample for analyses, participants had to meet
the inclusion criteria, which required them to detect no less than 70% of the signals presented in
the first period on watch and commit no more than ten false alarms during any period on watch.
Many participants were removed in Experiment Four due to low correct detection rates and high
false alarm rates (predominantly from the cognitive conditions).
It is probable that a trait like achievement motivation assisted participants in learning
about task parameters and understanding signal-to-noise discrimination, which also resulted in
some of the groups reporting higher intrinsic motivation at pre-task, as well as more
concentration and fewer task-unrelated thoughts at post-task. These results suggest that
concentration may be linked to task-related and task-unrelated thoughts, which does not support
mind-wandering or mindlessness theory, rather these results support the initial conceptualization
of “worry,” which is defined by the DSSQ as an increase in concentration, TRTs, and a decrease
in TUTs. Based on the operationalization of each of these information processing theories, there
should be more mind-wandering or cognitive disengagement from the task, not more
concentration toward the task.
The results indicated that participants in the cognitive condition monitoring either two or
four displays demonstrated the most concentration at post-task, which indicates that source
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complexity can influence individual cognitive engagement with the task. Furthermore, observers
receiving autonomy-supportive instructions tended to report more task-unrelated thoughts at
post-task, which would indicate that these instructions might afford more or less mind-wandering
or mindlessness associated with the task. Observers randomly assigned to receive controlling
instructions reported more task-related and fewer task-unrelated thoughts at post-task, which
indicates that the type of task instructions play a role in attentional resources retained upon the
conclusion of the vigil.
Autonomous motivation, in addition to task type, and instruction type, was significantly
related to pre-task and post-task intrinsic motivation. This result suggests that participants higher
in autonomous motivation may have slightly more intrinsic motivation to perform the vigilance
task at post-task. Instruction type also significantly influenced post-task intrinsic motivation.
Participants receiving controlling instructions reported the most post-task intrinsic motivation
compared to participants receiving autonomy-supportive instructions (on average). Participants
receiving controlling instructions also reported slightly higher post-task success motivation (on
average). These results indicate that instruction manipulations can influence motivation and that
autonomy-supportive instruction, while it implies choice, may actually result in less motivation
upon conclusion of the task.

Stress and Workload

Achievement motivation had little effect on a majority of the stress-related measures,
with the exception of pre-task tense arousal and anger/frustration. Participants monitoring two
and four displays tended to report higher pre-task tense arousal, but lower pre-task
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anger/frustration than observers in the single display condition. However, achievement
motivation seemed to have the greatest impact on perceived global workload. Participants
monitoring one or two displays in either sensory condition reported some of the lowest global
workload. Observers in the cognitive condition monitoring four displays reported some of the
highest global workload. Manipulations to motivational instructions did not appear to affect
global workload.
Autonomous motivation affected pre-task tense arousal and post-task hedonic tone.
Interestingly, participants randomly assigned to the sensory task reported higher tense arousal,
whereas participants in the cognitive condition lower on this measure prior to completing the
vigil. Participants in the cognitive condition monitoring only one display had some of the lowest
tense arousal scores. In addition to effecting tense arousal, autonomous motivation was also
related to perceived global workload. Participants in the cognitive condition receiving controlling
instructions and monitoring four displays reported the most global workload; however,
participants in the sensory condition receiving autonomy-supportive instructions and monitoring
only one display reported the lowest global workload. Autonomy-supportive instructions seemed
to reduce workload in most cases, except when participants were randomly assigned to monitor
four displays, which require significantly more information processing, which apparently offset
the benefits of the autonomy-supportive instructions.

Performance

Autonomous motivation and achievement motivation influenced vigilance performance
over time, but did so in dramatically different ways. For example, achievement motivation
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played a role in the proportion of correct detections over time, but autonomous motivation
significantly interacted with task type, instruction type, source complexity, and period on watch,
to affect the proportion of correct detections observed over time. In nearly every sensory
condition, the traditional vigilance decrement tended to manifest over time, with the exception of
participants in the sensory condition who received autonomy-supportive instructions and
monitored only one display.
Performance in the cognitive condition tended to be more variable and potentially
indicative of the vigilance increment, which is an increase in performance over time (Loeb et al.,
1988; Sprague, 1981). Participants in the cognitive condition who received controlling
instructions and monitored either one or two displays demonstrated a decrease in performance
early on in the vigil, but subsequently indicated an improvement in performance in the last
periods on watch. It could be the case that autonomous motivation results in observers become
more aware of their performance over time, which would explain some of the variable increases
in performance (i.e., motivation drives compensation for poorer performance). For example,
participants high in autonomous motivation in the cognitive condition may realize their
performance is declining, thus these individuals direct more resources toward performing the
task well and improve from each period on watch. In sensory conditions, individuals may be less
aware of performance declines over time due to the limited number of information processing
requirements associated with this task.
In terms of false alarms, achievement motivation and autonomous motivation, in addition
to the number of displays, influenced the number of false alarms during the vigil. Several
interesting findings were observed in relation to the false alarm data that were not hypothesized.
First, it is worth noting that in two cognitive conditions participants committed zero false alarms.
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Secondly, participants in the sensory condition who received autonomy-supportive instructions
and monitored four displays demonstrated an increase in false alarms over time. This group also
demonstrated some of the greatest standard errors surrounding the number of false alarms over
time. The number of false alarms committed by participants in the sensory conditions tended to
be variable with a trend toward a slight increase in the number of false alarms over time. In most
instances, participants in the cognitive conditions demonstrated a numerical decline in the
number of false alarms committed throughout the vigil.
Achievement motivation and autonomous motivation did not appear to have a robust
effect on mean response time except in Experiment Four. In this experiment, there were
significant interactions between achievement motivation and autonomous motivation based on
task type, instruction type, and source complexity. Response time varied across conditions,
however in two conditions there was a significant decrease in mean response time over the
course of the vigil: participants in the cognitive condition who received autonomy-supportive
instructions and monitored two displays and participants in the sensory condition with
autonomy-supportive instructions who monitored four displays. In many conditions, response
time tended to increase. There was a trend toward an increase in response time in nearly all of
the sensory conditions, whereas response time was variable (i.e., fluctuating between increases
and decreases or vice versa) in the cognitive conditions.
Achievement motivation and autonomous motivation demonstrated the greatest impact
on sensitivity and response bias in Experiment Four. Achievement motivation and autonomous
motivation influenced sensitivity toward critical signals based on task type, instruction type, and
number of displays. In most of the cognitive conditions, sensitivity tended to increase over time,
which indicates that individuals were better able to discern critical signals from non-signals.
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However, in the sensory conditions, sensitivity tended to decline variably (with the exception of
participants in the sensory condition receiving controlling instructions and monitoring two
displays where sensitivity actually increased over time). For example, observers in the sensory
condition receiving controlling instructions and monitoring four displays became steadily less
sensitive to differences between signals and non-signals over time.
In terms of response bias, there were extremely inconsistent findings between task type,
instruction type, and number of displays; however, response bias trended toward the same
pattern over time. This indicates that response criteria shifted dramatically from liberal and
conservative responding throughout the course of the vigil. This could be due in part to
individual differences in motivation or potentially due to a third variable which was not
measured in the present dissertation.
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CHAPTER NINE: GENERAL DISCUSSION

An overarching goal for this dissertation was test the assumption that the vigilance
decrement is a manifestation of task design and individual differences (Hancock, 2013, 2016).
Thinking in this same vein, it could then be argued that the antithesis is also true: the vigilance
decrement is a phenomenon that can be offset by thoughtful task design, which could include
designing for motivational affordances (Szalma, 2014) or individual differences in trait or state
motivation. It was established in this dissertation that in order to cognitively engage participants
in the vigilance task, several features were required: 1) a true cognitive aspect, such as symbolic
processing and manipulation (i.e., processing beyond that required of sensory vigilance tasks), 2)
an optimal degree of complexity and information processing demands, and 3) a consideration of
individual differences in autonomous motivation. Given this, future research could serve to
integrate these features into the operationalization of cognitive vigilance tasks, especially since
there is little cohesion in the literature for the definition of cognitive vigilance tasks.
Furthermore, the four studies performed in this dissertation extended the research on
motivation and vigilance. In each study, it was demonstrated that achievement motivation and
autonomous motivation may play a role in vigilance performance and signal detection.
Importantly, it was found that achievement motivation and autonomous motivation act distinctly
in vigilance performance, as well as in perceived stress and workload, and motivation and
engagement post-task. Moreover, these four studies provided partial support for the resourcedepletion account of vigilance and did not indicate a great degree of support for mindlessness
theory or mind-wandering theory, which are two information processing theories currently
utilized in the literature to explain the performance decrement. For example, the pattern of
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response across measures of motivation, stress, and performance tended to support the resource
account of the vigilance decrement.
This dissertation also demonstrated that achievement motivation and autonomous
motivation are individual differences that should be considered in tasks that require vigilance.
Both types of motivation appear to be involved in the cognitive engagement associated with the
task, especially in post-task engagement. For example, both autonomous motivation and
achievement motivation were significantly related to more task-related thoughts at post-task,
more concentration at pre-task and post-task, and fewer task-unrelated thoughts, which is
indicative of less mind-wandering and more cognitive engagement with the task upon conclusion
of the vigil.
Finally, there were several significant findings that supported the examination of
achievement motivation and autonomous motivation in each of the experiments. Each significant
result for task motivation and task engagement, workload and stress, performance, and
sensitivity and response bias across achievement motivation and autonomous motivation are
reiterated below in Tables 24-27 for purposes of clarity.
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Table 24. The table below includes the significant results for measures of engagement and
motivation across each experiment (N = 398).
Covariate
Achievement
Motivation

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)
1) Main effect
of AchM on
pre-task
energetic
arousal
2) Main effect
of task type on
post-task
energetic
arousal

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)
1) Interaction
between task type
and number of
displays on posttask taskunrelated
thoughts

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)
1) Interaction
between AchM and
task type on posttask intrinsic
motivation
2) Interaction
between AchM and
task type on pre-task
concentration
3) Interaction
between instruction
type and task type
on pre-task
concentration
4) Interaction
between instruction
type and task type
on pre-task taskunrelated thoughts
5) Main effect of
AchM on pre-task
energetic arousal
6) Main effect of
AchM on post-task
energetic arousal

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
1) Interaction between
AchM, instruction type,
task type, and number of
displays on pre-task
intrinsic motivation
2) Interaction between
AchM, instruction type,
task type, and number of
displays on post-task
concentration
3) Interaction between
AchM, instruction type,
task type, and number of
displays on post-task
task-unrelated thoughts
4) Interaction between
AchM, task type, and
number of displays on
post-task concentration
5) Interaction between
AchM and instruction
type on pre-task intrinsic
motivation
6) Interaction between
instruction type, task
type, and number of
displays on post-task
concentration
7) Interaction between
instruction type, task
type, and number of
displays on post-task
task-unrelated thoughts
8) Interaction between
task type and number of
displays on post-task
concentration
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Covariate

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
9) Interaction between
AchM and number of
displays on post-task
task-unrelated thoughts
10) Main effect of
AchM on post-task
success motivation
11) Main effect of
AchM on pre-task
energetic arousal
12) Main effect of
AchM on post-task taskunrelated thoughts
13) Main effect of
number of displays on
post-task task-unrelated
thoughts
14) Main effect of
instruction type on pretask intrinsic motivation

Autonomous
Motivation

1) Main effect
of AuM on
post-task
energetic
arousal
2) Main effect
of AuM on
pre-task
intrinsic
motivation
3) Main effect
of condition
on post-task
intrinsic
motivation

1) Interaction
between task
type, AuM, and
number of
displays on posttask energetic
arousal
2) Main effect of
number of
displays on posttask energetic
arousal
3) Main effect of
task type on posttask
concentration

4) Main effect
of AuM on
post-task taskunrelated

1) Interaction
between task type,
AuM, and
instruction type on
pre-task
concentration
2) Interaction
between instruction
type and AuM on
pre-task
concentration
3) Interaction
between AuM and
instruction type on
post-task taskunrelated thoughts
4) Main effect of
AuM on pre-task
energetic arousal
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1) Interaction between
instruction type, task
type, and AuM on posttask intrinsic motivation
2) Interaction between
number of displays and
AuM on post-task
intrinsic motivation
3) Interaction between
instruction type and task
type on post-task
intrinsic motivation
4) Interaction between
instruction type and
AuM on pre-task
success motivation
5) Interaction between
task type, number of

Covariate

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)
thoughts

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)
5) Main effect of
AuM on post-task
energetic arousal

displays, and AuM on
post-task energetic
arousal

6) Main effect of
AuM on post-task
success motivation

6) Interaction between
task type and number of
displays on post-task
energetic arousal

7) Main effect of
AuM on pre-task
intrinsic motivation

7) Main effect of AuM
on post-task success
motivation

8) Main effect of
AuM on pre-task
concentration

8) Main effect of AuM
on pre-task intrinsic
motivation

9) Main effect of
AuM on post-task
concentration

9) Main effect of
instruction type on pretask success motivation

10) Main effect of
AuM on pre-task
task-unrelated
thoughts

10) Main effect of
instruction type on pretask energetic arousal

11) Main effect of
AuM on post-task
task-unrelated
thoughts
12) Main effect of
instruction type on
pre-task
concentration
13) Main effect of
instruction type on
post-task
concentration

219

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)

11) Main effect of
number of displays on
post-task intrinsic
motivation

Table 25. The table below includes the significant results for measures of stress and workload
across each experiment (N = 398).
Covariate
Achievement
Motivation

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)
1) Main effect of
task type on posttask tense arousal

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)
1) Interaction between
instruction type, task
type, and AchM on
global workload
2) Interaction between
instruction type and
task type on global
workload
3) Interaction between
instruction type and
AchM on global
workload
4) Main effect of
AchM on pre-task
hedonic tone
5) Main effect of
AchM on post-task
hedonic tone

Autonomous
Motivation

1) Main
effect of
AuM on
post-task
tense
arousal
2) Main
effect of
AuM on
post-task
hedonic
tone

1) Main effect of
AuM on post-task
hedonic tone

1) Main effect of AuM
on post-task tense
arousal
2) Main effect of AuM
on pre-task hedonic
tone
3) Main effect of AuM
on post-task hedonic
tone

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
1) Interaction between
instruction type, task
type, number of displays,
and AchM on global
workload
2) Interaction between
number of displays and
AchM on pre-task tense
arousal
3) Interaction between
number of displays and
AchM on pre-task
anger/frustration
4) Main effect of number
of displays on pre-task
tense arousal
5) Main effect of number
of displays on pre-task
anger/frustration
1) Interaction between
instruction type, task
type, number of displays,
and AuM on pre-task
tense arousal
2) Interaction between
instruction type, task
type, and number of
displays on pre-task tense
arousal
3) Interaction between
task type and AuM on
pre-task tense arousal

3) Main
effect of
AuM on
pre-task
anger/frustr
ation

4) Interaction between
AuM and instruction type
on global workload
5) Interaction between
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Covariate

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)
4) Main
effect of
AuM on
post-task
anger/frustr
ation

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
instruction type and task
type on global workload
6) Main effect of AuM on
post-task tense arousal
7) Main effect of AuM on
post-task hedonic tone
8) Main effect of task
type on pre-task tense
arousal
9) Main effect of
instruction type on global
workload
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Table 26. The table below includes the significant results for measures of performance across
each experiment (N = 398).
Covariate
Achievement
Motivation

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)
1) Main effect of
period on number
of false alarms

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)
1) Main effect of
period on number
of false alarms

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
1) Interaction between
period, number of displays,
and AchM on false alarms
2) Interaction between
period and number of
displays on false alarms
3) Interaction between
period, AchM, task type,
and number of displays on
response time
4) Interaction between
period, instruction type,
task type, and AchM on
response time
5) Interaction between
period, task type, and
number of displays on
response time
6) Interaction between
period, instruction type, and
task type on response time
7) Main effect of AchM on
proportion of correct
detections

Autonomous
Motivation

1) Main
effect of
period on
number of
false
alarms

1) Interaction
between period,
number of
displays, and AuM
on response time
2) Interaction
between period
and task type on
response time
3) Interaction
between period
and number of

1) Interaction
between instruction
type, task type, and
AuM on proportion
of correct
detections
2) Interaction
between instruction
type and task type
on proportion of
correct detections
3) Interaction
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1) Interaction between
period, task type, number of
displays, and AuM on
proportion of correct
detections
2) Interaction between
period and task type on
proportion of correct
detections
3) Interaction between
AuM and period on
proportion of correct

Covariate

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)
displays on
response time
4) Main effect of
period on
proportion of
correct detections

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)
between instruction
type and AuM on
proportion of
correct detections
4) Main effect of
instruction type on
proportion of
correct detections
5) Main effect of
period on
proportion of
correct detections

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
detections
4) Interaction between
number of displays and
AuM on false alarms
5) Interaction between
period, task type, number of
displays, and AuM on
response time
6) Interaction between
period, instruction type,
task type, and AuM on
response time
7) Interaction between
period, instruction type,
number of displays, and
AuM on response time
8) Interaction between
period, instruction type,
task type, and number of
displays on response time
9) Interaction between
period, instruction type, and
AuM on response time
10) Interaction between
period, task type, and
number of displays on
response time
11) Interaction between
period, instruction type and
number of displays on
response time
12) Interaction between
period, instruction type, and
task type on response time
13) Interaction between
period and number displays
on response time
14) Main effect of period
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Covariate

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
on proportion of correct
detections
15) Main effect of task type
on proportion of correct
detections
16) Main effect of AuM on
proportion of correct
detections
17) Main effect of period
on false alarms
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Table 27. The table below includes the significant results for measures of sensitivity and
response bias across each experiment (N = 398).
Covariate
Achievement
Motivation

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)
1) Main effect
of period on
sensitivity

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)
1) Main effect of
task type on
sensitivity

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
1) Interaction between period,
instruction type, task type,
number of displays, and
AchM on sensitivity
2) Interaction between AchM,
instruction type, task type,
and number of displays on
sensitivity
3) Interaction between period,
instruction type, task type,
and number of displays on
sensitivity
4) Interaction between
instruction type, task type,
and number of displays on
sensitivity
5) Interaction between
instruction type, task type,
number of displays, and
AchM on response bias
6) Interaction between period,
instruction type, task type,
and number of displays on
response bias
7) Interaction between
instruction type, task type,
and number of displays on
response bias

Autonomous
Motivation

1) Interaction
between period
and AuM on
response bias

1) Interaction between period
and AuM on sensitivity
2) Interaction between period,
task type, and AuM on
response bias
3) Interaction between period
and AuM on response bias
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Covariate

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
4) Interaction between task
type and period on response
bias
5) Main effect of period on
sensitivity
6) Main effect of period on
response bias

Implications for Motivation and Engagement in Vigilance

There have been few published studies in the extant literature on vigilance focused on the
effect of manipulations to motivation on performance. The present dissertation investigated
motivation and engagement through three distinct, but interrelated, lenses: 1) motivation as both
a state and trait individual difference (i.e., autonomous motivation and achievement motivation),
2) motivation through task design (i.e., manipulations to the type of task and source complexity),
and 3) motivation through instructional design (i.e., autonomy-supportive vs. controlling
instructions).
The results of the four studies included in this dissertation demonstrated that achievement
motivation, which is motivation to experience success, and autonomous motivation, which is
motivation to experience choice, significantly influence cognitive state, specifically energetic
arousal, success motivation, intrinsic motivation, concentration, task-related, and task-unrelated
thoughts. However, achievement motivation and autonomous motivation act differently on
measures of engagement depending on the type of task, type of instructions administered, and the
degree of source complexity. For example, in Experiment Four post-task concentration and posttask task-unrelated thoughts were significantly dependent upon achievement motivation, task
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type, source complexity, and instruction type. There was also a main effect of achievement
motivation on post-task success motivation, pre-task energetic arousal, and post-task taskunrelated thoughts. These results support previous findings from Experiments Two and Three,
which demonstrated that achievement motivation is implicated in the perception of engagement
in the task and motivation to perform the task at pre- and post-task. Juxtaposing this, Experiment
Four indicated that autonomous motivation was significantly related to post-task energetic
arousal, post-task intrinsic motivation, and post-task task-unrelated thoughts through main
effects and in combination with task type, instruction type, and source complexity.
Across each of the four experiments it was demonstrated that both achievement
motivation and autonomous motivation influenced post-task task-unrelated thoughts. However,
achievement motivation was linked to concentration more frequently than autonomous
motivation, which tended to interact more frequently with energetic arousal and intrinsic
motivation. This is not necessarily surprising given that autonomous motivation is a subfactor of
the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory, which is rooted in self-determination theory. But, this is of
particular interest given that vigilance tasks do not exert a great deal of motivational affordances
or even necessarily intrinsically motivating to perform by nature. Achievement motivation may
have more to do with task focus (i.e., task concentration) than task engagement or task
motivation.
In addition to state and trait motivation, the results of this doctoral work indicated that the
type of task and complexity associated with the task also influence task engagement and selfreported motivation to perform the vigilance task. This research also suggests that the vigilance
decrement is iatrogenically created, as well as implies that motivation and engagement are too
induced by the design of the task. Thus, motivational design, which is afforded in this case by
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task type and source complexity, not only influenced the performance decrement, but also
affected subjective reports of motivation and engagement at pre- and post-task. For example,
task type (i.e., cognitive or sensory) and source complexity (i.e., number of displays)
significantly influenced the degree of post-task task-unrelated thoughts, post-task concentration,
post-task intrinsic motivation, and post-task energetic arousal, across each of the four studies in
this dissertation (and when autonomous motivation or achievement motivation was accounted for
as a covariate).
The results of this dissertation, particularly Experiments Three and Four, indicated that
the type of instructions could also impact the task engagement and task motivation associated
with vigilance. Interestingly, autonomy-supportive instructions, while these instructions imply
choice, may actually result in less motivation toward the task upon conclusion of the vigil, at
least when task type and the degree of source complexity are taken into account. In many
autonomy-supportive instruction conditions, performance was actually poorer than anticipated. It
is also possible that the autonomy-supportive manipulation to instructions (as opposed to
potentially stronger manipulations, which may include the choice over rest breaks or the choice
to leave the study early) was too weak to elicit an effect.
For example, in Experiment Four participants in the autonomy-supportive group tended
to succumb to the vigilance decrement (particularly participants in the sensory four-display
condition) and demonstrated some of the most liberal response bias and decreased sensitivity
over time. Furthermore, participants in the controlling motivation condition demonstrated some
of the best performance (i.e., many correct detections, few if any false alarms). It is possible that
motivational instruction manipulations may prime participants to respond in a particular, which
influences both motivation and engagement to perform the vigilance task, as well as performance
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in the task itself. However, the latter is a proposition that will require further empirical testing in
the future.

Implications for Theories of Vigilance and Information Processing

Another purpose of this dissertation was to examine the degree to which the results
supported resource theory, mindlessness theory, or mind-wandering theory, which are three
theories of information processing that attempt to explain the vigilance decrement. To
recapitulate, resource theory suggests that the vigilance decrement occurs due to a depletion of
mental resources, which enable individuals to process information and respond to critical signals,
as well as avoid false alarms. Resource theory implies a greater performance decrement will be
observed in more demanding tasks due to the increase in the utilization of more information
processing resources, which are being depleted due to the demand and time on task.
Conversely, mind-wandering theory suggests that the decrement occurs, not necessarily
because of resource depletion, but because attention is directed away from the task primarily by
task-unrelated thoughts. Mind-wandering theory posits that this cognitive ‘drifting away’ from
the task can be either intentional (i.e., the individual purposefully allows their mind to wander) or
unintentional (i.e., attention slips away from the task), which may manifest behaviorally as fewer
physical responses to critical signals (i.e., button presses for correct detections; Thomson et al.,
2015). Mind-wandering theory also implies that greater cognitive engagement can be established
when the task is designed to be more behaviorally engaging (see Thomson et al., 2015; Pop et
al., 2012). Like resource theory, mind-wandering somewhat suggests (albeit, it is not directly
stated, but rather implied) that the task can be designed to afford more or less engagement, but
229

suggests behavioral engagement equates to cognitive engagement, which is most akin to a
misnomer.
Furthermore, the third information processing theory that seeks to explain the vigilance
decrement is mindlessness theory. Like mind-wandering theory, mindlessness theory suggests
that the decrement is a result of under-stimulation of the mind during vigilance, ultimately
resulting in the performance decrement. Supporters in favor of this theory suggest that the mind
becomes “thoughtless” after a period of time, which occurs due to the monotony of vigilance
performance (Manley et al., 1999; Robertson et al., 1997). This results in a pattern of automatic
responding over time. However, one major distinction between mind-wandering theory and
mindlessness theory is what happens to attentional processes during the vigil. Mindlessness does
not describe what happens to attention rather this theory merely suggests that the mind becomes
blank, which implies that there are no inward or outward thoughts. Moreover, mindlessness
theory does not discuss the mechanism of recovery of attention, nor does this theory discuss
where the mind goes during vigilance.
The evidence in supporting of each of these theories is included in Table 28. An
overwhelming proportion of the significant results supported resource theory, which also argues
that vigilance tasks are accompanied by high workload and stress. The results from Experiments
Two, Three, and Four indicated that global workload increased in conditions that were more
complex and required symbolic processing (i.e., the cognitive task). Similarly, measures of stress
(i.e., tense arousal and anger/frustration) tended to increase between pre-task and post-task,
which are results that were consistently demonstrated across all four experiments. These results
favor the resource-depletion account of the vigilance decrement.
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Moreover, measures of task engagement (i.e., task-related thoughts, task-unrelated
thoughts, concentration, and energetic arousal) also indicated support for resource theory. For
example, task-related thoughts and energetic arousal increased pre-post vigil across each of the
experiments. This indicates that these tasks are at least somewhat engaging to perform and that
participants were interested in their performance on the task at post-task, which is implied by the
increase in task-related thoughts and decrease in task-unrelated thoughts over time (albeit, in
most of the conditions).
In many instances, correct detection performance initially declined in the cognitive
condition and then increased over time, which could be considered a vigilance increment. This
claim is supported by several significant interactions between measures of performance, such as
proportion of correct detections, number of false alarms, and response time with autonomous
motivation or achievement motivation. There were also significant, positive correlations between
these individual differences and measures of performance, which indicated that higher
motivation scores were associated with improved performance in specific periods on watch.
Again, this evidence tends to favor the resource theory of vigilance performance.
In order to demonstrate support for mind-wandering theory or mindlessness theory, there
should not be an increase in energetic arousal or task-related thoughts between pre-task and posttask. Instead, the opposite should be observed: an increase in task-unrelated thoughts and
decreases in task-related thoughts, concentration, and energetic arousal. There was only partial
evidence from Experiments Two, Three, and Four to support either of these theories.
Furthermore, there should be no difference across task types or variations in source
complexity in terms of measures of stress and workload according to mind-wandering theory and
mindlessness theory. These theories of information processing do not distinguish between task

231

type effects. In sum, mind-wandering theory and mindlessness theory posit that vigilance is
vigilance and will be accompanied by a decline in performance over time regardless of source
complexity or task type because a vigilance task is ultimately perceived as monotonous and
boring.
In that vein, is important to note that the traditional vigilance decrement was only
observed in specific instances across each of the experiments. In Experiment Two, the vigilance
decrement was observed in only the sensory four-display condition. In Experiment Three, the
vigilance decrement was observed in both the autonomy-supportive and controlling instruction
sensory conditions, but not in any of the cognitive conditions. In Experiment Four, the vigilance
decrement was observed in sensory condition where participants received the autonomysupportive instructions and monitored two displays, the sensory condition where participants
received the controlling instructions and monitored two displays, the sensory condition where
participants received controlling instructions and monitored four displays, and, the cognitive
condition where participants received autonomy-supportive instructions and monitored two
displays. In Experiment One, a vigilance decrement was not observed for either task type.
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Table 28. The table below includes the results of each experiment supporting evidence for each
of the above information processing theories (N = 398).
Theory
Resource
Theory

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)
1) Energetic
arousal increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type
2) TRTs
increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type
3) TUTs
decreased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type
4) Tense arousal
increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type
5)
Anger/frustration
increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)
1) Energetic
arousal increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type and
source complexity

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)
1) Energetic
arousal increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type and
instruction type

2) TRTs increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type and
source complexity

2) TRTs increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type and
instruction type

3) Tense arousal
increased between
pre- and post-task
across task type
and source
complexity

3) TUTs decreased
between pre- and
post-task in the
cognitive task

4)
Anger/frustration
increased between
pre- and post-task
across task type
and source
complexity
5) High global
workload was
reported for
participants in the
cognitive task
6) High global
workload was
reported for
participants
monitoring one or
four displays

4) TUTs decreased
between pre- and
post-task across
instruction type
5) Tense arousal
increased between
pre- and post-task
across task type
and instruction type
6)
Anger/frustration
increased between
pre- and post-task
across task type
and instruction type
7) High global
workload was
reported for
participants in the
cognitive task

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
1) Energetic arousal
increased between
pre- and post-task
across task type,
instruction type, and
source complexity
2) TRTs increased
between pre- and
post-task across task
type, instruction type,
and source
complexity
3) TUTs decreased
between pre- and
post-task across task
type and instruction
type
4) TUTs decreased
between pre- and
post-task for
participants
monitoring one or
four displays
5) Tense arousal
increased between
pre- and post-task
across task type,
instruction type, and
source complexity
6) Anger/frustration
increased between
pre- and post-task
across task type,
instruction type, and
source complexity
7) High global
workload was
reported for
participants in the
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Theory

EXP. ONE
(N = 79)

EXP. TWO
(N = 105)

EXP. THREE
(N = 93)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 121)
cognitive task
8) Global workload
increased as source
complexity increased

Mindlessness
Theory

1) Concentration
decreased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type
2) Low global
workload was
reported across
task type

1) Concentration
decreased between
pre- and post-task
across task type
and source
complexity
2) Lower global
workload was
reported for
participants in the
sensory task

1) Concentration
decreased between
pre- and post-task
across task type
and instruction type

1) Concentration
decreased between
pre- and post-task
across task type,
instruction type, and
source complexity

2) Lower global
workload was
reported across
instruction type

3) Lower global
workload was
reported for
participants
monitoring two
displays
Mindwandering
Theory

1) Low global
workload was
reported across
task type

1) TUTs increased
between pre- and
post-task across
task type and
source complexity
2) Lower global
workload was
reported for
participants in the
sensory task

1) TUTs increased
in the sensory task
2) Lower global
workload was
reported across
instruction type

3) Lower global
workload was
reported for
participants
monitoring two
displays

Note. TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs = task-unrelated thoughts.
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1) TUTs increased in
the two-display
conditions only
2) Low global
workload was
reported across
instruction type
3) Lower global
workload was
reported for
participants in the
sensory task

Limitations to this Work and Future Directions

This dissertation is not without its limitations. For example, there was a great deal of
attrition in the cognitive conditions in nearly all of the experiments, especially in instances where
participants were required to monitor four displays (i.e., Experiments Two and Four).
Anecdotally, many participants (who tended to be removed from the study during data cleaning)
randomly assigned to the cognitive condition noted that monitoring the four displays for critical
signals was extremely difficult. In other conditions, participants tended to report that monitoring
one display (despite the task being either cognitive or sensory) was very boring and monotonous.
They reported similar suggestions central to the idea of making the task more engaging. While
this is anecdotal evidence, it does align with previous findings, which suggests that vigilance
need not be vigilance, if the individual can achieve a sort of “flow state” or the difficulty of the
task is “titrated” to match the capacity of the individual. Again, this dissertation did demonstrate
that the vigilance decrement is likely a manifestation of task design.
In addition to task type, future vigilance research could examine the effect of different
instructional sets. For example, in the present dissertation, the effect of autonomy-supportive
instructions on vigilance performance was not as hypothesized, especially in terms of response
bias and criterion shifting. Autonomy-supportive instructions tended to result in participants
responding more liberally to false alarms. In some conditions, instruction type actually lowered
post-task motivation to perform the vigilance task and altered engagement in the vigil at pre-task.
Furthermore, participants in the controlling instruction condition tended to demonstrate better
performance most likely because they performed exactly as directed.
It is not the goal of this dissertation to argue that one form of instructions are more
important over another, rather the purpose of testing different instructional sets was to
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empirically demonstrate that task framing can influence task perception and performance. In that
vein, combinations of instruction types were not studied in the present dissertation (i.e., initially
autonomy-supportive instructions seguing into controlling instructions) and it is likely the case
that a combination of instruction types will be necessary to maximize the potential for optimal
performance. In terms of future research, it could also be useful to revisit the early work in
vigilance, which framed the task as a “challenge,” considering there has been little work in this
area since these original studies. Future research could also explore other successful
manipulations to task instructions involving motivation (i.e., rationale, acknowledgement,
choice/autonomy) and examine the effect of these instructions on vigilance performance (see
Deci et al., 1994).
Finally, another limitation to this dissertation was the lack of consistency in the results
from experiment to experiment. For example, trait or state motivation would correlate to
response time in one experiment, but not in another. In some conditions a decrement was
observed, but not across subsequent experiments. In some conditions there was fluctuation in
performance from period to period (e.g., sensitivity and response bias in Experiment Four), and
in some instances there was an increment in performance between pre- and post-task (albeit after
an initial decline). While the results are not necessarily clean, there are several implications
based on these findings: 1) replication of this work is required within the laboratory and outside
of the laboratory to provide support for the effect of motivation, or potential lack of effect of
motivation, in vigilance, and 2), future research should extend the length of the vigil to observe
the long-term effects of achievement motivation and autonomous motivation on vigilance
performance.
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To conclude, this dissertation resulted in several theoretical and practical implications,
which could be used to guide future research involving vigilance performance. First, it was
demonstrated across several studies that autonomous motivation and achievement motivation
were two covariates related to task engagement, perceived stress, perceived workload, and
vigilance performance. Each of type of motivation affects these measures differently. For
example, autonomous motivation covaried more often with pre- and post-task measures of task
engagement, pre- and post-task measures of perceived stress, and interacted with measures of
vigilance performance, whereas achievement motivation covaried more often with workload and
response time measures. These results indicated that it is important to consider individual
differences in motivation in various types of vigilance tasks (i.e., complex, simple, sensory,
cognitive). Motivational manipulations to task instructions also influence task engagement,
perceived stress, perceived workload, and vigilance performance. In sum, the results of this
dissertation indicated that motivation is an important construct to consider in the measurement of
sustained attention and design of tasks requiring vigilance. In terms of practical application,
motivation could also be used a selection tool to screen for individuals high or low in either of
achievement motivation or autonomous motivation, which could result in better performance on
real-world vigilance tasks.
Additionally, the patterns of the task engagement, perceived stress, and vigilance
performance data tended to support the resource-depletion account of the vigilance decrement
across the four experiments presented in this dissertation. For example, task-related thoughts
increased (in most cases) at post-task and task-unrelated thoughts tended to decrease post-vigil,
which is not in line with mind-wandering theory or mindlessness theory. The results from the
stress measures also align with a resource interpretation, or overload account, of the data.
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Participants indicated worry and concern with their performance at post-task and tended to report
higher perceived stress and workload post-vigil, which is indicative of capacity limitations and
that energy is being drained over time. There was extremely limited support for mindlessness
theory (i.e., vigilance decrement results from automaticity) or mind-wandering theory (i.e.,
intentional or unintentional perceptual withdrawal). This theoretical extension will aid in better
understanding the relationship between motivation and attention in practical settings that require
vigilance, such as baggage screening, improvised explosive device (IED) detection, and
thwarting cyber-attacks.
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AchM
AuM

EXP. ONE
AchM
AuM
-.049
-.049
-

EXP. TWO
AchM
AuM
-.051
-.051
-

EXP. THREE
AchM
AuM
-.145
-

EXP. FOUR
AchM AuM
-.137
-

Pre-Success
Motivation
Post-Success
Motivation
Pre-Intrinsic
Motivation
Post-Intrinsic
Motivation
PreConcentration
PostConcentration
Pre-Energetic
Arousal
PostEnergetic
Arousal
Pre-TRTs

-.105

.099

.136

.147

-.156

.106

-.110

.024

-.124

.163

-.109

.227

-.295**

.330**

-.327**

.256*

.082

.261

.041

.344**

-.033

.247

-.067

.250*

-.095

.426**

-.032

.355**

-.009

.048

-.076

-.001

.027

.272

-.144

.217

.039

.497**

-.225

.141

-.015

.297*

-.016

.054

-.022

.347**

-.190

.172

-.265

.036

-.286**

.161

-.385**

.270*

-.248*

.112

-.269

.270

-.160

.165

-.326**

.347**

-.226

.206

-.152

-.150

.116

-.152

-.215

-.203

-.035

-.105

Post-TRTs
Pre-TUTs

-.105
-.191

-.018
-.176

-.052
.084

.113
-.183

-.159
-.070

-.074
-.321**

-.183
.003

-.094
-.198

Post-TUTs

-.044

-.268

-.032

-.143

-.023

-.396**

-.002

-.115

Note. * = p < .01. ** = Bonferroni correction of p < .004.
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Energetic
Arousal
Tense
Arousal
Hedonic
Tone

EXP. ONE
Pre
Post
16.57 17.28
(4.10) (4.18)
12.96 16.13
(4.08) (5.42)
25.63 22.16
(3.94) (4.27)

EXP. TWO
Pre
Post
16.56 17.17
(3.90) (4.18)
12.65 15.29
(3.40) (5.03)
25.46 22.22
(4.06) (3.95)

EXP. THREE
Pre
Post
16.99 17.57
(4.12) (5.05)
12.81 14.76
(3.35) (4.04)
25.38 22.52
(4.60) (4.21)

EXP. FOUR
Pre
Post
17.78 18.33
(3.78) (4.43)
12.97 15.71
(3.40) (4.72)
26.02 22.74
(4.20) (4.33)

Anger/
Frustration
Success
Motivation
Intrinsic
Motivation

7.77
(3.41)
20.91
(6.09)
24.87
(5.05)

11.29
(4.55)
19.80
(7.25)
15.34
(4.92)

8.00
(3.38)
13.91
(8.03)
21.32
(4.88)

10.83
(4.25)
18.79
(6.73)
11.63
(4.97)

7.89
(3.53)
20.02
(7.74)
18.05
(4.50)

10.42
(4.28)
19.39
(7.01)
12.26
(4.34)

7.69
(3.16)
20.24
(6.71)
17.50
(4.71)

9.92
(3.60)
20.00
(6.83)
12.50
(4.75)

Overall
Motivation
Self-Focused
Attention
Self-Esteem

3.39
(1.13)
22.41
(6.61)
11.28
(7.66)

2.76
(1.26)
18.66
(8.45)
15.86
(6.17)

2.25
(1.45)
13.21
(9.59)
17.59
(8.42)

2.75
(1.18)
16.66
(7.09)
16.41
(5.22)

3.14
(1.38)
17.41
(8.19)
13.83
(7.21)

2.82
(1.28)
16.02
(7.38)
17.42
(4.79)

3.11
(1.20)
19.59
(7.76)
12.51
(7.23)

2.92
(1.25)
17.58
(7.80)
15.60
(6.34)

Concentration

15.53
(6.08)
21.80
(4.78)
19.89
(7.94)

6.99
(6.95)
25.62
(7.31)
23.62
(7.20)

21.78
(6.00)
14.91
(8.21)
11.25
(8.38)

7.71
(6.65)
25.38
(7.57)
20.94
(6.16)

17.39
(6.46)
20.25
(7.12)
15.67
(7.81)

8.76
(7.02)
26.57
(7.39)
19.20
(6.13)

15.81
(6.45)
20.74
(5.42)
17.74
(8.34)

7.33
(6.95)
25.22
(7.51)
20.58
(7.04)

17.66 14.89
9.93
15.25 13.83 14.31
Task(14.89) (7.17) (8.72) (6.88) (7.91) (6.83)
Unrelated
Thoughts
Note. Numbers reported in parentheses are standard deviations.

16.96
(9.23)

16.21
(7.72)

Control/
Confidence
Task-Related
Thoughts
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Global
Workload
Mental
Demand
Temporal
Demand
Physical
Demand
Perceived
Performance

EXP. ONE
38.55
(13.27)

EXP. TWO
39.35
(12.84)

EXP. THREE
38.53
(13.96)

EXP. FOUR
40.13
(15.33)

36.58
(27.93)
35.44
(26.91)
9.34
(9.11)
41.98
(31.50)

36.61
(26.71)
28.26
(25.57)
9.96
(12.07)
53.75
(32.93)

35.10
(28.20)
25.68
(23.98)
12.56
(17.96)
46.59
(33.52)

41.69
(29.22)
28.98
(26.35)
10.47
(14.99)
52.11
(32.29)

30.87
29.91
32.06
(25.06)
(25.47)
(26.66)
34.84
32.81
31.52
Frustration
(33.10)
(30.55)
(31.12)
Note. Numbers reported in parentheses are standard deviations.
Effort
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35.04
(27.09)
31.54
(30.16)

APPENDIX F
CORRELATIONS WITH MEASURES OF STRESS AND WORKLOAD ACROSS ALL
STUDIES
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EXP. ONE
AchM
AuM
-.097
.006
-.044
-.240

EXP. TWO
AchM
AuM
.104
-.105
.062
-.212

-.042
-.126

.114
.460**

-.044
-.084

.268*
.402**

-.320**
-.300*

.314**
.427**

-.153
-.187

.099
.286**

-.007

-.300*

.114

-.277**

.132

-.274*

.159

-.148

.038

-.485**

.166

-.257

.097

-.343**

.132

-.173

.079
-.095

-.123
-.057

.130
.021

.025
.136

-.170
-.240

.028
.216

-.166
-.116

-.032
.162

-.100
-.080

-.105
.002

.111
.108

.034
-.008

.080
-.102

-.090
.012

.001
.145

.005
-.104

-.096

.010

-.007

.030

.102

.159

.058

-.048

.070

-.020

.111

.098

-.095

.121

-.068

.106

-.074 -.327** .081
-.128
Frustration
Note. * = p < .01. ** = Bonferroni correction p < .003.

.175

-.326** -.016

-.136

Pre-Tense Arousal
Post-Tense
Arousal
Pre-Hedonic Tone
Post-Hedonic
Tone
Pre-Anger/
Frustration
PostAnger/Frustration
Global Workload
Mental Demand
Temporal Demand
Physical Demand
Perceived
Performance
Effort
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EXP. THREE
AchM
AuM
.152
-.219
.082
-.295*

EXP. FOUR
AchM AuM
.071
-.080
-.080 -.134

APPENDIX G
CORRELATIONS WITH MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE ACROSS ALL STUDIES
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Period 1 Hits

EXP. ONE
AchM
AuM
.152
.118

EXP. TWO
AchM
AuM
-.012
.145

EXP. THREE
AchM
AuM
-.010
-.001

EXP. FOUR
AchM AuM
-.028 -.069

Period 2 Hits
Period 3 Hits
Period 4 Hits

-.098
.014
-.102

.123
.115
-.202

.038
-.036
-.023

.131
.306**
.048

-.015
.064
-.122

.035
.174
.000

.041
.030
-.022

.109
.115
.086

Overall Hits
Period 1 FAs
Period 2 FAs
Period 3 FAs

-.013
-.110
-.172
-.021

.144
-.141
-.048
-.199

-.008
-.119
.027
.084

.208
.039
.167
.032

-.034
-.007
-.021
.046

.076
-.128
-.024
-.233

.015
.155
.116
.114

.108
-.002
.190
.190

Period 4 FAs
Overall FAs
Period 1 RT
Period 2 RT

-.075
-.095
-.029
-.023

.073
-.175
-.186
-.289

.070
-.019
-.062
.016

-.133
.045
-.137
-.176

.214
.038
-.038
.039

-.063
-.167
.124
.023

.034
.139
-.039
-.086

.131
.142
-.051
-.154

-.165
-.249
.017
-.122
.004
-.069
-.086 -.140
Period 3 RT
-.025
-.278
.050
-.155
-.130
.109
.011
-.170
Period 4 RT
-.097
-.287
.059
-.175
.053
-.185
-.063
.109
Overall RT
Note. * = p < .01. ** = Bonferroni correction p < .003. Hits = proportion of correct detections.
FAs = number of false alarms. RT = mean response time.
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CORRELATIONS WITH MEASURES OF SENSITIVITY AND RESPONSE BIAS
ACROSS ALL STUDIES
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EXP. ONE
AchM AuM

EXP. TWO
AchM AuM

EXP. THREE
AchM AuM

EXP. FOUR
AchM
AuM

Sensitivity
Period 1

.194

.148

.093

.063

.036

-.029

.018

.164

Period 2

-.037

.116

.037

.014

-.015

.100

-.050

-.015

Period 3
Period 4

0.21
-.022

.176
.174

.014
-.055

.127
.099

.048
-.205

.165
.037

.018
-.001

-.180
-.017

Response Bias
Period 1

-.037

-.029

.111

.027

-.062

.022

-.026

.070

Period 2

.231

-.073

-.014

-.201

-.087

.042

-.127

-.149

.002
.000
.029
-.222
-.094
.147
.076
-.022
.052
-.081
Period 4
Note. * = p < .01. ** Bonferroni correction = p < .005.

-.023
.026

-.083
.041

-.254**
-.115

Period 3
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APPENDIX I
RELIABILITY OF THE ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION AND AUTONOMOUS
MOTIVATION MEASURES ACROSS ALL STUDIES
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Sample
Cronbach’s alpha (α) for
Achievement Motivation

EXP. ONE
.506

EXP. TWO
.523

EXP. THREE
.562

EXP. FOUR
.538

Cronbach’s alpha (α) for
.879
.795
.821
.805
Autonomous Motivation
N
79
105
93
121
Note. The Ray Achievement Motivation Scale (Ray, 1979) consisted of 14 items and the
Autonomy subscale of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (Deci et al., 1994; Ryan, 1982)
consisted of seven items.
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APPENDIX J
ENGAGEMENT, MOTIVATION, STRESS, AND WORKLOAD DATA FOR
EXCLUDED PARTICIPANTS ACROSS ALL STUDIES
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EXP. ONE
(N = 13)

EXP. TWO
(N = 19)

EXP. THREE
(N = 11)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 27)

20.69
(2.87)
30.92
(7.58)
15.62
(3.31)
18.54
(3.99)

21.32
(2.75)
34.53
(10.07)
16.00
(3.23)
17.37
(3.64)

27.64*
(9.82)
34.45
(10.08)
18.18
(3.79)
18.09
(6.24)

23.96
(4.92)
45.44** a
(2.53)
17.89
(3.83)
18.19
(3.87)

25.69
(4.79)
15.31
(4.13)
25.77*
(4.17)
19.69
(7.95)

18.68
(4.62)
9.16
(3.86)
9.05
(6.00)
19.58
(6.79)

25.82**
(3.06)
17.27**
(6.25)
20.82
(8.76)
25.82
(3.06)

22.74**
(5.52)
16.59* a
(6.57)
22.81
(6.49)
20.26
(7.50)

11.00*
(4.38)
7.00
(7.07)
20.46
(8.55)
23.46
(7.33)

25.74**a
(3.31)
10.89
(6.67)
8.37
(5.10)
19.95
(6.60)

16.00
(6.36)
7.82
(7.11)
16.27
(10.15)
19.09
(6.39)

13.59
(6.72)
8.19
(6.83)
20.78
(7.75)
21.74
(7.82)

14.69
(7.80)
12.69
(4.53)

8.63
(8.07)
15.42
(8.20)

12.91
(7.87)
13.45
(8.93)

19.78
(7.24)
14.67
(6.25)

13.54
(3.97)
21.31**
(5.44)

13.37
(3.89)
16.05
(4.10)

13.91
(3.11)
14.36
(2.77)

12.63
(3.80)
15.11
(4.53)

Motivation Measures
Achievement Motivation
Autonomous Motivation
Pre-Energetic Arousal
Post-Energetic Arousal
Pre-Intrinsic Motivation
Post-Intrinsic Motivation
Pre-Success Motivation
Post-Success Motivation

Engagement Measures
Pre-Concentration
Post-Concentration
Pre-TRTs
Post-TRTs
Pre-TUTs
Post-TUTs

Stress Measures
Pre-Tense Arousal
Post-Tense Arousal
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Pre-Hedonic Tone
Post-Hedonic Tone
Pre-Anger/Frustration
Post-Anger/Frustration

EXP. ONE
(N = 13)

EXP. TWO
(N = 19)

EXP. THREE
(N = 11)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 27)

25.46
(3.60)
18.31*
(4.11)
8.54
(4.48)
13.08
(4.82)

25.05
(4.72)
21.11
(3.83)
8.21
(3.05)
10.37
(4.02)

24.27
(2.87)
23.64
(3.07)
9.45
(3.14)
9.45
(2.62)

25.48
(4.38)
21.63
(5.32)
8.85
(3.58)
11.08
(4.05)

Workload Measures
Global Workload

48.38
38.98
40.36
43.01
(16.08)
(13.85)
(15.58)
(16.87)
Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. N = number of participants excluded for
performance deviations. TRTs = task-related thoughts. TUTs = task-unrelated thoughts. * = p <
.01. ** Bonferroni correction = p < .002. Significant results indicate a significant difference
between participants included in the experiment and participants excluded from the experiment. a
= equal variances not assumed.
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APPENDIX K
EFFECT SIZES FOR ENGAGEMENT, MOTIVATION, STRESS, AND WORKLOAD
DATA ACROSS EXCLUDED PARTICIPANTS FOR ALL EXPERIMENTS
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Cohen’s d
EXP. ONE
(N = 13)

EXP. TWO
(N = 19)

EXP. THREE
(N = 11)

EXP. FOUR
(N = 27)

Achievement Motivation

0.49

0.19

0.79

0.47

Autonomous Motivation
Pre-Energetic Arousal

0.46
0.25

0.10
0.16

0.05
0.30

1.66
0.03

Post-Energetic Arousal
Pre-Intrinsic Motivation
Post-Intrinsic Motivation

0.31
0.17
0.01

0.05
0.34
0.56

0.09
2.02
0.93

0.03
1.02
0.71

Pre-Success Motivation
Post-Success Motivation

0.93
0.01

0.69
0.12

0.10
1.19

0.39
0.04

Engagement Measures
Pre-Concentration
Post-Concentration
Pre-TRTs

0.85
0.001
0.07

0.82
0.48
0.42

0.22
0.13
0.07

0.34
0.12
0.38

Post-TRTs
Pre-TUTs
Post-TUTs

0.02
0.37
0.37

0.15
0.15
0.02

0.02
0.17
0.11

0.16
0.34
0.22

Stress Measures
Pre-Tense Arousal

0.14

0.20

0.34

0.09

Post-Tense Arousal
Pre-Hedonic Tone

0.95
0.05

0.17
0.09

0.12
0.29

0.13
0.13

Post-Hedonic Tone
Pre-Anger/Frustration
Post-Anger/Frustration

0.92
0.19
0.38

0.29
0.07
0.11

0.30
0.50
0.27

0.23
0.34
0.30

Workload Measures
Global Workload

0.67

0.02

0.12

0.18

Motivation Measures
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